Write Two Classmate Responses On The New International Econo

Write two classmate responses on the New International Economic

Write two classmate responses on the New International Economic Order (NIEO).

For Rafael: assess whether the NIEO failed or succeeded from multiple perspectives, noting that despite criticisms, institutions like the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNCTAD emerged and contributed to development and trade equity.

For Absalom Stroman: explain why the NIEO campaign failed, focusing on political will, power disparities, and external opposition from developed countries.

Provide an academically reasoned analysis with evidence from development literature.

Paper For Above Instructions

The New International Economic Order (NIEO) emerged in the 1970s as a collective push from developing countries and sympathetic international organizations toward a more equitable global economic system. Its core aims were to reform the rules governing trade, finance, technology transfer, and external debt so that developing countries could escape chronic dependence and accelerate their development. The NIEO was framed not merely as aid but as a redefinition of the international economic architecture to reflect political and economic realities of a post‑colonial world. Institutions such as UNESCO and UNICEF, alongside specialized bodies, provided political and normative support for a more just distribution of resources, while the movement sought to recalibrate power dynamics that historically favored the developed world. This historical setting matters because it illuminates why the NIEO was both appealing to many governments and vulnerable to opposition from powerful actors who benefited from the status quo (UNCTAD, 1974; UNDP, 1990).

Rafael’s perspective reflects a nuanced assessment that the NIEO’s legacy cannot be reduced to a simple success/failure dichotomy. He acknowledges that the NIEO did not fully overhaul the global order and that sovereign and political constraints limited the implementation of its broader reforms. Yet he also points to constructive outcomes that emerged in its wake. One important argument is that the NIEO stimulated the creation and empowerment of development-oriented institutions and policy debates that endured beyond the formal life of the proposal. For example, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) intensified its focus on poverty reduction, capabilities, and human development, while UNCTAD expanded its work on trade, development, and policy space for the Global South. These institutional developments helped to embed a more development‑friendly discourse within international economics, even if the NIEO’s sweeping structural reforms did not materialize in full (UNDP, 1990; UNCTAD, 1974).

Rafael also notes that, from a developmentalist perspective, the NIEO advanced the idea that development requires not just aid but a rebalanced set of economic rules and inclusive growth mechanisms. The emergence of policies and programs that sought to diversify export baskets, improve terms of trade, and promote targeted investment in human capital can be read as indirect, long‑term beneficiaries of NIEO thinking. UNDP’s later work on poverty reduction and human development indicators helped shift policy priorities toward people-centered development, while UNCTAD’s analysis emphasized the interdependence of trade liberalization and development outcomes. From this vantage point, the NIEO contributed to a more plural and policy‑receptive global governance environment, even if a comprehensive policy package never came to fruition (Gill, 1987; Helleiner, 1994).

From a broader scholarly standpoint, Rafael’s argument aligns with critiques that while the NIEO failed to deliver a wholesale reordering of the international economy, it succeeded in reframing the terms of debate about fairness, development, and sovereignty. It catalyzed critical scholarship on global governance that persisted through subsequent decades, influencing discussions about debt, technology transfer, and the legitimacy of existing institutions. The NIEO also highlighted the tension between the goals of developing countries and the political economy of the established powers, a tension that continued to shape international economic negotiations well into the late 20th and early 21st centuries (Thirlwall, 1988; Amin, 1976).

In sum, Rafael’s assessment captures a balanced view: the NIEO did not immediately transform the structure of global capital and trade, but it contributed to durable institutional and discursive change that constrained and redirected how development was understood and pursued. The creation and sustenance of development‑oriented entities such as UNDP and UNCTAD illustrate that the NIEO’s influence extended beyond its immediate policy proposals, fostering a more equitable rhetoric and additional policy space for developing countries to pursue growth with greater consideration for social outcomes (UNDP, 1990; UNCTAD, 1974).

Absalom Stroman’s perspective emphasizes the political economy of failure. He attributes the NIEO campaign’s shortcomings primarily to the balance of power in international relations: the developed world’s willingness to defend privileged access to markets, technology, and capital constrained the NIEO’s ability to compel meaningful reform. External opposition—through political pressure, veto power in international forums, and the persistence of conditionality tied to structural adjustment—undermined collective action among developing countries. This analysis also points to the contradictions within the South, where diverging interests, economic inertia, and short‑term domestic concerns complicated unified bargaining positions. In such a configuration, the NIEO’s comprehensive reform agenda faced a formidable opposition that leveraged existing institutions and the prevailing neoliberal paradigm to reassert market liberalization and financial stability as core policy blueprints (Gill, 1987; O’Brien, 1992).

Stroman’s one‑word thematic takeaway, when embedded within a broader analytic frame, is that the NIEO campaign failed not solely due to lack of good intentions but because of structural power asymmetries and the geopolitical economy that privileged wealthy states. The United States, Western European powers, and financial institutions asserted a preference for liberalization, open capital markets, and conditional aid that reinforced the asymmetries the NIEO sought to address. This pattern of resistance manifested in the late 1970s and 1980s as debt crises, policy conditionalities, and the ascendancy of market-led development strategies, all of which eroded momentum for a quasi‑revolutionary economic order (Helleiner, 1994; Rodrik, 2011).

Despite the ultimately mixed record of NIEO goals in the 1970s and beyond, the campaign can be seen as a catalyst for ongoing reforms in the international order. It spurred a more explicit engagement with development finance, trade justice, and the governance of global economic institutions. The more modest, yet consequential, outcomes—such as strengthened policy space in some developing countries, greater attention to human development, and increased debate about fair trade and debt relief—represent a durable, if incremental, shift toward a more inclusive global economy. The NIEO’s legacy persists in contemporary discourses around sustainable development, equitable trade, and reform of international financial architecture (Sachs, 1990; Stiglitz, 2002).

References

• United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (1974). The New International Economic Order: Background and Implications. Geneva: UNCTAD.
• United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (1990). Human Development Report 1990. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Gill, S. (1987). Power and Resistance in the NIEO. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 16(3), 393-405.
• Helleiner, E. (1994). States and the Reemergence of Global Economic Governance. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
• Thirlwall, A. P. (1988). Growth and Development with NIEO: A Theoretical Perspective. London: Macmillan.
• Amin, S. (1976). Economic Development and Unequal Exchange. New York: Monthly Review Press.
• O’Brien, R. (1992). Global Political Economy. London: HarperCollins.
• Rodrik, D. (2011). The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the Global Economy. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
• Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
• Panitch, L., & Gindin, S. (1989). The NIEO and the Politics of Development. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.