When Emotion And Cognition Collide: 85 Seafaring Men To An I
When Emotion And Cognition Collide 85seafaring Men To An Islandand
When Emotion and Cognition Collide • 85 seafaring men to an island—and to their subsequent deaths—by singing sweetly to them. No man had ever been able to resist the Sirens, and their beach was "piled with boneheaps of men now rotted away." Ulysses instructed his men to sail past the Sirens without stopping and to put wax in their ears to block out the Sirens' sweet song. Because Ulysses wanted to hear the Sirens, he told his men to tie him with ropes to the ship's mast and ordered them not to release him, no matter how much he begged, until they had sailed safely by the Sirens. As his ship set sail, he warned his men: "If I supplicate you and implore you to set me free, then you must tie me fast with even more lashings." Ulysses' plan worked, and his ship passed the Sirens unscathed.
Each one of us faces internal conflicts between what we want to do and what we think we should do. While Ulysses knew that he should not follow the Sirens' song, when he heard them sing he wanted desperately to go to them. Compulsive gamblers like Mark Merrill want to visit the casinos, but know that they should avoid them because of the difficulty they have of knowing when to stop. Alcoholics want to drink, but know that they should abstain because of the likely negative consequences. Students want to relax and socialize in the evenings, but know they should study.
Consumers must often decide whether to buy the product they want or a product they think they should purchase for health, environmental, or budgetary reasons. In Chapter 1, we introduced the affect heuristic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002), which argues that decision makers have an automatic affective, or emotional, reaction to most options. Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni (1998) argue that this emotional response is often in disagreement with the decision that an individual would make after more thoughtful reasoning. We use the terms "want" and "should" to categorize these two types of preferences. How do individuals come to have preferences that put them in disagreement with themselves?
When does emotion win, and when does reason win? Multiple Selves Schelling (1984) argues that people frequently behave like two individuals: "one who wants clear lungs and long life and another who adores tobacco, or one who wants a lean body and another who wants dessert" (p. 58). The "multiple-selves" theory has been used to account for a variety of dysfunctional behaviors, such as alcohol and drug abuse (Ainslie, 1975), as well as common consumer errors, including the decision to spend money rather than save it (Loewenstein, 1996). In almost all of these cases, one of our "selves" is in favor of a decision that provides immediate gratification rather than an alternative that would provide greater future rewards.
Cognitive neuroscience research suggests that we may actually be able to identify our multiple selves in different brain regions. Different brain areas are activated when we consider either immediate rewards we want or larger, delayed rewards we should choose (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). More sophisticated brain regions are required to combine and integrate these signals. In particular, the prefrontal cortex seems to be key in the integration of information and decision making (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999). People with damage to the prefrontal cortex have trouble weighing the immediate and long-run benefits necessary for deciding between what they want to do and what they should do (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997).
Notably, however, people who have suffered injuries to emotional regions of the brain sometimes become more rational decision makers, in the sense that they are more likely to select options with higher expected value (Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2005). In sum, the neuroscience evidence suggests that emotional brain areas impel us to want some things that are not in our long-term interests, and that more sophisticated brain areas in the prefrontal cortex can override these desires and select options with higher expected utility. Whatever the source of our clashing internal preferences, Schelling (1984) points out that they have substantial economic consequences.
Indeed, the multiple-selves theory helps to explain otherwise perplexing phenomena, including: the prevalence of large industries supporting both smoking products and treatments to help people quit smoking; the simultaneous increase in obesity and the increasing popularity of diet books and diet fads; the popularity of drinking and the need for programs like Alcoholics Anonymous; the popularity of both illegal drugs and clinics to treat drug addiction; the prevalence of pornography and prostitution in the face of strong social and legal taboos regarding sexual behavior; and the frequency of procrastination and the popularity of books, programs, and motivational systems designed to help people stop procrastinating.
Preference Reversals As we have noted, internal inconsistencies between transient concerns and long-term self-interest reflect natural tensions between what people want to do and what they think they should do. In Chapter 4, we used this want/should distinction to explain preference reversals between separate and joint modes of evaluation. Evidence suggests that emotional appeal (and the "want" self) is stronger when we evaluate options one at a time, and that the more reasoned, reflective "should" self will be stronger when we confront multiple options at the same time and can weigh them against each other. Standards of comparison clarify differences between alternatives and promote more rational decision making (Hsee, 1996).
By contrast, when considering a single option, decision makers are often driven by the question, "Do I want it?" In this situation, emotional and visceral motives are stronger. Thus, when someone is given the option of a short-term reward (recreational drugs, skipping work, etc.) that has long-term costs, the "want" self may make an immediate assessment that the option seems appealing. Yet when that person explicitly compares the short-term desire against the choice to resist the indulgence, the "should" self is empowered by the ability to evaluate and compare the relative value of each choice. It is the "should" self that methodically makes New Year's resolutions, and the "want" self that breaks them one at a time (Khan & Dhar, 2006, 2007).
The impact of temporal differences One way to describe the behavior produced by internal conflicts is by applying the economic concept of discounting, which states that any choice that involves a tradeoff between current and future benefits should discount the future to some extent. For example, a can of your favorite soda should be more valuable to you tonight than if you were to receive it ten years from now, if for no other reason than you might not be around to enjoy it in ten years. A rational decision maker would discount the future using exponential discounting, which means discounting each future time period by the same percentage. Say, for instance, that your chance of death is about 1 percent per year.
You might then discount the value of the soda by 1 percent for a delay of one year. If you had been willing to pay $1 to receive it immediately, you would only be willing to pay $0.99 now in order to guarantee delivery a year from now. To guarantee delivery in ten years, you would be willing to pay $1 x .9910, or about $0.90. By contrast, self-control problems such as procrastination, laziness, and addiction can produce choices that reflect hyperbolic discounting. The intuition behind this theory, first formally employed by Laibson (1994), is quite simple.
Relative to the present time period, we view all gains and losses in the future to be worth less than they would be in the present. Returning to the soda example, a soft drink would be worth subjectively more to you today than it would be tomorrow or a year from now. Note that the difference between getting it in 365 days or 366 days seems miniscule, while the same one-day delay between today and tomorrow is likely to matter much more. As O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) put it, we are biased toward the present. Milkman, Rogers, and Bazerman (2007) examined the temporal component of the conflict between the "want" self and the "should" self in the context of movie rentals.
They found that when people are ordering movies that they will receive days later from their online DVD rental service, they focus more on what they think they should see (such as documentaries and art films). In contrast, once the movies arrive, the movies that they want to see (such as comedies and action movies) are more likely than the "should" movies to wind up in the DVD player. As a result, "should" movies stay in customers' homes without being played significantly longer than "want" movies. Essentially, when customers are making decisions about the future, they focus on what they should do. But when making decisions in the present, they are more likely to do what they want to do.
The same researchers (Rogers, Milkman, & Bazerman, 2007) examined ordering choices in the context of an online grocery delivery service, ir^ which customers place their orders online, and the order arrives within a few days. In general, as the time between the order and the requested delivery increases, customers spend a higher percentage of their order on "should" items (such as vegetables) than on "want" items (such as ice cream). Finally, Rogers and Bazerman (2008) explore the support that citizens have for policies that pit what they think they should support versus what they want to support. An example of this conflict is a gas tax, which most people do not want, yet believe that they should support.
Rogers and Bazerman (2008) find that support for such "should" policies goes up significantly if the policy will be implemented in the future rather than immediately. Such contradictions between decisions made at different time periods can be traced to the vividness of present concerns. Obviously, we care most about what is happening to us in the present moment, since that is what we are actually experiencing. If you're craving Ben & Jerry's ice cream, you want it now, not later, and certainly not in a couple of days. Notably, our differing temporal preferences are rooted in our biology.
When we consider an immediate reward, the emotional centers in our brains are activated. When we consider a delayed reward, it is the more rational and reflective prefrontal cortex that is most active (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). Reconciling Internal Conflicts The research on internal inconsistency raises important questions. For our own long-term health and safety, should we try to allow the "should" self to completely control our decisions? Or does the "want" self have something valuable to add to improve the decisions of the "should" self?
We offer advice on this issue from three areas: economics, Raiffa's decision-analysis perspective (see Chapter 1), and a negotiation framework (developed further in Chapter 9). Advice from Economists Economists such as Schelling (1984) and Thaler (1980) argue that the key to resolving our internal conflicts is to create a means of controlling the destructive impulses of the short-term decision maker. Because the "should" self is the planner, it can develop advance schemes to corral, co-opt, or control the "want" self. Thaler and Shefrin (1981) compare the multiple-selves problem to the agency problem faced by the owner of a firm who employs a clever but self-interested manager. The owner's challenge is to structure the manager's job in a way that makes the manager want to act in the owner's best interest.
In this metaphor, the firm's owner is the "should" self, planning to control the impulses of the manager's "want" self. Specifically, the "should" self could search for ways to bring the interests of the two selves into alignment. For the dieter, this might mean finding enjoyable forms of physical exercise and making sure that healthful food is available when the "want" self gets hungry. The "should" self might also anticipate situations in which passion tends to overcome reason and avoid those situations entirely, as Mark Merrill tried to do when he put his name on Indiana's gambling self-exclusion list. Some casinos offer their own self-exclusion lists for problem gamblers, but casino managers have proven quite accommodating to gamblers who change their minds and take themselves off the list (Holt, 2006).
For precisely this reason, inflexible precommitment can increase the effectiveness of such rules. For example, alcoholics can take a drug called Antabuse, which produces violent nausea if they subsequently consume alcohol. Similarly, paternalistic outside parties (such as parents, an employer, or the government) sometimes try to help people avoid succumbing to the "want" self. Many states try to protect consumers from short-term impulses by legislating revocability periods for high-priced items (e.g., condominium share purchases). Advice from Decision Theorists The multiple-selves problem implies that, in the words of Walt Whitman (1855/2001), we each "contain multitudes." Acknowledging this complexity represents a challenge for decision analysts, who usually assume When Emotion and Cognition Collide • 89 decision makers have coherent and internally consistent preferences.
Howard Raiffa's (1968) approach to the problem is particularly intriguing. He advocates acknowledging such internal inconsistencies, as well as the fact that two competing preferences cannot both be in an individual's interest. Specifically, Raiffa recommends questioning each self to find out which one is making the error. Perhaps the "should" self can confront the "want" self with its limited perspective—for example, the danger of ignoring long-term implications of a decision. Alternatively, it could be that the "want" self can elucidate for the "should" self some of the more elusive feelings that the "should" self has neglected by its formal analysis.
Raiffa suggests that this communication should take place until reconciliation occurs. Raiffa's approach recognizes the importance of giving voice, opportunity, and input to the emotional and visceral needs of the "want" self. As Loewenstein (1996) notes, the "want" self can provide valuable input: "Hunger signals the need for nutritional input, pain indicates the impingement of some type of potentially harmful environmental factors, and emotions serve a range of interrupting, prioritizing, and energizing functions." Advice from Negotiation Researchers Raiffa's approach assumes that the two parts of the self can negotiate a settlement to their differences, given their mutual dependence on each other.
Yet we can all think of instances in which the "should" self made a decision with the logic of self-interest, only to be later overruled by the impulsive behavior of the "want" self. For example, a diet or exercise regime could be sabotaged by an individual's failure to reconcile the "want" self to the "should" self s new agenda. For this reason, we recommend the development of a rational negotiation strategy for dealing with the "want" self. Our modification of Raiffa's advice grants the "want" self more autonomy and a stronger voice in the decision-making and negotiation process. By treating the "want" self as a negotiator who has the power to declare an impasse, we aim to bypass both the domination of the "should" self in the decisionmaking stage and the domination of the "want" self in the implementation stage.
We suggest that you impose several criteria on your negotiation between the "want" and "should" selves. First, require the two sides to reach an agreement, as ongoing conflict would lead the "should" self to continue to make a variety of decisions that the "want" self sabotages. Second, the agreement should be Pareto efficient (see Chapter 9); that is, there should be no other agreement that the "want" self and the "should" self both prefer over the created agreement." This agreement might be reached through "discussions" and compromises between the two selves about key issues—for example, how often the "want" self will get to eat ice cream, how many days a week the "should" self will exercise, and so on. By both selves agreeing to reasonable times and limits, the "want" self is likely to be more willing to follow the agreement. Third, the "should" self must not push for an agreement that is outside the bargaining zone; that is, the terms must not be unacceptable to the "want" self, either currently or in the future. The "should" self must remember that there is no court of law for suing yourself for a contract violation—the "want" self can void the contract at any time.
Paper For Above instruction
When emotion and cognition collide, internal conflicts within individuals often manifest, influencing decision-making in profound ways. This interplay between emotional impulses and rational thought shapes behaviors ranging from trivial daily choices to significant life decisions. Analyzing these internal conflicts through psychological, neuroscientific, and economic perspectives offers valuable insights into human behavior, self-control, and the potential pathways to reconcile conflicting internal selves.
The myth of Ulysses and the Sirens provides a classic illustration of internal conflict between emotion and reason. Ulysses recognized the danger of succumbing to the Sirens' alluring song but sought to experience it nonetheless. His strategy—having his men plug their ears with wax and binding himself to the mast—epitomizes an attempt to control emotional impulses through pre-planned, rational measures. This myth encapsulates the broader human struggle: the desire to indulge one’s passions versus the need for self-control to avoid destructive outcomes. This internal conflict is often mirrored in modern decision-making, where individuals grapple with urges that conflict with their long-term interests.
Psychologically, humans experience a fundamental tension between their immediate desires and their long-term aspirations. The "want" and "should" dichotomy epitomizes this dichotomy, with the former driven by visceral, emotional reactions, and the latter guided by rational planning and moral considerations. The affect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2002) exemplifies how emotional reactions can automatically influence judgments, often in opposition to reasoned decisions (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 1998). Consequently, individuals frequently face choices where their emotional self favors immediate