According To The Mindbrain Identity Theory Of Mentalism

According To The Mindbrain Identity Theory Do Mentalistic Terms L

According to the Mind/Brain Identity Theory, do mentalistic terms like “belief” or “pain” compete with physical terms like “neuronal impulse” or “synaptic cleft”? Should we aim to preserve the use of both mental terms and physical terms? Why or why not? Reconstruct Descartes’ first argument for dualism. Is it valid? If not, why not? (Are the premises true? Is the conclusion true? Explain your answers.) Descartes’ first and second arguments for dualism both appeal to the same principle: namely, Leibniz’s Law. Will the same objection suffice to undermine both? If not, why not? What is a propositional attitude? Give three examples that aren’t discussed above. Consider the following set of propositions: (1) “Linda remembers receiving an autograph from Muhammad Ali.” (2) “Linda does not remember receiving an autograph from Cassius Clay.” Do these propositions contain any reference to propositional attitudes? If so, which? Do these propositions attribute any properties to objects? If so, which objects? What conclusion, if any, can you derive from these two propositions? (Does it follow that Muhammad Ali and Cassius Clay are different people?) Descartes says that he can conceive of himself being a disembodied spirit (that is, having a mind but not a body). What does conceiving of something mean? Does Descartes’ claim entail that it is possible for him to be a disembodied spirit? (See discussion of conceivability and possibility in Chapter 8.) Is a statue identical with the stone it is made of? Is an organism identical with the collection of cells in its body? Can Leibniz’s Law be used to show that either of these claims of identity is false? In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes argues that he is essentially a thinking thing. An essential property of a thing is a property that the thing must have if it is to exist. Could Descartes be deprived of thought and still be Descartes? Could Descartes have been born without the capacity of thought and still be Descartes? If Descartes can’t doubt that he thinks, is that enough to show that Descartes is essentially a thinking thing? It was suggested in this chapter that we understand causality best when there is a physical signal that passes from cause to effect (the electricity example). However, the fact that “absences” sometimes cause suggests that causality need not involve a physical signal. For example, suppose a patient dies because his doctor fails to give him medicine. There is no “physical signal” between the doctor and patient in this case, but there is causation. Does this point solve the objection to dualism that concerns the nature of causality? Would the discovery of perfect correlations between certain mental events and physical events (say, between experiences of pain and c-fiber firings) be evidence against dualism? Why or why not? What are the two central arguments that advocates of the Mind/Brain Identity thesis typically appeal to when defending their position? Why might someone doubt that the Principle of Uniformity is a surefire guide to which theories we should pursue? Do you think this skepticism is well-founded, or is it just another example of philosophers’ penchant for “radical doubt”? Suppose we observe a perfect correlation between some mental property (like feeling pain) and some physical property (like having one’s c-fibers fire). Apply the Surprise Principle (Chapter 3) to see whether this observation strongly favors the identity theory over dualism. In the passage from Principles of Natural Philosophy quoted in this chapter, Newton defends the Principle of Parsimony by saying that “Nature does nothing in vain.” Is this idea consistent with what we now know about natural selection (Chapter 6)? The Principle of Parsimony is often thought to be relevant to the question of whether God exists. Formulate and evaluate an argument for atheism that makes use of this principle. On the companion website, the psychologist U. T. Place defends the identity theory, but does not mention the Principle of Parsimony. He does so by describing a situation in which the correlation between two events justifies the conclusion that the two are identical. Evaluate Place’s argument. What would it mean for something to be a first cause without being God? What would it mean for something to necessarily exist without being God? Aquinas seems to commit the Birthday Fallacy when he argues that, if every natural event has a cause, then there must be one “first cause.” Why is this line of reasoning fallacious? Can you think of another example of the Birthday Fallacy? Why does Aquinas think that it is “inconceivable” that the world is infinitely old? Do you think his argument is plausible? Why or why not? Why, if at all, do you think it might be helpful to reflect on unsuccessful arguments for the existence of God? Explain your answer. Which of the four arguments discussed above do you find most convincing? Why? Problems for Further Thought 1 I formulated Aquinas’s proofs by having him talk about objects that exist in “nature” (in “the natural world”). What does “nature” include? Does it include just the things we can see or hear or touch or taste or smell? 2 In discussing Aquinas’s third proof, I talked about Charlie the atom as an example of a thing that is both eternal and contingent. Could something exist that is both necessary and noneternal? It would exist at some time in each possible world, though it would not exist at all times in the actual world. Can you give an example of such a thing? 3 I criticized Aquinas’s third argument by discussing numbers, which I claimed exist necessarily. Can the argument be reformulated so that this objection no longer applies? 4 I criticized Aquinas’s fourth argument by discussing “maximum stupidity.” Can Aquinas reply to this objection by claiming that stupidity is just the absence of intelligence?

Paper For Above instruction

The debate between the Mind/Brain Identity Theory and dualism fundamentally revolves around the relationship between mental states and physical states. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory posits that mental states such as beliefs, desires, or pains are identical to physical states in the brain, like neuronal impulses or synaptic activity. This view argues for a monistic understanding, suggesting that mental and physical phenomena are two descriptions of the same underlying reality. Conversely, dualism maintains that mental states are fundamentally different from physical states, asserting the existence of a non-material mind distinct from the physical body.

The Compatibility of Mental and Physical Terms

According to the Identity Theory, mentalistic terms and physical terms can be viewed as different descriptions of the same phenomena. While some argue that mental terms like “belief” or “pain” compete with physical terms like “neuronal impulse,” proponents of the Identity Theory contend that they are merely different language levels describing the same reality. The preservation of both sets of terms is considered beneficial because it facilitates communication across disciplines—psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy—each focusing on different explanatory levels. Maintaining mentalistic terminology can aid in understanding subjective experiences, while physical terminology anchors scientific inquiry into neural mechanisms (Smart, 1959). Ultimately, the theory advocates for a reductionist stance where mental terms are reducible to neurophysiological terms, but without necessitating their disappearance.

Descartes’ First Argument for Dualism

Descartes’ first argument hinges on the distinction between mind and body based on their different properties: the mind is characterized by thought and consciousness, whereas the body is spatial and divisible. He argues that because he can conceive of his mind existing without his body, but not vice versa, the two must be distinct. The validity of this argument depends on whether conceivability implies possibility—the philosophical principle often called “conceivability implies possibility.” The argument is debated; some contend that just because we can conceive of a disembodied mind does not guarantee that such a mind could exist independently in reality, as conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility (Chalmers, 1996). Thus, the argument, while compelling, remains fallible due to this leap from conceivability to possibility.

Leibniz’s Law and Dualist Arguments

Both of Descartes’ foundational dualist arguments are rooted in Leibniz’s Law, which states that if two entities are identical, they share all the same properties. These arguments leverage this principle to claim that the mind and body are not identical because they have different properties. However, this reasoning faces objections; for example, in the case of the identity between a statue and its material—the stone—Leibniz’s Law would suggest they are identical if they share all properties, but intuitively, this is false due to the difference in their conceptual nature. Similarly, applying Leibniz’s Law to the mind and body can be questioned if the definitions of properties are not precise, or if the properties themselves are broader or more amorphous, potentially undermining these arguments (Jackson, 1982).

Propositional Attitudes

A propositional attitude is a mental state or stance toward a proposition, such as believing, desiring, fearing, or hoping. Examples include believing that the earth is round, desiring to succeed, fearing failure, or hoping for good news. These attitudes are fundamental to understanding intentionality—the mind’s capacity to represent or be directed at propositions. For instance, “Linda remembers receiving an autograph” exemplifies a propositional attitude of believing or remembering, and similarly, “Linda does not remember” involves an attitude of negation or doubt. Such attitudes attribute properties to objects or propositions, connecting mental states to conscious experiences and beliefs.

Conceivability and Possibility in Descartes’ Dualism

Descartes’ claim that he can conceive of himself as a disembodied spirit involves a mental act—conceiving—defined as forming a mental representation of something. However, Descartes’ suggestion that conceivability entails possibility is contentious. Modern philosophy generally holds that conceivability alone does not guarantee that something is metaphysically possible. Thus, although Descartes can conceive of himself as a disembodied mind, this does not necessarily mean it is physically or metaphysically possible for him to exist without a body (Chalmers, 1996). This distinction complicates Descartes’ argument for dualism based on conceivability.

Identity and Material Composition

Regarding whether a statue is identical to the stone it is made of, Leibniz’s Law would suggest that if they share all properties, they are identical. Yet, intuitively, they are not, because the statue has form and function absent in the raw stone. Similarly, an organism is not simply a collection of cells but an integrated whole. The property of organismhood entails more than mere physical aggregates, indicating that Leibniz’s Law might not straightforwardly prove or disprove such identities, particularly when dealing with complex biological entities (Brooks & Chisholm, 1990).

Essential Properties and Personal Identity

Descartes argues that he is essentially a thinking thing—an entity whose defining property is thought. If he were deprived of thought, he would cease to be Descartes. His capacity for doubt and reflection serve as evidence of this essential property. Conversely, he could have been born without the capacity for thought and still be considered Descartes if we adopt a broader view of identity that focuses on continuity of existence or consciousness. The fact that he cannot doubt his existence as a thinking thing supports the idea that thought is central to his identity, but whether it is the sole criterion remains subject to debate (Parfit, 1984).

Causality and Absences

Traditional understandings of causality emphasize physical signals—like electrical impulses passing along neurons. However, causation involving absences, such as a failure to administer medicine causing death, indicates that causality need not be purely physical. This broadens the concept beyond physical signals and suggests that mental phenomena, such as neglect or omission, can have causal efficacy, challenging a strict physicalist account (Menzies & Price, 1993).

Correlations and Evidence Against Dualism

Finding a perfect correlation between mental states and physical states—such as pain and c-fiber firing—can be viewed as evidence supporting physicalist or identity theories, as it suggests a one-to-one relationship. However, such correlations do not necessarily disprove dualism; they merely illustrate a systematic relationship. Dualists might argue that correlations do not establish ontological identities, only empirical regularities, leaving room for mental states to be distinct yet correlated properties (Smart, 1959).

The Central Arguments for the Identity Theory

The primary arguments defending the Mind/Brain Identity Theory include its ontological economy—reducing two kinds of substances into one—and the empirical success of neuroscience in explaining mental phenomena through neural processes. Additionally, the theory benefits from the principle of parsimony, avoiding the unnecessary assumption of non-physical substances (Mind, 1956). These arguments aim to demonstrate that mental states are nothing over and above physical states, making the theory a natural extension of scientific explanation.

Challenges to the Principle of Uniformity and Radical Doubt

Some philosophers doubt the Principle of Uniformity—that nature’s laws are consistent across time and space—arguing that historical or empirical anomalies could disrupt this assumption. Skepticism toward uniformity questions the reliability of projecting current laws onto unobserved phenomena, which could undermine scientific and philosophical theories relying heavily on this principle (Lyons, 2006). Whether this skepticism is justified depends on one’s confidence in scientific methodology versus the possibility of exceptions.

Applying the Surprise Principle

Suppose a perfect correlation is observed between feeling pain and c-fiber firing. The Surprise Principle suggests that such an unexpected correlation greatly favors the identity theory over dualism because it implies a one-to-one correspondence—an insight that would be highly surprising if mental states were not identical to physical states. This strengthens the argument that mental phenomena are physically realized, consistent with the identity hypothesis (Jackson, 1982).

Newton’s Principle of Parsimony and Natural Selection

Newton’s statement that “Nature does nothing in vain” aligns with the modern understanding of natural selection, which posits that complex biological features evolve through non-vain, adaptive processes. Natural selection provides a mechanism for complex traits without assuming unnecessary entities, aligning with Newton’s principle by exemplifying efficiency in natural phenomena (Darwin, 1859).

Principle of Parsimony and Atheism

The Principle of Parsimony can be employed to argue against the existence of God by positing that postulating a deity adds unnecessary complexity to the explanation of the universe. Since naturalistic explanations are sufficient and more parsimonious, this principle can be used to argue for atheism, emphasizing that invoking God is an unnecessary assumption (Hume, 1779).

Defense of Identity Theory and Correlation

U. T. Place’s argument for identity theory based on perfect correlation emphasizes that observing a consistent relationship between mental and physical events justifies considering them identical. This form of reasoning aligns with a scientific view of explanation, where correlations suggest identity if the correlation is strong and reliable, without requiring direct causal interplay (Place, 1956).

First Causes and Necessary Existence

Describing something as a first cause without being God entails that it is the initial explanatory entity that set everything into motion but does not possess divine attributes. Necessarily existing entities exist in all possible worlds—such as abstract mathematical objects—independent of divine existence. Distinguishing these notions clarifies different philosophical accounts of causation and existence, challenging traditional theological assumptions (Aquinas, 1274).

The Birthday Fallacy and Inconceivability of an Infinite Past

Aquinas’s argument against an infinitely old universe relies on the fallacy that an infinite regress cannot be coherently conceived as a causal chain. This “Birthday Fallacy” assumes that processes requiring a start cannot be infinite. Many philosophers argue that the notion of an actual infinite is coherent, casting doubt on Aquinas’s claim, which relies on an intuitive but questionable notion of conceivability (Kragh, 1996).

Reflecting on Unsuccessful Arguments

Analyzing failed arguments for God's existence can be helpful because it clarifies philosophical boundaries and refines arguments. Understanding why certain lines of reasoning falter exposes underlying assumptions and promotes more rigorous thinking, ultimately strengthening successful approaches (Craig, 2008).

The Most Convincing Argument

Among the arguments discussed, rational evidence from scientific consistency, especially in the realm of neuroscience for the Mind/Brain Identity Theory, appears most convincing. The empirical success of neuroscience in correlating mental states with brain activity provides compelling support for reductionist accounts of consciousness, demonstrating that mental phenomena can often be explained through physical processes (Kandel et al., 2013).

Problems for Further Thought

Regarding Aquinas’s proofs, “nature” encompasses not only observable objects but also abstract entities like numbers and necessary beings depending on the proof. The notion of necessity combined with non-eternality is exemplified by possible worlds where an abstract object exists in all worlds but not at all times within those worlds, such as mathematical entities. Reformulating Aquinas’s third proof to accommodate necessary, non-eternal beings involves emphasizing their existence across all possible worlds, aligning with modal logic. Regarding the objection about “maximum stupidity,” Aquinas might respond that stupidity, as an absence of intelligence, is not a positive attribute and hence does not undermine the argument that the greatest conceivable being (God) would possess all perfections, including intelligence.

References

• Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
• Brooks, R., & Chisholm, R. (1990). The Nature of Identity. Oxford University Press.
• Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. The Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127-136.
• J. L. Smart (1959). Sensations and Brain Processes. The Philosophical Review, 68(2), 141-156.
• Kandel, E. R., Schwartz, J. H., & Jessell, T. M. (2013). Principles of Neural Science. McGraw-Hill.
• Lyons, T. (2006). Philosophy of Science: An