Why Did Assad Win? Was President Obama Correct To Announce T

Why Did Assad Win? Was President Obama Correct to Announce That “the Time Has Come for President Assad to Step Aside” in Aug. 2011? What Should the U.S. Have Done?

The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, has been one of the most complex and devastating conflicts in the modern Middle East. Bashar al-Assad's victory over various opposition factions raises critical questions about the factors that contributed to his survival and the broader implications of international responses, particularly the stance taken by the United States. This essay explores why Assad was able to retain power, evaluates President Obama's assertion in August 2011 that Assad should step aside, and examines what actions the U.S. might have undertaken to influence the outcome more effectively. The analysis will demonstrate that Assad's resilience was rooted in a combination of strategic military support, a rigid state apparatus, and regional geopolitics, while also critiquing the Obama administration's limited intervention and proposing alternative strategies that could have potentially altered the course of the conflict.

Introduction

The rise and persistence of Bashar al-Assad's regime have confounded expectations. Initially perceived as a fragile dictatorship, Assad managed to maintain control amidst widespread protests and brutal repression. The international community, especially the U.S., believed that Assad's removal was essential for regional stability and democratic transition, prompting President Obama in August 2011 to declare that the "time has come for President Assad to step aside." However, Assad’s survival suggests a confluence of internal resilience and external backing that official American rhetoric underestimated. This essay investigates the underlying reasons for Assad’s victory, assesses the validity of the early U.S. position, and evaluates the options available to Washington in shaping the conflict’s trajectory.

Factors Contributing to Assad’s Victory

One of the primary reasons for Assad’s endurance was his strategic consolidation of power through a sophisticated network of patronage, security forces, and military backing. According to Joshua Landis, Assad’s regime benefitted from a well-entrenched security apparatus that prioritized loyalty over ideology, ensuring the loyalty of key military and intelligence officials¹. This internal cohesion allowed him to survive multiple offensives and protests that threatened his rule.

Externally, Iran and Russia played pivotal roles in sustaining Assad’s regime. Iran provided vital military advisors, arms, and financial support, effectively serving as the backbone of Assad’s survival². Russia’s direct military intervention from 2015 onward marked a turning point, providing Assad with air support, military advisors, and diplomatic backing that helped shift the balance of power on the battlefield³. Without this external support, the opposition might have succeeded early in the conflict.

Another key aspect of Assad’s resilience was regional geopolitics. Turkey’s ambiguous stance and support for certain opposition factions, alongside U.S. hesitance, fragmented the opposition and delayed a unified front against Assad⁴. The regional rivalries between Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia created a complex proxy war environment where Assad’s survival was facilitated by external patronage and regional strategic calculations.

Was President Obama Correct to Call for Assad to Step Aside?

In August 2011, President Obama declared that Assad should step aside, indicating a clear U.S. preference for regime change. While this stance aligned with democratic ideals and regional stability concerns, its practical implications were problematic. The optimistic expectation that Assad would voluntarily relinquish power proved unfounded. As Landis notes, regime change in Syria was complicated by Assad’s control of key military and security forces, and U.S. rhetoric did little to influence his decision-making⁵.

Moreover, the Obama administration’s reluctance to intervene militarily limited Washington’s ability to shape the conflict’s outcome. The U.S. lacked a coherent plan to support opposition forces beyond limited aid, and its focus on diplomatic negotiations, such as the Geneva talks, failed to produce tangible results. In this context, the call for Assad to step down carried symbolic weight but lacked enforceability or a clear strategy for achieving regime change, which allowed Assad to fracture the opposition and consolidate power.

What Should the U.S. Have Done?

The alternative strategic approach for the United States should have involved a more proactive and coordinated effort, blending diplomatic, economic, and military tools. First, the U.S. could have bolstered moderate opposition groups by providing covert military assistance, training, and resources to establish a credible alternative government. This approach would have increased pressure on Assad while avoiding the direct troop commitments that could have entangled the U.S. in another protracted conflict⁶.

Second, the U.S. should have forged stronger regional and international coalitions, including coordinating with Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Turkey to create a unified front that prioritized regime change and stabilization efforts. Diplomatic efforts could have been coupled with targeted sanctions and efforts to isolate Assad’s regime financially and politically, further weakening his internal support⁷.

Third, the U.S. might have considered establishing a safe zone or no-fly zone with multinational support, which could have protected civilians and created safe havens for opposition forces. While controversial and requiring significant military commitment, such measures could have altered the battlefield dynamics and increased the opposition’s leverage

. However, these options carried risks, including escalation with Russia and Iran, which ultimately constrained American options.

Conclusion

Assad's victory in Syria resulted from a complex interplay of internal resilience, external support, and regional geopolitics, which outmaneuvered limited U.S. intervention and diplomatic efforts. President Obama’s call in 2011 for Assad to step aside reflected a strategic desire for regime change but lacked the practical tools and commitment necessary to effectuate such a transition. A more comprehensive approach, combining covert support to opposition forces, regional coordination, and targeted military intervention, might have increased the chances of a different outcome. Ultimately, Syria’s conflict underscores the importance of credible threat and intervention strategies in responding to civil wars driven by entrenched authoritarian regimes and external patrons.

List of Sources

• Landis, Joshua. "Why Assad Is Likely to Survive to 2013," Middle East Policy, 19:1 (Spring 2012): 72-85.
• Gelvin, James. The New Middle East. Oxford University Press, 2011.
• Lund, Aron. "The Free Syrian Army Doesn't Exist," Syrian Comment, March 16, 2013.
• Judis, John. "America’s Failure — and Russia and Iran’s Success — in Syria’s Cataclysmic Civil War," TPM, January 10, 2017.
• “60 Minutes,” CBS, September 15, 2013, "The Briefer: Ex-CIA No. 2 on Syria crisis."
• “Libya’s civil war: The four-year descent from Arab spring to factional chaos,” The Economist, January 10, 2015.
• Lynch, Mark. "The New Arab Order," Foreign Affairs, September/October 2018.
• Graham Allison, "The Myth of the Liberal Order," Foreign Affairs, June 14, 2018.
• Mearsheimer, John. "U.S. Policy in the Middle East," Lobelog, January 2017.
• Morell, Mike. Testimony before Congress, 2013.