Sample Brief Previously Submitted By A Student In BUAD

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Analyze the case of KELO et al. v. CITY OF NEW LONDON, focusing on the legal issues surrounding eminent domain and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Summarize the facts of the case, explain the Court’s decision and reasoning, and discuss the various dissenting opinions, including their arguments about the limits of eminent domain and public use. Conclude with your personal opinion on whether the taking of private property for economic development aligns with constitutional protections.

Paper For Above instruction

The case of KELO et al. v. CITY OF NEW LONDON is a landmark Supreme Court decision addressing the scope and limits of eminent domain under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. At the core of the case lies the question of whether the government’s use of eminent domain to transfer private property to other private entities for economic development constitutes "public use" as mandated by the Fifth Amendment, which states that private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation.

The facts of the case reveal that after the closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in New London, the city reactivated the New London Development Corporation (NLDC)—a non-profit organization—aiming to develop the vacated land in the Fort Trumbull area. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals expressed an interest in establishing a research and production facility on the site. Consequently, the city, through the NLDC, acquired over 90 acres of land—including property owned by private individuals—via eminent domain, intending to use the land for residential, recreational, retail, marina, industrial, and other urban renewal projects. The majority of private owners sold their property, but 15 owners refused, citing emotional and sentimental reasons rather than financial compensation. The city’s plans, backed by a development plan deemed “carefully considered,” sought to revitalize the area, a goal consistent with previous cases upholding government takings for redevelopment (Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.; Berman v. Parker, 346 U.S.).

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the city’s use of eminent domain, ruling that such actions aligned with “public use” under the Fifth Amendment. The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Stevens, emphasized that prior cases had endorsed government acquiring land for development and urban renewal, even if eventual beneficiaries are private entities. The Court maintained that the entire development plan was a valid exercise of the government’s authority because it aimed at economic revitalization—a broad interpretation of "public use." This decision rested on the premise that “public welfare is broad and inclusive,” and that the Court’s role was not to second-guess the wisdom of political bodies but to ensure that the plan met the constitutional requirement of public purpose.

Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion advocated for a rational-basis review of eminent domain cases. He noted that in this case, unlike others, no single private party benefited disproportionately, and Pfiser’s interest arose after the plan was set in motion. Therefore, proceedings suggested that the taking was part of a comprehensive development plan rather than opportunistic transfer.

Conversely, dissenting Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas articulated concerns about the erosion of constitutional protections. Justice O’Connor criticized the decision as opening the door to abuses—arguing that the Fifth Amendment’s “public use” clause should be strictly construed. She maintained that for a taking to be constitutional, it must serve the "good of all," not private economic interests. She cited historical principles, emphasizing that eminent domain should be limited to public projects like roads, hospitals, or utilities, and not extended to phases of economic development that primarily benefit specific private entities.

Justice Thomas vehemently dissented, asserting that the “public use” clause has been essentially nullified. He argued that the current interpretation allows governmental power to be misused, empowering local legislatures to take property under the guise of economic development without genuine public benefit. Echoing early legal principles, he insisted that eminent domain should be a last resort—only used when absolutely necessary for public purposes explicitly outlined in the Constitution. The broad interpretation adopted jeopardizes property rights and disproportionately disadvantages less influential communities, especially those with weaker political voices.

In my personal opinion, I align with the dissenting Justices, particularly Justice O’Connor and Thomas. The foundational principle of the Fifth Amendment is to protect individuals from arbitrary seizure of property for the benefit of private gain or economic schemes that may not serve the public interest. History and constitutional intent suggest that eminent domain should be narrowly applied, reserved for tangible public projects—roads, schools, public utilities—rather than expansive redevelopment schemes primarily benefiting private businesses. The potential for abuse in such broad interpretations is significant; it risks marginalizing vulnerable communities and eroding property rights that are vital to individual liberty and economic security. Therefore, I believe that the Court’s decision in KELO v. New London signals an overreach that diminishes constitutional protections and unnecessarily permits government powers to be exploited for private economic advantage.

References

• Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
• Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
• Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
• Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
• United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946).
• Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
• Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
• New York Central RR Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
• Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
• Justice O’Connor’s dissent in KELO v. CITY OF NEW LONDON, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).