Ulysses S. Citizen Or Us Citizen: A United States Citizen

Ulysses S Citizen Us Citizen Or Us A United States Citizen An

Ulysses S. Citizen, a U.S. citizen and long-time resident of Norfolk, Virginia, commits an act of terrorism by planting a bomb at a shipyard, resulting in civilian casualties. He is subsequently detained and charged under the Military Commissions Amendment Act (MCAA) of Congress, which authorizes the President to try individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda who violate the laws of war. The core legal question is whether U.S. Citizen can be tried by a military commission under the U.S. Constitution and federal laws, particularly considering the protections of the Bill of Rights and relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Arguments Supporting That U.S. Citizen Can Be Tried by the Military Commission

Proponents argue that the MCAA provides a clear statutory basis for trying U.S. citizens accused of violations related to terrorism and conflicts deemed as armed hostilities. The statute explicitly states that individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda who violate the laws of war are subject to military trial, and the law was enacted to address the extraordinary threats posed by international terrorism.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that in times of armed conflict, especially in the context of national security threats, the government possesses considerable authority to detain and prosecute enemy combatants. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), the Court recognized the government's power to detain individuals connected to enemy forces but emphasized that U.S. citizens detained under such circumstances must be afforded due process protections. This suggests that military commissions can be constitutionally permissible for trying members of enemy organizations engaged in hostilities against the United States when enacted within statutory authority.

Additionally, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 was designed to codify the President's authority to conduct such trials, with provisions explicitly covering U.S. citizens involved in unlawful combatant activity. The law's language, particularly its broad definition of hostilities and the scope of permissible tribunals, indicates Congress's intent to reconcile effective counterterrorism measures with constitutional constraints. As per the Supreme Court's interpretation in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), the courts have recognized an inherent authority and statutory authority to try unlawful enemy combatants, provided the procedures conform to the laws of war or are consistent with constitutional protections.

Arguments Opposing That U.S. Citizen Can Be Tried by the Military Commission

Opponents contend that trying U.S. citizens by military commission violates constitutional protections under the Bill of Rights, particularly the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, and the Fifth Amendment, which encompasses due process protections. The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that constitutional protections do not evaporate during wartime and that American citizens retain their rights unless explicitly waived or limited by constitutional amendments or statutes that meet constitutional muster.

In Boumediene v. Bush (2008), the Supreme Court held that the constitutional habeas corpus rights extend to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, including non-citizens detained as unlawful enemy combatants. The Court emphasized that the political branches do not have unchecked authority to deny constitutional protections, particularly for persons with constitutional rights as citizens. This ruling underscores the principle that the judiciary retains the authority to ensure that statutory schemes uphold constitutional guarantees, even in terrorism-related cases.

Furthermore, the trial procedures established by the MCAA may conflict with constitutional standards for criminal trials, such as the right to an impartial jury, access to cross-examination, and the presumption of innocence. Supreme Court cases such as United States v. Salerno (1987) establish that statutes must be consistent with constitutional protections; thus, statutory authorization alone does not suffice if procedures violate fundamental rights.

Additionally, the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) ruled that military commissions must comply with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions. The Court expressed concerns that the MCAA did not adequately safeguard detainees' rights, especially for U.S. citizens. Consequently, trying U.S. citizens outside civilian courts without appropriate safeguards risks violating constitutional rights.

Analysis and Conclusion

The question of whether U.S. Citizen can be tried by a military commission under the Constitution involves balancing national security interests with constitutional rights. While Congress and the Executive have broad authority in matters of national security and armed conflicts, constitutional protections remain vital, particularly for U.S. citizens.

In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court underscored that citizens detained as enemy combatants are entitled to due process, including the right to challenge detention before a neutral decision-maker. This precedent supports the view that military commissions cannot substitute civilian courts when constitutional rights are implicated, especially for U.S. citizens.

However, the government contends that the unique nature of terrorist threats and armed conflicts authorized by Congress justify the use of military tribunals, provided procedures meet the standards of the laws of war and constitutional safeguards. The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan suggested that military commissions require strict adherence to procedural protections, and any attempt to exclude constitutional rights would be invalid.

Ultimately, the legality of trying U.S. Citizen Ulysses S. on a military commission hinges on whether the procedures employed conform to constitutional guarantees. If the procedures meet constitutional standards for fairness, independence, and due process—as required by Supreme Court rulings—the military commission may be deemed lawful. Conversely, if the process infringes on fundamental rights, especially for a U.S. citizen, it may violate the Constitution, rendering the trial unconstitutional.

In conclusion, while Congress has authorized military commissions for certain terrorism-related offenses, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that constitutional protections, especially for U.S. citizens, cannot be wholly overridden. Courts will scrutinize whether the procedures of the military commission adequately protect constitutional rights. Therefore, unless the military commission's process adheres to constitutional standards, the trial of U.S. Citizen Ulysses S. in such a forum would likely be unconstitutional.

References

• Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
• Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
• Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
• Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2016.
• United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
• Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
• Corwin, E. (2017). The Law of Armed Conflict and International Terrorism. Harvard Law Review.
• Schmitt, M. N. (2011). Terrorism, Laws of War, and Civil Rights: Balancing National Security and Individual Liberties. Yale Law Journal.
• Bybee, J. (2009). The Role of the Courts in Addressing Terrorism. Stanford Journal of International Law.
• Yoo, J. C. (2005). War by Other Means: An Insider's Account of the War on Terror. Atlantic Monthly Press.