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Please Use Cases Attachedshould Californians Be Able To Require Higher welfare standards for farm animals that are raised in other states if products from those animals are to be sold in California? Pork producers are challenging a law that California voters adopted in 2018 via ballot initiative with over 63% approval. It set new conditions for raising hogs, veal calves, and egg-laying chickens, whose meat or eggs are sold in California. The state represents about 15% of the U.S. pork market. At most commercial hog farms, pregnant sows are kept in “gestation crates” that measure 2 feet by 7 feet—enough room for the animals to sit, stand, and lie down, but not enough to turn around.

California’s law requires that each sow must have at least 24 square feet of floor space—nearly double the amount that most now get. It does not require farmers to raise free-range pigs, just to provide more square feet when they keep hogs in buildings. The National Pork Producers Council argues that this requirement imposes heavy compliance costs on farmers across the U.S., since large hog farms may house thousands of sows, and that it restricts interstate commerce. Farmers and animal welfare advocates understand that if California wins, states with the most progressive animal welfare policies—primarily West Coast and Northeast states—will be able to effectively set national standards for the well-being of many agricultural animals, including chickens, dairy cattle, and beef cattle.

Conceivably, California might also be able to require basic conditions for human labor, such as minimum wage standards, associated with products sold in California. Nine other states have already adopted laws requiring pork producers to phase out gestation crates. How would John Marshall analyze the constitutional issue presented by the California law? Would Marshall probably uphold the law or not? How would the Cooley standard be applied here? Under that standard, would the law be constitutional or not? Does this law discriminate against interstate commerce? What factors would go into modern balancing analysis? Would the law likely be upheld or not?

Paper For Above instruction

The legal controversy surrounding California's 2018 law on farm animal welfare standards illustrates complex constitutional issues involving interstate commerce and states' rights. This paper analyses the legal arguments from the perspective of historical and contemporary jurisprudence, primarily focusing on John Marshall's approach and the Cooley standard, and evaluates whether the law would withstand constitutional scrutiny today.

Constitutional Framework and Marshall's Analysis

The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3). Historically, this has been interpreted to allow Congress to regulate economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. However, the question arises whether states can impose regulations on out-of-state producers whose products are sold within their borders, especially when such regulations aim to advance moral or social objectives, such as animal welfare.

John Marshall, in cases such as Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), emphasized a broad interpretation of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, asserting that the federal government has the power to regulate navigation and commercial activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Marshall generally upheld expansive federal power where state laws interfere with such regulatory authority. Applying this reasoning, Marshall might view California’s law as an attempt to regulate economic activity extending across state lines—raising questions of whether the law imposes unreasonable burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce.

Application of the Cooley Standard

The Cooley doctrine, originating from Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852), distinguished between direct and indirect regulation, holding that states could regulate local aspects of commerce that are local and not unreasonably burdening interstate trade. Under the Cooley standard, regulation is permissible if it is related to local concerns and does not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.

When applied to California’s law, the Cooley standard might initially permit the regulation if it is viewed as a local concern—animal welfare—posed within California’s borders. However, since the law affects out-of-state producers and their ability to sell products in California, it begins to resemble a regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce, making it potentially unconstitutional under the Cooley doctrine when considered in its modern context. The key issue would be whether the law’s burdens on interstate commerce outweigh the state’s interest in animal welfare.

Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce and Modern Balancing

The primary concern in modern judicial review—particularly under the Pike test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (1970)—is whether the law “regulates even-handedly” and whether the benefits to the state outweigh the burdens on interstate commerce. The law might discriminate against out-of-state producers if it imposes more stringent standards that out-of-state entities cannot meet as economically, effectively favoring local producers.

In this case, the law arguably creates a significant burden on out-of-state farmers who must redesign facilities or incur compliance costs that are not required of in-state producers, potentially amounting to a wrapper for economic protectionism under the guise of animal welfare. The courts would consider factors like the nature of the regulation, purpose, the burden it imposes, and whether there are less restrictive means available to achieve California’s goals.

Likelihood of Upheld or Struck Down

Given the evolving jurisprudence emphasizing free interstate commerce and judicial skepticism of barriers to trade, there is a high likelihood that a court would scrutinize California’s law closely. While states have a compelling interest in animal welfare, the extent of their authority over out-of-state producers—especially when it potentially discriminates—may lead courts to strike down such laws unless they serve a legitimate local purpose without imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce.

Conclusion

Overall, John Marshall’s broad interpretation of federal power would probably lead him to view such laws skeptically if they restrict interstate commerce. The Cooley standard, applied in its modern sense, tends to limit states from enacting regulations that discriminate against out-of-state products. The balancing test would favor free trade unless California convincingly demonstrates that its interests in animal welfare outweigh the economic burdens placed on interstate commerce. Given these considerations, modern courts are likely to find California’s law susceptible to constitutional challenge, particularly on grounds of discrimination and excessive burden.

References

• Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
• Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
• Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
• United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
• Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
• South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 84 (1984).
• Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
• MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Dept. of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, 690 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2012).
• Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297.
• Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011).