Assignment 2: Fair Shares At Center City Anuraphilic Frog Lo
Assignment 2 Fair Sharesthe Center City Anuraphilic Frog Lovers Soc
Assignment 2: Fair Shares The Center City Anuraphilic (frog lovers) society has fallen on hard times. Abraham, Bobby and Charlene are the only remaining members and each feels equally entitled to take possession of the society’s collection of live rare tropical frogs. The decision is made to use the method of sealed bids and fair shares to decide who will take possession of the entire collection and how much will be paid in compensation to the other members. Abraham unseals his estimate of the value of the collection at $12,000.00. Bobby’s estimate of the value of the collection is $6,000.00. Charlene values the collection at $9,000.00. Who receives the collection of frogs? What is each person’s fair share of the monetary value of the collection? Why is the monetary amount of each fair share different? How much money is owed to each of the two people who do not “win” the collection of frogs? In your opinion how “Fair” is the process described above? Now pretending for a moment that you like frogs, we will insert you into the situation under special circumstances. Despite (or perhaps because of) your love of all things amphibious, you currently lack the funds to pay each of the others their probable fair share. You will not receive the collection, but wish to receive as much money as possible. You have no knowledge of the amounts in each of the sealed bids, but strongly suspect that Abraham will bid between $10,000.00 and $12,000.00. Given that you cannot afford to “win” the process, describe how you will go about deciding what to put down for your own estimate of the value of the collection. Comment on your peers' responses, addressing the following: Do your peers' responses address all of the points of the assignment? Are the answers and the reasoning behind those answers clear? By Sunday, February 15, 2015, deliver your assignment to the appropriate Discussion Area. Through Wednesday, February 18, 2015, review and comment on your peers’ responses. Use the Respond link to post responses and materials that pertain to this assignment. Use the Respond link beneath any existing postings to respond to them.
Paper For Above instruction
The scenario involving the Center City Anuraphilic Frog Lovers Society presents a complex decision-making problem rooted in fair division and bargaining theory. The members—Abraham, Bobby, and Charlene—aim to divide a rare tropical frog collection using sealed bids and a fair share method. The critical aspects involve understanding how valuations influence the outcome, the fairness of the process, and strategic behavior when funds are limited. This paper explores these elements in detail, offering insights into equitable resource division, strategic bidding, and the ethical considerations inherent in such negotiations.
Introduction
The challenge faced by the society is emblematic of broader issues in disputes over resource division among stakeholders with varying valuations. When the society’s collection is valued differently, and members submit sealed bids without knowledge of others’ valuations, the process hinges on fairness and strategic incentives. The key questions involve who receives the collection, how the fair shares are calculated, and the implications of strategic underbidding, especially when monetary constraints prevent a participant from winning.
Valuations and Fair Shares
The valuations submitted by Abraham ($12,000), Bobby ($6,000), and Charlene ($9,000) reflect subjective and potentially divergent assessments. The fair share of the collection for each member is calculated by dividing the total valuations by the number of members. The total valuation is $12,000 + $6,000 + $9,000 = $27,000. Dividing this by three gives each person a fair share of $9,000. This means that, in theory, if the collection is valued at $27,000, then each member’s fair share is equally $9,000. The divergence in their valuations explains why the monetary amounts of their fair shares differ from their bid amounts—since the fair value is an average, not necessarily aligned with any individual’s subjective valuation.
Outcome of the Bidding Process
Given Abraham’s highest valuation ($12,000), it is logical that he would win the collection if bids are truthful. Bobby’s valuation ($6,000) is well below the fair share ($9,000), indicating that he perceives less value in the collection and may bid accordingly. Charlene’s valuation at $9,000 aligns with her fair share, suggesting a neutral position. Thus, Abraham is likely to receive the collection in a truthful bidding scenario. The amount owed to the non-winning members, in a fair division, would be their fair shares, or possibly compensation based on the difference between their valuation and what they receive if the process involves equitable payment or transfer of the collection.
Fairness of the Process
The fairness of this procedure depends on perceptions of equitable treatment and strategic honesty. The sealed bid method aims to produce an outcome that reflects individual valuations and ensures that the resource is allocated to the party who values it most. However, potential inequities arise when members bid strategically or when monetary constraints limit participation. The method assumes rational bidding behavior and full information about fair shares, which may not always hold true, raising questions about fairness from a broader ethical perspective.
Considering the Strategic Player with Limited Funds
As an enamored frog lover who cannot afford to win, deciding what to bid requires strategic estimation under uncertainty. Suspecting Abraham’s bid will be between $10,000 and $12,000, and knowing that my funds are insufficient, I would avoid bidding aggressively to prevent unnecessary expenditure. Instead, I might bid just below Abraham’s lower estimate, say around $9,900, effectively positioning myself to maximize potential compensation if the process favors the second-highest bid or if the process involves fair restitution. Alternatively, I might underbid significantly to increase the chances of being compensated for my bid or to signal my valuation without risking a win. This strategic understatement aligns with game-theoretic principles, ensuring minimal loss while potentially benefiting from the process’s redistribution of assets or payments.
Critical Evaluation of Strategies
My peer’s responses should account for all aspects of the assignment—including valuation, fairness, strategic bidding, and ethical considerations. Clear reasoning involves understanding how bids influence outcomes and how strategic underbidding can be advantageous when funds are limited. Effective responses explicitly articulate the rationale behind bid choices, considering the emotional attachment to frogs, the fairness of the process, and economic incentives. Dissecting these responses provides insight into the complex interplay between strategy, fairness, and personal interest in resource division.
Conclusion
The process of fair shares and sealed bids offers a structured approach to resource division among stakeholders with differing valuations. While it aims to maximize fairness and efficiency, strategic behavior and financial constraints can complicate the outcome. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for designing equitable distribution mechanisms and evaluating their ethical implications. In practice, a combination of honest valuation, strategic bidding, and acknowledgment of individual constraints can lead to more just and sustainable resolutions in resource division scenarios.
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