State Trooper Jones Follows Mike Smith Driving His Car

State Trooper Jones Follows Mike Smith Driving His Car Down The Highw

State Trooper Jones follows Mike Smith, driving his car down the highway at normal speed. After three miles of being followed, Smith changes lanes without signaling. Trooper Jones immediately turns on the lights and sirens and signals Smith to pull over. Smith does so. The trooper, in full trooper regalia, walks up to the driver's window, leans in, and asks, ominously, "do you know why I pulled you over?" Smith says no.

Jones says, "you changed lanes without signaling". Jones, nervously, gulps and apologizes. "License and registration, sir" says Jones. Smith complies. While examining the documents, Trooper Jones detects the odor of burnt marijuana (in this jurisdiction it is still illegal to possess or use marijuana) from inside the car.

Trooper Jones asks Smith " have you been smoking weed in your car just now?" Smith stammers "uh-um-ah". Trooper Jones tells Smith to get out of the car and quickly puts him in handcuffs. Trooper Jones then asks Smith is there any more drugs in the car? Smith replies "yes, in the trunk". Trooper Jones rummages through the trunk and finds a bag of cocaine, about four ounces.

Trooper Jones then asks Smith if he is being paid to transport the drugs, a defeated Smith replies "yes". What right or element of criminal procedure is involved here? If so, what triggers the right/procedure? Can the admission Smith gave about the drugs in the car be used in court against Smith? What about the admission of drug running? Should they be admissible? Is there a case about questioning that is on point here? What is it? What did it say? Have you heard of or read about any similar cases?

Paper For Above instruction

This scenario involves several critical elements of criminal procedure, primarily focusing on Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, the voluntariness of confessions, and the admissibility of evidence obtained during police encounters. Understanding these elements is essential to evaluating the legality of Trooper Jones's actions and the admissibility of statements made by Mike Smith during the investigation.

Fourth Amendment and Traffic Stops

The initial interaction between Trooper Jones and Mike Smith is governed by the Fourth Amendment, which protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. The officer's stop of Smith’s vehicle appears to be justified by a minor traffic violation—changing lanes without signaling. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), the Supreme Court clarified that a traffic stop based on observed violations is justified if the officer has reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, which, in this case, originated from a traffic violation alone. The officer's decision to initiate the stop was therefore lawful, as it was based on a clear traffic infraction.

Scope of the Stop and Plain View Doctrine

During the traffic stop, Trooper Jones had the authority to ask for Smith’s license and registration. The detection of the odor of burnt marijuana provides grounds for further questioning under the plain view doctrine and probable cause. As established in Michigan v. Clifford (1984), the smell of illegal substances can constitute probable cause to search. This scent triggered the officer’s suspicion that criminal activity, specifically drug possession, was occurring, allowing him to extend the investigation beyond the initial reason for the stop.

Search and Seizure: The Exclusion of Evidence

Jones’s subsequent actions — asking Smith if he has been smoking weed, ordering him out of the car, and searching the trunk — raise critical questions about the legality of searches conducted during traffic stops. Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches need to meet certain criteria. The Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Labron (1997) held that searches based on suspicion and during lawful stops are permissible if they are within the scope of the officer’s basis of suspicion. The prolonged detention and search of the trunk without a warrant could be challenged if unreasonable.

However, the presence of probable cause, such as the smell of marijuana and the officer’s observation, may legitimize the search under exigent circumstances. The findings of cocaine and the admissions about drug trafficking must be scrutinized to determine if they are admissible.

Admissibility of Confessions and Statements

The statements made by Smith regarding the drugs and drug running are confessions that must satisfy voluntariness requirements under the Due Process Clause. The case of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) established that statements made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless the defendant was informed of their rights and knowingly waived them. Smith’s reactions—stammering, nervousness—do not inherently indicate coercion, but the context of being quickly handcuffed and questioned about serious crimes might suggest custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.

Since the police questioned Smith about drugs after handcuffing him, these statements could be challenged as inadmissible if procedural safeguards (Miranda rights) were not observed. The confession about drugs found in the car could be admissible if it was given voluntarily and with proper warnings. Conversely, the admission related to drug running, if obtained through coercion or without Miranda compliance, might be suppressed in court.

Legal Cases on Questioning and Confessions

A landmark case relevant here is Miranda v. Arizona, where the Supreme Court held that custodial interrogations are subject to warnings to safeguard Fifth Amendment rights. The failure to administer these warnings typically results in the exclusion of confessions. Additionally, the case of Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) indicates that a suspect's level of custodial detention significantly influences the admissibility of statements. If Smith was held in custody and not properly advised of his rights, his statements could be deemed inadmissible.

Similar Cases and Precedents

In Arizona v. Gant (2009), the Court examined the scope of vehicle searches without warrants, emphasizing the importance of probable cause. This case aligns with the scenario, where the smell of marijuana and other evidence underpin the search’s legality. Moreover, in Colorado v. Connelly (1986), the Court addressed voluntariness, highlighting that confessions obtained through coercion are inadmissible. These cases collectively underscore the importance of procedural safeguards during police questioning and searches.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Trooper Jones's actions are largely justified by the initial traffic violation and probable cause stemming from the odor of marijuana. The search of the trunk and subsequent discovery of cocaine hinge on the reasonableness of the suspicion and probable cause. The admissibility of Smith’s statements depends critically on whether proper Miranda warnings were given and whether his confessions were voluntary. Legally, if Jones adhered to constitutional standards, the evidence and statements may be admissible; if not, they could be suppressed, potentially weakening the prosecution’s case.

References

• Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
• Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
• Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
• Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1997).
• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
• Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
• Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
• Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
• Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
• Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).