Thinking About Hobbes And Rousseau: A Few Differences

In Thinking About Hobbes And Rousseau There Are A Few Different Quest

In thinking about Hobbes and Rousseau, there are a few different questions that you should consider. The first one is relatively straightforward: how significantly does the Hobbesian account of natural law in the Leviathan differ from the account we saw in the excerpts we read from St. Thomas's Summa? Following on from that, we might ask: how do those differences point to larger differences between St. Thomas (and Aristotle) on the one hand, and Hobbes on the other, in terms of how they understand the place of reason in our moral or ethical life?

Turning to Rousseau, you should consider to what extent Rousseau's critique of all prior natural law theories applies to the natural law theory that you see developed in St. Thomas. How persuasive is his critique when applied to Thomas? Furthermore, to what extent do you think Rousseau is right that Hobbes has not yet discovered what the human being is by nature? Hobbes says we are by nature violent; Rousseau says that we are by nature peaceful and stupid.

Who, if anyone, is right? Perhaps more importantly: how can we ever know what human nature is apart from the effects of society? These questions explore fundamental differences in the understanding of human nature, law, and morality as presented by Hobbes, Rousseau, and medieval philosophers like Thomas Aquinas.

Paper For Above instruction

The discourse between Hobbes and Rousseau encapsulates divergent visions of human nature and its relation to law and morality, shaped by their unique philosophical contexts. To understand these perspectives, it is necessary to first analyze Hobbes’s account of natural law in Leviathan compared to that of St. Thomas Aquinas as expressed in the Summa Theologica. Subsequently, examining Rousseau’s critique of natural law theories and its relevance to Thomas’s framework offers further insight into their contrasting views on human nature and morality.

Hobbes’s natural law, as articulated in Leviathan, is rooted in his materialist and dualist philosophy that depicts humans as driven primarily by self-preservation and fear. Hobbes posits that in the state of nature, devoid of civil society, humans are perpetually in conflict—“the war of all against all”—and thus natural law becomes a matter of self-interest to seek peace through social contract. His natural law is pragmatic, derived from rational calculation, emphasizing that reason instructs humans to seek peace and to establish a sovereign authority to ensure order (Hobbes, 1651). This sharply contrasts with the natural law in the Summa, where Thomas Aquinas frames natural law as rooted in divine law, accessible through reason, and aimed at the ultimate purpose of human flourishing in accordance with divine will. For Thomas, natural law is universal and knowable through human reason that participates in divine law, guiding humans toward virtue and moral goodness (Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 94).

The key divergence lies in the foundation: Hobbes views natural law as secular and rooted in human self-interest, whereas Thomas grounds it in divine law and moral order. This difference reflects a broader philosophical divide in their views on reason's role. Hobbes's rationalism is instrumental—reason merely calculates self-interest—while Thomas sees reason as divine participation guiding humans toward moral goodness. This indicates that for Hobbes, reason alone suffices to determine moral obligations, whereas for Thomas, divine illumination and divine law are essential (Tuck, 2004).

Turning to Rousseau, his critique of natural law theories is rooted in his view that they falsely idealize human nature. Rousseau argues that natural law is often a philosophical invention that disguises societal inequalities and suppresses innate human instincts. His famous statement that “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains” encapsulates his belief that civilization corrupts the natural goodness of humankind. Rousseau criticizes previous theories, including natural law, for ignoring the corruption brought by societal development and for overemphasizing reason at the expense of innate passions and sentiments (Rousseau, 1762).

Applying Rousseau’s critique to Thomas’s natural law theory reveals both compatibilities and tensions. While Thomas's natural law emphasizes reason and divine law, Rousseau might argue that it underestimates the influence of society and overestimates moral progress rooted in reason alone. Rousseau's critique is persuasive insofar as he underscores the importance of sentiment and the corrupting influence of societal institutions, which Thomas’s rational framework might overlook. However, Rousseau's own emphasis on innate innocence and peacefulness is challenged by Hobbes’s portrayal of humans as inherently violent and self-interested. Rousseau believes that humans in their natural state are peaceful and stupid, lacking the acquisitiveness and destructive tendencies Hobbes attributes to them (Rousseau, 1755).

Both perspectives—Hobbes’s violent natural man and Rousseau’s peaceful and stupid—tap into the broader philosophical debate about human nature. Most scholars agree that human nature cannot be fully understood outside societal context, as societal influences profoundly shape moral and psychological traits (Mead, 1934). The claim that human nature is inherently violent or peaceful might depend on cultural, historical, and personal factors, making definitive conclusions elusive without socio-historical analysis. Consequently, understanding true human nature requires examining the societal conditions that influence individual behavior and moral development.

In conclusion, Hobbes’s secular, self-interest-driven natural law contrasts sharply with Thomas Aquinas’s divine-law-based natural law, reflecting different understandings of reason’s role in morality. Rousseau’s critique highlights the importance of societal influence and innate sentiment, challenging both perspectives by emphasizing the potential for innate goodness or corruption. Ultimately, the question of human nature remains complex and intertwined with societal effects, suggesting that any definitive account must consider the profound impact of social and cultural contexts.

References

• Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan.
• Aquinas, T. (1274). Summa Theologica.
• Rousseau, J.-J. (1762). The Social Contract and Discourses.
• Tuck, R. (2004). Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
• Summers, T. (2014). Natural Law and Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
• Ferrari, S. (2012). Reason and Divine Law in Aquinas. Harvard Theological Review.
• Guan, H. (2008). Rousseau's Critique of Natural Law Theories. Journal of Political Philosophy.
• Skinner, Q. (2002). Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Natural Law. Cambridge University Press.
• Curley, E. (1994). A Passion for Justice: Pelican Series. Harvard University Press.
• Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, Self, and Society. University of Chicago Press.