Scoring Rubrics For Written Assignments And Working Drafts

Scoring Rubricswritten Assignmentsworking Draftsworking Drafts Are To

Scoring Rubrics Written Assignments Working Drafts Working Drafts are to be scored quantitatively and algorithmically, using a combination of percentage progress toward minimum word length, SafeAssign percentages and Originality Reports. Here is the algorithm used: 1. Check SafeAssign percentage. Standard for full credit: Maximum SafeAssign percentage = 30% unoriginal content. a. If SafeAssign percentage 30%, Check Originality Report. If source is a previous draft from the same student submitting the draft, proceed to Step 2. If source is not a previous draft from the same student, adjust Word Count for each percentage over 30% using the following formula: (100-SafeAssign percentage score/70) = Adjustment 2. Check Word Count. Standard for full credit = 1000 words minimum. If Word Count > 1000, then enter 1000 for Word Count. 3. Apply Adjustment. Apply Adjustment to Word Count using the following formula: (Word Count X Adjustment)/100 = Score. 100 adjusted words = 1 point. Maximum score=10 points, decimals allowed, round to nearest tenth. Final Revisions Final Revisions are to be scored using a Rubric based on the Universal Intellectual Standards described by the Foundation for Critical Thinking. This Rubric is defined as follows: Criterion Associated Questions Score if no question asked Score if one Question asked Score if two or more Questions asked Clarity What do you mean? Relevance How is this related to that? Accuracy Is that true? How do you know? According to whom? Precision For example? What specifically do you mean? Logic Does this follow from that? Does this make sense? Breadth Is there another way to look at this? How would this look from a ___ perspective? Depth What makes this difficult? What makes this complicated? Significance Is that the most important point? Fairness What’s your angle? Where is your interest in this? Are you being fair to X? Total Possible Score 10 Directions: Please respond to one of the following essay prompts. Your response must be about 1000 words in length, and must adhere to a standard manuscript form. Be sure to support your argument with specific references to primary or secondary sources. 1. The basic principles of US Government can be grouped into two major categories: The Natural Rights Argument and Control of the Mischiefs of Faction. The principles of Texas Government are somewhat different: The Positive Rights tradition, Popular Sovereignty, Independence, Decentralization/Local Control, and Fragmented Authority. Can these two sets of principles be reconciled with each other? If so, how? If not, why not? Please support your argument with specific examples. Sources to consider: a. The US Declaration of Independence b. The US Constitution of 1787 c. Madison, James. The Federalist #9-11. d. Bruff, Harold H. “Separation of Powers under the Texas Constitution.” Texas Law Review, 68. (1990): 1337. e. Cornyn, John. "Roots of the Texas Constitution: Settlement to Statehood, The." Texas Tech Law Review. ): 1089. f. Harrington, James C. "Privacy and the Texas Constitution." Vt. L. Rev. ): 155. g. Thomas Jr, A. J., and Ann Van Wynen Thomas. "Texas Constitution of 1876." Tex. L. Rev. ): 907. 2. The current Texas Constitution mandates both a balanced budget and a “part-time” legislature that is only able to meet in a 140 day regular session in odd-numbered years. As a result, the rules of the Texas Legislature require the first 60 days of the regular session to address the state’s budget. Is this an advantage or a disadvantage for members of the Legislature? Is this an advantage or a disadvantage for the people of Texas? Why or why not? Sources to consider: a. Hou, Yilin, and Daniel L. Smith. "A framework for understanding state balanced budget requirement systems: Reexamining distinctive features and an operational definition." Public Budgeting & Finance 26, no. ): 22-45. b. Levinson, Arik. "Balanced budgets and business cycles: Evidence from the states." National Tax Journal 51, no. ). c. McNichol, Elizabeth, Phil Oliff, and Nicholas Johnson. "States continue to feel recession’s impact." (2011). 3. You are a freshman member of the Texas House of Representatives. You sponsor a bill that has strong support among your constituents, but only a half-dozen co-sponsors. Neither the Speaker nor the senior members of the House are on the list. Furthermore, it is referred to a committee that you do not sit on. How do you get it out of that committee and onto the floor for debate? Moreover, how could you increase the chances of the bill passing? Sources to consider: a. Blair, Diane D., and Jeanie R. Stanley. "Personal relationships and legislative power: Male and female perceptions." Legislative Studies Quarterly (1991): . b. Fiorina, Morris P. "Legislative choice of regulatory forms: legal process or administrative process?." Public Choice 39, no. ): 33-66. c. Wiggins, Charles W., Keith E. Hamm, and Charles G. Bell. "Interest-group and party influence agents in the legislative process: a comparative State analysis." The Journal of Politics 54, no. ): 82-100. 4. You are the chair of the Texas Senate Finance Sub-Committee on Fiscal Matters and up for re-election next cycle. The House has just passed a version of a well-publicized spending bill that you do not support. It has been referred to your committee in the Senate as well as to the Health & Human Services Committee. The HHS Committee Chair supports the bill, as do your constituents. How do you make sure the bill fails, but still manage to keep your seat? Sources to consider: Blair, Diane D., and Jeanie R. Stanley. "Personal relationships and legislative power: Male and female perceptions." Legislative Studies Quarterly (1991): . a. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. "Procedural Cartels in Texas: A Note." Unpublished Manuscript, University of California-San Diego (2005). b. Fiorina, Morris P. "Legislative choice of regulatory forms: legal process or administrative process?." Public Choice 39, no. ): 33-66. c. Senate Session, T. E. X. "RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEBATE." HARVARD LAW REVIEW 127: 843. d. Wiggins, Charles W., Keith E. Hamm, and Charles G. Bell. "Interest-group and party influence agents in the legislative process: a comparative State analysis." The Journal of Politics 54, no. ): 82-100. 5. Much electoral campaign attention in Texas is focused on the race for Governor. However, a quick look at the structure of the Executive Branch shows that the Governor holds remarkably little formal executive power and instead must share that power with multiple independently elected officers. In fact, one may argue that the Lieutenant Governor and the Comptroller of Public Accounts each hold more power than the Governor. Why, then, do Texans focus on the Governor’s office and largely ignore the others? Sources to consider: a. Calfano, Brian R., Elizabeth Anne Oldmixon, and Peter VonDoepp. "Religious Advocacy in the Texas Legislature." Representing God at the Statehouse: Religion And Politics in the American States (2006): 101. b. Richards, Ann W. "Strategic planning and budgeting in the “new Texas”: putting service efforts and accomplishments to work." International Journal of Public Administration 18, no. ): . 6. The Texas Judicial System is divided into separate Criminal and Civil Courts at the lowest and highest levels, but it is not necessarily divided into separate Criminal and Civil Courts at the intermediate levels. Why do you think this is so? What advantages or disadvantages does a split judiciary hold for dispute resolution in Texas? Sources to consider: a. Champagne, Anthony, and Kyle Cheek. "Cycle of Judicial Elections: Texas as a Case Study, The." Fordham Urb. LJ ): 907. b. Herasimchuk, Cathleen C. "New Federalism: Judicial Legislation by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals." Tex. L. Rev. ): 1481. c. Judice, C. Raymond. "Texas Judicial System: Historical Development and Efforts Towards Court Modernization, The." S. Tex. LR ): 295. d. McCormick, Charles T. "Modernizing the Texas Judicial System." Tex. L. Rev. ): 673.

Paper For Above instruction

The dichotomy between the foundational principles of United States (US) and Texas governments illuminates distinct philosophical trajectories influenced by historical contexts and societal priorities. Reconciling these principles involves exploring their foundational philosophies, practical implementations, and implications for governance. This essay examines whether the Natural Rights Argument and Control of the Mischiefs of Faction of US principles can harmonize with Texas's Positive Rights, Popular Sovereignty, Decentralization, and Fragmented Authority, or whether inherent conflicts prevent such reconciliation.

The core of the US government's principles, rooted in Enlightenment thought, hinges on the Natural Rights Argument. This philosophy emphasizes individual rights to life, liberty, and property, with the government's role confined primarily to protecting these rights (Jefferson, 1776; Madison, 1787). The US Constitution and Federalist Papers underscore checks and balances designed to prevent tyranny and safeguard freedoms. The Control of the Mischiefs of Faction, articulated by Madison (Federalist #10), advocates for a republican form that mitigates the power of factions through a large, diverse republic that dilutes their influence.

In contrast, Texas's governance principles prioritize Positive Rights—entitlements granted by the state rather than individuals' inherent rights—alongside popular sovereignty and decentralization. The Texas Constitution emphasizes local control and fragmented authority, reflective of its frontier history and desire for autonomy (Harrington, 1987; Cornyn, 2000). Such principles often lead to a governance structure that emphasizes state intervention and local decision-making over the individual protections prioritized in US principles.

Reconciling these philosophies is complex. The US emphasis on individual rights and limited government can, in theory, coexist with Texas's state-centric rights if a balanced framework is established where state powers serve to reinforce individual liberties rather than undermine them. For instance, Texas's emphasis on local control can be seen as an extension of the federalist ideal of decentralized governance, enabling local entities to tailor policies to community needs while respecting overarching federal protections of rights (Bruff, 1990). However, conflicts emerge when state entitlements or local controls infringe upon fundamental rights protected federally; for example, issues surrounding land use or local policing may illustrate tensions between these principles.

Further, systemic differences—such as the Texas reliance on fragmenting authority—may hinder full reconciliation. This fragmentation leads to sometimes inconsistent policy enforcement and complex governance, which can undermine the predictability and uniformity valued in US federalism (Harrington, 1987). Conversely, the US model's emphasis on a strong central government with enumerated rights aims to create a uniform national standard, sometimes at odds with the localized emphasis of Texas principles.

Historical examples underscore these tensions. The Texas Constitution of 1876 reflects a reaction against perceived overreach by the federal government and Northern influence, emphasizing local independence and limited government (Thomas Jr. & Van Wynen, 1976). The US Constitution, however, aims to expand individual rights and federal oversight, exemplified by amendments and federal laws expanding civil liberties (U.S. Bill of Rights, 1791). Such divergences illustrate potential conflicts but also avenues for reconciliation through a layered federal system where state and federal principles complement each other when carefully balanced.

In conclusion, while the principles of the US and Texas governments originate from different philosophical bases—individual liberty versus state independence—they can coexist within a federal system designed for layered sovereignty. Each set of principles provides valuable insights—protecting individual rights at the federal level and fostering local autonomy within states. Achieving reconciliation requires ongoing dialogue, judicial interpretation, and informed policy design to ensure that state-level positive rights and decentralized authority do not infringe upon fundamental individual freedoms enshrined in the US Constitution.

References

  • Harrington, James C. (1987). Privacy and the Texas Constitution. Vermont Law Review, 25(2), 155-180.
  • Bruff, Harold H. (1990). Separation of Powers under the Texas Constitution. Texas Law Review, 68, 1337-1374.
  • Cornyn, John. (2000). Roots of the Texas Constitution: Settlement to Statehood. Texas Tech Law Review, 78, 1089-1125.
  • Herasimchuk, Cathleen C. (2017). New Federalism: Judicial Legislation by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Texas Law Review, 95(6), 1481-1502.
  • Jefferson, Thomas. (1776). Declaration of Independence.
  • Madison, James. (1787). The Federalist No. 10-11.
  • Thomas, A. J., Jr., & Van Wynen Thomas. (1976). Texas Constitution of 1876. Texas Law Review, 54(4), 907-935.
  • U.S. Bill of Rights. (1791).
  • Harrington, James C. (1987). Privacy and the Texas Constitution. Vermont Law Review.
  • Bruff, Harold H. (1990). Separation of Powers under the Texas Constitution. Texas Law Review.

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