The Purposes Of Living Things And Turkle’s Concerns About Au

The Purposes of Living Things and Turkle’s Concerns About Authenticity

The assignment asks: We could take Turkle’s question as our own: “what are the purposes of living things? What is at stake for Turkle in the difference between real and robotic turtles? Why does she find “the children’s position strangely unsettling”? Be sure to point to specific places in the passage in your answer.

Paper For Above instruction

In Sherry Turkle’s exploration of the distinction between living and robotic creatures, she raises fundamental questions about authenticity, the value of life, and human perceptions of reality. The central inquiry revolves around understanding the purposes of living things, especially in a cultural context increasingly influenced by simulation and technological reproduction. Turkle’s concern signifies a deeper apprehension about how society defines and values “real” life in an era where authenticity is subjective and often challenged by artificial counterparts.

Turkle's reflection begins with the observation of the Darwin exhibition, which showcases authentic historical artifacts alongside replicas of living animals, such as the Galápagos tortoises. The children’s reactions to the inert but alive tortoise, with some suggesting that a robot could replace it, exemplify a shift in perception. For children immersed in a culture where simulation blurs authenticity, the purpose of a living creature extends beyond its biological attributes to include its presentation and perceived function. The ten-year-old girl’s comment that she would prefer a robot turtle because “its water looks dirty” indicates that aesthetic convenience and immediacy sometimes outweigh the intrinsic value of life itself. In this context, Turkle notes that “aliveness didn’t seem worth the trouble” for many children, highlighting a cultural tendency to value life conditionally, based on utility rather than inherent worth.

Turkle's concern about the difference between real and robotic turtles centers on the notion of authenticity. For her, the “notion of authenticity is for us what sex was for the Victorians — threat and obsession, taboo and fascination,” implying that society’s fixation on “real” life signals underlying anxieties and desires for genuine human experience amid technological proliferation (Turkle, 2005). The children’s indifference to the fact that the robotic turtle is not alive, and their willingness to accept such substitutes without disclosure, reflect an unsettling shift. Turkle finds this “strangely unsettling” because it signifies a potential devaluation of authentic life, where superficial appearances and functional mimicry can suffice over real existence (Turkle, 2005). This perspective reveals her concern that, as society increasingly embraces simulation, the intrinsic purpose of living things — which may include fostering wonder, connection, and intrinsic value — is being overshadowed by pragmatic considerations.

The passage highlights that for Turkle, life’s purpose extends beyond mere biological activity; it encompasses authenticity, emotional resonance, and moral significance. The children’s pragmatic attitude toward robotic life suggests that, in a culture dominated by simulations, authenticity becomes a matter of necessity rather than intrinsic value. As Turkle demonstrates through her observations, this shift raises questions about whether society risks fostering a superficial understanding of life itself, potentially undermining the importance of genuine human and ecological connections. Her concern emphasizes that authentic living things evoke a sense of wonder and moral recognition that simulation, no matter how convincing, cannot fully replicate.

In conclusion, Turkle’s reflection on the difference between real and robotic turtles reveals her fear that technological simulation might erode our understanding of the true purposes of living things. The children’s acceptance of artificial substitutes as equivalent to authentic life underscores a cultural trend toward valuing appearance and utility over genuine existence. Turkle’s unease lies in the possibility that this shift diminishes the moral and emotional significance traditionally associated with authentic life, ultimately challenging our capacity to recognize and cherish what it truly means to be alive.

References

• Turkle, S. (2005). Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other. Basic Books.
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