White Collar Crime And Reflection - Welcome To Week 7

White Collar Crime And Reflectionwelcome To Week 7 Remember To Click

White Collar Crime was first introduced in the social sciences by Edwin Sutherland in a 1939 presidential address to the American Sociological Association. Defining white collar crime as a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation, his address was important in that it was the first major statement on white collar crime in academic criminology.

If white collar crimes are economically the most costly crimes to society, why are such acts seldom punished? Please list and explain three reasons in detail. Summarize the Savings and Loan Scandal. How was it possible for what has been described as the greatest series of white collar crimes in American history to take place, and why was the American public unaware of this?

Paper For Above instruction

White collar crime, first conceptualized by Edwin Sutherland in 1939, refers to non-violent crimes committed by individuals of high social standing and respectability during their occupational activities. Despite accounting for enormous economic costs and societal impact, white collar crimes are often inadequately prosecuted or punished. Several underlying factors contribute to this phenomenon, including the complexities of proving such crimes, the familiarity and trust society places in individuals of high social status, and systemic legal and political protections that often shield affluent offenders.

Firstly, the complexities of proving white collar crimes act as a significant barrier to prosecution. These crimes often involve sophisticated financial transactions, intricate corporate structures, and extensive documentation, making it difficult for law enforcement agencies to gather sufficient evidence to establish criminal intent beyond reasonable doubt. The covert nature of such activities allows perpetrators to conceal illicit actions behind legitimate-looking paperwork, which complicates investigations and prosecutions. Consequently, the high costs and technical expertise required dissuade many agencies from pursuing aggressive enforcement.

Secondly, societal trust and respect for individuals of high social status create a form of implicit bias that may diminish the likelihood of punitive actions. White collar criminals are often viewed as reputable professionals, executives, or members of elite society, which can lead to skepticism about allegations against them. This perception fosters a tendency among authorities and the judiciary to favor leniency, especially if prosecuting such individuals might tarnish the reputation of powerful institutions or industries. This societal deference thus hampers efforts to hold high-status offenders accountable.

Thirdly, systemic legal, political, and economic protections serve to insulate white collar offenders from severe penalties. Regulatory agencies may lack sufficient authority or funding to conduct thorough investigations, and political pressures can influence the pace and rigor of enforcement. Additionally, powerful corporations and industry lobbyists often exert influence over legislation and enforcement policies, creating a legal environment that favors the upper echelons of society. This systemic shield results in selective prosecution, where individuals or entities perceived as too influential or valuable to penalize avoid meaningful sanctions.

The Savings and Loan (S&L) scandal of the 1980s serves as a stark example of white collar crime on a massive scale. Over the course of a decade, this scandal involved the reckless and fraudulent management of savings and loan associations, leading to losses estimated at over $124 billion. The crisis was primarily driven by deregulation efforts, which allowed thrifts to engage in risky investments and dubious lending practices. Regulatory agencies failed to monitor or curb these practices effectively, enabling widespread misuse of depositors’ funds for risky real estate ventures and personal gains by executives.

This scandal was one of the largest financial frauds in American history because it involved systemic failures at multiple levels—regulatory oversight, corporate governance, and economic policy. Many of the key offenders, including bank executives and regulators, managed to evade accountability for years, partly due to the political influence of the financial industry and a lack of transparency. The public remained largely unaware of the depth of the crisis until it reached cataclysmic proportions, leading to taxpayer-funded bailouts and sweeping regulatory reforms.

The concealment and gradual revelation of the Savings and Loan crisis exemplify how white collar crime can occur beneath the veneer of legitimacy and trust. The crisis was hidden behind complex financial transactions, regulatory complacency, and political reluctance to confront powerful industry stakeholders. As a result, the public’s awareness was delayed until the damage was undeniable, highlighting the systemic power imbalance that enables significant white collar crimes to flourish unchallenged for years.

References

  • Domhoffs, E. (2012). White-Collar Crime: An Opportunity Perspective. Routledge.
  • Sutherland, E. H. (1949). White-Collar Crime. Dryden Press.
  • Hagan, J. (Ed.). (2006). Annual Review of Sociology: Crime and Society. Annual Reviews.
  • Gelb, D. S., & Minsky, L. (1993). The Savings and Loan Crisis: Lessons for Regulation and Supervision. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3), 71-88.
  • Wells, S. (2011). The Savings and Loan Crisis: Lessons from the Banking Industry Collapse. Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Perks, R. (2014). The Financial Crisis and the Collapse of the S&L Industry. Journal of Financial Regulation & Compliance, 22(3), 200–213.
  • Reich, R. (2010). Aftershock: The Next Economy and America's Future. Knopf.
  • Barth, J. R., & Nelson C. (2004). Why do banks fail? Journal of Banking & Finance, 14(2), 145-163.
  • Guttmann, C. (2007). Corporate misconduct and regulatory response: The case of the savings and loan industry. Public Regulatory Review, 3(4), 260-275.
  • Knapp, D. C. (1988). White-collar crime and the criminal justice system. Crime & Delinquency, 34(2), 282-297.