W6 Assignment: First Amendment Introduction To Philosophy ✓ Solved

W6 Assignment: First Amendment Introduction to Philosophy Th

W6 Assignment: First Amendment Introduction to Philosophy There are three parts to this assignment.

Part One

The First Amendment actually says, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Our Founding Fathers were very familiar with the writings of John Locke, and the need to keep government and religions separate was just as important to them as guaranteeing the toleration of different religious beliefs. • What were Locke’s three primary reasons for keeping government and religion separate? Which one of those reasons do you think is the most applicable today, and why?

Part Two

Many people misread the First Amendment and think it is advocating “freedom from religion” rather than “freedom of religion.” They use this misreading to ban symbols of religion from public places. • From what you know about Locke, explain whether or not you think that Locke’s view of religious toleration would require the removal of religious symbols from the public view. Be sure to provide evidence for your position that is based on logical reasoning rather than emotional reactions. Feel free to quote from the textbook to support what you believe would be Locke’s position concerning the government prohibiting the display of religious symbols. • Also, based on what Locke has said, do you think there ever could be times that it would be legitimate for the government to suppress a religion or some of their beliefs because of that religion’s extreme practices—even if what they are doing is not breaking the law? Why or why not?

Part Three

Mill insists that progress and happiness (for both the individual and society) is only possible when each person is able to express himself openly and fully about the things important to him. Critics argue that liberalism’s emphasis on individual choice undermines social cohesion and responsibility, and that toleration of a diversity of religions leads to disunity. • If the above conclusions about liberalism are true, would restricting religious diversity to five or six major religions in the United States still give people a choice in how they worship but also eliminate some of the religious divisiveness which separates people and prevents the citizenry from viewing itself as a single nation working together for the common good? In other words, is religious toleration dividing us rather than uniting us? Explain your thinking with examples and detailed reasons.

Paper For Above Instructions

John Locke’s defense of religious toleration rests on three interlocking reasons that shaped the American Founders’ approach to the First Amendment: (1) the magistrate’s incompetence in spiritual matters, (2) the ineffectiveness and immorality of coercion in matters of conscience, and (3) the need to preserve civil peace by keeping religion and government separate (Locke, 1689). First, Locke argued that civil authorities lack the epistemic competence to determine religious truth and therefore cannot legitimately decide matters of salvation or doctrine (Locke, 1689). Second, he maintained that faith cannot be compelled; external force produces outward conformity but not genuine belief and so is both ineffective and unjust (Locke, 1689). Third, Locke emphasized that entangling state power with religious enforcement produces persecution and social instability—mixing spiritual and civil jurisdiction fuels factional conflict and undermines public peace (Locke, 1689).

Of these three reasons, the most applicable today is the concern for civil peace and social stability. Modern pluralistic societies are religiously diverse and interdependent; state endorsement or suppression of particular faiths tends to amplify political polarization and sectarian resentment (Putnam, 2007). In contemporary democracies, where many different faiths and nonreligious worldviews coexist, government neutrality in religion reduces the risk that policy will be seen as favoring one identity group over others, thereby promoting civic cooperation (Pew Research Center, 2015).

Turning to public religious symbols, Locke’s toleration doctrine suggests he would not require wholesale removal of religious symbols from public view. Locke’s point is that conscience and belief lie beyond the appropriate reach of the civil magistrate unless public order or rights are at stake (Locke, 1689). Religious symbols displayed by private citizens or groups in public spaces constitute expressive conduct and, in Locke’s framework, fall within the sphere of tolerable difference so long as they do not coerce others or threaten civil peace. American constitutional doctrine reflects a similar balance: the Court has permitted some passive displays of religious expression (Van Orden v. Perry, 2005) while restricting government-sponsored prayer or endorsements that signal state preference (Engel v. Vitale, 1962; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971). Thus Locke would likely oppose a blanket ban on religious symbols in public areas, favoring tolerance unless a display clearly undermines public order or becomes a vehicle for coercion.

Could a government legitimately suppress a religion or specific beliefs because of “extreme practices” if those practices do not technically break the law? Locke’s answer would depend on whether the practices pose a real threat to the civil interests that government is charged to protect—life, liberty, and property (Locke, 1689). Locke denied civil jurisdiction over inward belief but accepted magistrates’ duty to restrain actions that endanger others or the public peace. Mill’s harm principle reinforces this limitation: individual liberty should be curtailed only to prevent harm to others (Mill, 1859). Therefore, if a religious practice, even if framed as belief, predictably causes harm or subverts core civic duties, Locke and Mill would allow state intervention to protect citizens. Conversely, belief alone, however offensive, warrants toleration so long as it produces no harm.

Regarding the proposal to restrict religious diversity to a handful of major religions, both Locke’s and Mill’s liberalism would oppose such an artificial narrowing. Restricting choice undermines individual autonomy, freedom of conscience, and the expressive development vital for social progress (Mill, 1859). Empirically, forcing a narrow religious landscape is likely to breed exclusion, resentment, and covert dissent rather than foster genuine unity. Scholarship on diversity suggests nuance: Putnam (2007) documents short-term declines in social trust in diverse settings but also highlights the importance of inclusive institutions and cross-group interaction for long-term cohesion. Allport’s contact hypothesis shows that structured, equitable contact reduces prejudice (Allport, 1954). Thus, promoting integration, interfaith dialogue, and neutral civic institutions better preserves both individual freedom and social solidarity than state-imposed religious limits.

Practically, limiting religion to five or six officially sanctioned faiths would be unjust, impractical, and counterproductive. It would violate the Lockean insight that conscience is beyond legitimate civil coercion and Mill’s defense of individual expression as socially beneficial (Locke, 1689; Mill, 1859). Historically and legally, the United States has adopted a model that protects private religious practice and constrains government endorsement of religion (Engel v. Vitale, 1962; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971). Where public order is genuinely endangered, targeted, content-neutral restrictions may be justified; otherwise, pluralism and liberty remain the best means to foster peaceful cooperation and mutual respect among citizens.

In sum: Locke’s three reasons—magistrate incompetence in spiritual matters, the futility of coercion in belief, and the need to avoid persecution and protect public peace—provide a foundation for favoring public toleration of religious symbols and beliefs unless they threaten civil interests. Mill complements this by insisting on freedom of expression absent harm. Rather than constraining religious diversity to a few sanctioned faiths, policy should aim to strengthen neutral civic institutions, encourage intergroup contact, and limit coercive state action to clear threats to public safety or rights.

References

• Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Addison-Wesley.
• Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
• Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
• Locke, J. (1689). A letter concerning toleration. In P. Laslett (Ed.), Two treatises of government and A letter concerning toleration (modern ed.). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1689)
• Mill, J. S. (1859). On liberty. Longman.
• Pew Research Center. (2015). America’s changing religious landscape. Pew Research Center.
• Putnam, R. D. (2007). E pluribus unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century. Scandinavian Political Studies, 30(2), 137–174.
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (n.d.). Religious toleration. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religious-toleration/
• Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
• Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).