The Trouble One Encounters In Trying To Give A Purely Behavi

The Trouble One Encounters In Trying To Give A Purely Behavioral Accou

The trouble one encounters in trying to give a purely behavioral account of virtue explains why the Greek moralists turn to character to explain what virtue is. It may be true that most of us can recognize that it would be foolish to risk our lives and the lives of others to secure a trivial benefit, and that most of us can see that it is unjust to harm others to secure power and wealth for our own comfort. We don't have to be virtuous to recognize these things. But the Greek moralists think it takes someone of good moral character to determine with regularity and reliability what actions are appropriate and reasonable in fearful situations and that it takes someone of good moral character to determine with regularity and reliability how and when to secure goods and resources for himself and others.

This is why Aristotle states in Nicomachean Ethics II.9 that it is not easy to define in rules which actions deserve moral praise and blame, and that these matters require the judgment of the virtuous person. A soldier's thinking about war may change during his service. For example, after experiencing his first real battle and seeing human beings lying dead or in pain, a soldier might be prompted to embrace pacifism and request or transfer to a non-combat unit. Such a request would not be looked on favorably by his superiors and usually would be denied. Because the man had accepted training as a combat soldier, they would reason, he would be obligated to finish his term of service.

Is this reasoning morally sound? Would it be morally acceptable for the soldier to continue fighting, even though he objected to it on principle?

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The discussion surrounding the nature of virtue and moral judgment raises profound questions about the foundation of ethical behavior, especially in situations where moral convictions conflict with social or institutional obligations. Historically, Greek philosophers like Aristotle emphasized that virtue transcends mere behavioral rule-following, advocating instead for a character-based approach where moral excellence manifests through consistent, reliable judgment rooted in virtuous character. This perspective underscores the limitations of purely behavioral accounts of morality, which attempt to define right actions solely through observable conduct, ignoring the crucial role of moral disposition and moral reasoning.

Aristotle's assertion in Nicomachean Ethics that moral virtues are matters of character aligns with the broader philosophical debate that morality cannot be entirely codified into rules or actions but depends on the virtue of the individual making judgments in complex, often adverse situations. Virtue ethics emphasizes qualities such as courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice, which enable individuals to navigate moral dilemmas with good judgment. Such qualities develop through habituation and are deeply intertwined with one’s moral identity, making the person a reliable source of moral discernment.

The example of the soldier contemplating whether to continue fighting illustrates the tension between social expectations, institutional duties, and personal moral convictions. The military authority’s reasoning that the soldier is obligated to complete his service, despite moral objections rooted in a changed perception of war, highlights a dilemma where behavioral compliance may conflict with moral integrity. From a virtue ethics perspective, this raises questions about whether obedience alone suffices or whether moral character should allow for moral dissent when conscience demands it.

Morally, the judgment of the virtuous person would consider the circumstances, the nature of the moral objection, and the overarching virtues at stake, such as courage and justice. While discipline and duty are important, a virtue ethicist might argue that genuine moral virtue entails the willingness to stand morally opposed when necessary, especially if continuing to fight violates core virtues like compassion or justice. The soldier’s change of heart signifies moral development aligning with virtues of authenticity and moral courage, suggesting that blindly following orders without moral reflection is insufficient for true virtue.

Furthermore, the unique context of war complicates moral reasoning. War inherently involves moral ambiguities, and the question arises whether institutional rules should override individual moral judgment. While discipline is vital, a virtuous individual is expected to exercise practical wisdom (phronesis), which involves discernment of when to obey authority and when moral integrity necessitates disobedience or withdrawal. This balance is difficult but essential for genuine moral growth and integrity.

In conclusion, the critique of purely behavioral accounts emphasizes that morality is rooted in character and moral judgment, not merely actions. The soldier's case exemplifies the importance of virtue in navigating moral complexities, illustrating that true morality involves discerning the right course of action based on moral virtues rather than blind adherence to rules. Such a perspective advocates for cultivating moral character to foster moral agency and authentic ethical conduct in varied and challenging life situations.

References

• Aristotle. (1984). Nicomachean Ethics (W. D. Ross, Trans.). Batoche Books.
• Hursthouse, R. (1999). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
• Annas, J. (1993). The Morality of Virtue. Oxford University Press.
• Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
• Taylor, G. (1985). Human Virtue and the Virtue of Human Beings. Philosophical Studies, 48(2), 159-176.
• MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. University of Notre Dame Press.
• Nicomachean Ethics. (2009). Edited by Roger Crisp. Cambridge University Press.
• Sayers, D. (2009). The Need for Virtue. Oxford University Press.
• Johnson, R. (2015). Moral Character and Virtue Ethics. Routledge.
• Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy, 33(124), 1–19.