Thomas Reid: The Scottish School Of Common Sense Realism

Thomas Reid The Scottish School Of Common Sense Realismreid Recognize

Thomas Reid: The Scottish School of Common Sense Realism Reid recognizes to some extent that Hume was not a total skeptic. Indeed, he ingenuously acknowledges, that it was only in solitude and retirement that he could yield any assent to his own philosophy; society, like day-light, dispelled the darkness and fog of scepticism, and made him yield to the dominion of common sense. (Inquiry, Chapter I, Introduction, Section V; see Hume's Treatise, Book I, Part IV, Section 7.) Hume's inability to remain skeptical was taken by Reid to be an inconsistency on his part and a demonstration of the weakness of philosophical reasoning in the face of common sense. Reid held that common sense will always win the contest with philosophy, "for, in reality, Common Sense holds nothing of Philosophy, nor needs her aid" (Inquiry, Chapter I, Introduction, Section IV).

Indeed, it is philosophy that stands in need of the aid of common sense to keep it from falling into skepticism. Philosophy... has no other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them, and draws its nourishment from them. Severed from this root, its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots. (Inquiry, Chapter I, Introduction, Section VII.)

On the other hand, it is easy to see why philosophers would be inclined to criticize a system that takes common sense as its starting point. The views of ordinary, non-philosophical people seem to be quite unreflective and indeed riddled with error. Philosophers have tended to view their task as being to rise above the common view of things and present a more lofty picture of the universe.

Reid does not fall victim to this kind of criticism, however. His account of "common sense," as outlined in the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay VI, Chapter 2, was itself a philosophical one. Reid begins by explaining what is "common" about "common sense." He thought that common sense is something which nearly all human beings have. The only ones who lack it are defective in some way, victims of "lunacy." A person who, through some natural mental defect, believes he is made of glass has departed from common sense. And a skeptical philosopher who does not believe that mind-independent bodies exist has similarly taken leave of common sense.

The difference is that the philosopher abandons common sense not due to a mental defect, but rather due to the influence of metaphysical arguments. So Reid describes a skeptic as a victim of "metaphysical lunacy." Self-evident beliefs can be divided according to whether they are about what is necessary (what is immutable, and whose contrary is impossible) or about what is contingent (what is mutable, and whose contrary is possible). Beliefs that are self-evident and necessary are called "axioms," and they include basic beliefs about mathematics. Such beliefs are infallible. "The light of truth so fills my mind in these cases, that I can neither conceive nor desire anything more satisfactory" (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay II, Chapter XX).

Among the self-evident beliefs about necessary truths are the following: · Of grammar: every complete sentence must have a verb. · Of logic: no proposition can be both true and false. · Of morals: no one ought to be blamed for an action he could not prevent. · Of metaphysics: · Sensible qualities and thoughts must have a subject. · Whatever begins to exist must have a cause which produced it. · We can infer with certainty from marks or signs of intelligent design in the effect that its cause designed it intelligently. A further distinction can be drawn in the domain of contingent self-evident beliefs. Some are quite general while others are particular. Reid called the former "first principles," including the following (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay VI, Chapter V): · The existence of everything of which I am conscious. · The thoughts of which I am conscious, are the thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person. · Those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be. · The natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious. · We have some degree of power over our own actions and what we will. · We continue to exist as identical beings, as far back as we can distinctly remember. · What is to be in the phenomena of nature will probably be like what has been.

Reid and Hume A final point concerns Reid's portrayal of Hume as an extreme skeptic. Hume acknowledged that his philosophy is very skeptical, but does it really depart from common sense? Hume explicitly recognized that nature prevents us from being skeptics with respect to the independent existence of bodies for more than short periods of time. He conceded that the same kind of judgments Reid called "common sense" come naturally to the ordinary person. Hume described our "natural" beliefs as being the fictitious products of the imagination, rather than as "a gift from Heaven" or a product of "the will of Him who made us." Hume was skeptical about any explanation of the human condition which appeals to the supernatural, especially when a wholly natural explanation can be given in its stead. It is better to recognize the extreme limitations of our power of judgment than to invent a divine basis for judgment which can never be proved to exist or even to be very probable. (See especially his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and Section XI of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.) Reid, on the other hand, held that a belief in intelligent design is self-evident. Moreover, he thought that Hume's attempt to explain all the workings of the human mind by his meager three principles of association produces only a caricature of the human being (Inquiry, Chapter I, Introduction, Section VI).

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Thomas Reid's philosophy, emblematic of the Scottish school of common sense realism, offers a vital counterpoint to the skeptical tradition exemplified by David Hume. Reid’s core assertion is that common sense principles underpin our immediate knowledge and perceptual beliefs, and these principles are self-evident and universally accessible to all human beings. Unlike Hume, who regarded many beliefs as products of the imagination and mere habits, Reid viewed these beliefs—particularly about the external world and personal identity—as inherently rational and trustworthy. This foundational contrast marks a significant philosophical divergence: Reid’s emphasis on common sense as an epistemic authority versus Hume’s skepticism about the reliability of human cognition and the primacy of empirical and natural-scientific explanations.

Reid's account of common sense reveals that he regarded it as a faculty or set of principles that almost every human possesses. These principles are not learned through reasoning but are innate or immediately accessible, forming the basis of our natural beliefs. Reid sharply distinguishes these from the skeptical conclusions of metaphysical reasoning, which he claims lead philosophers astray by abandoning common sense due to misguided metaphysical arguments. For Reid, the departure from these self-evident beliefs—such as the existence of the external world, the self, or the reliability of sensory perceptions—is a deviation from true human nature, equated with mental deficiency or metaphysical lunacy.

A key aspect of Reid’s philosophy is his classification of self-evident beliefs into axioms (necessary truths) and first principles (contingent truths). Axioms include the principles of logic (e.g., that no proposition can be both true and false), mathematics, and certain moral and metaphysical truths (such as the necessity of a cause for everything that begins to exist). First principles include beliefs about personal identity, the existence of external objects, and the trustworthiness of our natural faculties. These beliefs are not derived from inference but are foundational, providing the bedrock of human knowledge and guiding rational thought and scientific investigation.

Reid’s critique of Hume emphasizes that Hume’s skepticism, especially about the external world and personal identity, stems from a misguided metaphysical stance. While Hume accepts that natural beliefs come naturally to people, he regards them as fictitious constructs of the imagination, undermining their rational legitimacy. Reid contends that this skepticism is rooted in metaphysical lunacy—a departure from the realities of common sense. Hume’s reliance on principles of association, which he believed explained human cognition, Reid claims, is a reductive caricature of human psychology that neglects the innate rational faculties embedded within human nature.

Despite their differences, Reid acknowledges that Hume’s skepticism is limited by nature. Hume recognizes that our natural beliefs about bodies and personal persistence are resilient and grounded in human nature, not metaphysical speculation. This concession suggests that, for Hume, common sense plays a fundamental role in maintaining human trust in the external world, even if its basis is psychologically subjective. Conversely, Reid elevates common sense to the status of a rational, philosophical foundation that secures our knowledge from the distortions of skeptical metaphysics, advocating that these self-evident beliefs are so obvious they require no demonstration.

Reid’s stance demonstrates a philosophical optimism rooted in his belief that innate human faculties can reliably guide us to truth, provided we heed the principles of common sense. His critique of Hume underscores the danger of abstract metaphysical reasoning, which he perceives as leading philosophers further into skepticism, away from the intuitive certainties that ordinary human experience provides. The debate between Reid and Hume thus encapsulates central epistemological issues about the nature of knowledge, the reliability of perception, and the limits of rational inquiry grounded in natural human faculties.

In conclusion, Reid’s philosophy reaffirms that common sense is not at odds with philosophical reasoning but is foundational to it. It acts as a safeguard against falling into skepticism and supports the rational justification of our beliefs about the external world and ourselves. While Hume cast skepticism as a natural consequence of human psychology, Reid saw it as a deviation when metaphysical abstractions neglect the innate principles that constitute human cognition. This dialogue between skepticism and common sense continues to influence contemporary debates in epistemology, emphasizing the importance of innate human faculties and the limits of human reason in the pursuit of truth.

References

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• Hume, David. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. London: John Noon.
• Hume, David. (1748). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. London: A. Millar.
• Reid, Thomas. (1785). Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. Edinburgh: Mundell, Doig.
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