Week 6 Lecture 2: An Argument Against Skepticism, John Hospe

Week 6 Lecture 2 An Argument Against Skepticism, John Hospers Skepti

Skepticism is characterized as a disposition or attitude of doubt, especially concerning the availability of knowledge. In philosophy, this can range from specific doubts about particular claims to global skepticism, which doubts all knowledge. For example, Ereni doubts humans have ESP, while Brenda doubts Bob's claim of being an expert spelunker. Descartes attempted to be skeptically doubtful of all things, a stance known as \"global skepticism,\" where every belief is subject to doubt.

John Hospers challenges this form of skepticism by arguing that some things can indeed be known. To do this, he characterizes knowledge similarly to Plato: a person, S, knows that P when three conditions are fulfilled: (1) P is true; (2) S believes that P; and (3) S has evidence supporting P. Hospers emphasizes the necessity of evidence for knowledge but recognizes the need for precision regarding how much evidence suffices.

Hospers presents a dilemma about the sufficiency of evidence. On one hand, knowledge might require evidence that guarantees P's truth—meaning the evidence logically entails P. If this is necessary, then in many cases, we would know very little because evidence rarely guarantees certainty. On the other hand, if evidence only provides good reasons to believe P, then we might claim to know many things that are actually false if the evidence does not guarantee the truth of P. This latter approach allows for more knowledge but risks cases where the evidence supports P without guaranteeing it, leading to potential errors.

To address this dilemma, Hospers introduces a distinction between two senses of \"know\": the strong sense and the weak sense. The strong sense requires that evidence guarantees P's truth, aligning with Descartes' perspective, while the weak sense considers that evidence provides good reasons to believe P, which is the more common everyday usage. Hospers advocates for adopting the weak sense to avoid the problems associated with the strong sense, such as demanding certainty that is often unattainable.

Hospers argues that the strong sense of \"know\" is essentially meaningless because it demands certainty—a state seldom achievable or describable. For example, he questions whether one can reliably specify conditions under which one would be certain of P. If one cannot, then the term \"certain\" becomes empty of meaning. Descartes might answer this by attempting to posit such circumstances, but Hospers suggests that doing so reveals a misunderstanding of what knowledge in ordinary language entails.

In defense of the weak sense, Hospers emphasizes that evidence does not have to guarantee P to support belief; rather, evidence can be sufficient if it provides good reasons for P. Importantly, if an event contrary to P occurs—such as it raining when one claimed to know it wouldn’t—the initial claim to knowledge is rescinded because the proposition P was false, not because the evidence was inadequate. This approach allows us to maintain that evidence remains valuable even when it does not guarantee P's truth, thereby circumventing skepticism that demands certainty.

Hospers' argument also targets the notion that certainty is necessary for knowledge, claiming this to be an unhelpful and perhaps meaningless requirement. He illustrates this by questioning whether we can describe circumstances where we would be certain of P, suggesting that without such circumstances, the concept of certainty itself is trivial. For example, Descartes believed in radical doubt but aimed to find indubitable knowledge through clear and distinct ideas; Hospers questions whether such certainty is genuinely attainable or meaningful.

In summary, Hospers advocates for a pragmatic understanding of knowledge that relies on evidence providing good reasons (the weak sense) rather than requiring absolute certainty (the strong sense). His approach aims to block skepticism by showing that many everyday claims to knowledge are justified under this weaker interpretation, thus reaffirming the possibility of knowledge without demanding the impossible degree of certainty.

Paper For Above instruction

In the landscape of philosophy, skepticism presents a persistent challenge to the notion that knowledge is obtainable. The core of skepticism is the doubt about whether we can truly know anything at all. Descartes, a central figure in philosophical skepticism, attempted to doubt everything to establish a foundation for certain knowledge. In response, John Hospers presents a compelling argument against skepticism, emphasizing that some knowledge is indeed possible through a pragmatic understanding of evidence and belief.

Hospers adopts a definition of knowledge similar to Plato's, stating that a person S knows that a proposition P if three conditions are met: (1) P is true, (2) S believes that P, and (3) S has evidence supporting P. This tripartite condition reflects a rational account of knowledge, stressing the importance of evidence. However, Hospers recognizes that questions arise concerning how much evidence is necessary—should it guarantee P’s truth, or is providing good reasons enough? This dilemma hinges on two potential standards: the strong sense and the weak sense of knowledge.

The strong sense of knowledge requires that S’s evidence guarantees P, meaning the evidence logically entails the truth of P. This standard aligns with radical certainty, where knowledge is equated with absolute and infallible proof. Yet, this stringent requirement leads to skepticism because such certainty is rarely, if ever, attainable in practice. On the other hand, the weak sense only requires that evidence provide good reasons to believe P, even if it does not guarantee P’s truth. This more flexible standard is more aligned with everyday reasoning, but it raises concerns about the fallibility of our beliefs and knowledge claims.

Hospers argues that adopting the weak sense of knowledge is more practical and less skepticism-inducing. He illustrates that evidence need not guarantee the truth of a proposition for it to support justified belief. For example, on a Sunday, one might claim to know that it will rain tomorrow based on meteorological evidence. When Monday arrives and it rains, the initial claim is shown to be false, indicating that the belief was not knowledge under the stronger, guarantee-based sense. Nonetheless, this does not undermine the value of the original evidence; rather, it shows that knowledge does not require certainty, just rational justification.

Furthermore, Hospers challenges the idea that certainty is a meaningful concept in the context of knowledge. He questions whether there are any circumstances where one could be truly certain of a proposition, suggesting that the notion of certainty is either trivial or empty if such circumstances are undefinable. This critique aims to undermine the strong sense of knowledge that demands infallibility, thereby alleviating skepticism grounded in the impossibility of attaining certainty.

In embracing the weak sense, Hospers not only refutes radical skepticism but also aligns more closely with scientific and everyday practice, where evidence supports beliefs without guaranteeing them. He emphasizes that evidence remains valuable even when it does not produce infallible certainty, allowing us to navigate the uncertainties inherent in real-world decision-making. This pragmatic approach preserves the possibility of knowledge in a way that is meaningful and applicable to our lived experience, ultimately challenging the skeptics’ dismissive stance.

Hospers’ argument demonstrates that skepticism, especially in its global form, relies on unrealistic standards of certainty. By clarifying that knowledge need only be supported by good reasons, not guaranteed by infallible evidence, he restores confidence in the reliability of human cognition. His pragmatic perspective encourages a more nuanced understanding of knowledge that is compatible with scientific investigation and everyday reasoning, thereby effectively countering the radical doubts posed by skeptics like Descartes.

References

• Hospers, J. (1963). An Argument Against Skepticism. In An Introduction to Philosophy. New York: Basic Books.
• Descartes, R. (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy. Trans. John Cottingham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
• Plato. (c. 380 B.C.E). Theaetetus. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Retrieved from Project Gutenberg.
• Hume, D. (1739/1740). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
• Locke, J. (1690). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996.
• Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.
• Kenny, A. (2012). An Illustrated Brief History of Western Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Foucault, M. (1969). The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books.
• Nagel, T. (1979). The View From Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Audi, R. (1997). Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. London: Routledge.