Case Study 101 Resonus Corporation Frank Choy Is Normally A

Case Study 101resonus Corporationfrank Choy Is Normally A Quiet Perso

Case Study 101resonus Corporationfrank Choy is normally a quiet person, but his patience has already been worn thin by interdepartmental battles. Choy joined Resonus Corporation, a hearing aid designer and manufacturer, eight months ago as director of engineering. Production of the latest product has been delayed by two months, and Choy’s engineering services department (ESD)—which prepares final manufacturing specifications—is taking the heat as the main culprit for these delays. Similar delays have been occurring at Resonus for the past few years. The previous engineering director was fired after 18 months; the director before him quit after about the same amount of time.

Bill Hunt, CEO of Resonus for the past 15 years, responded to these problems by urging everyone to remain civil. “I’m sure we can resolve these differences if we just learn to get along better,” he said whenever a dispute broke out. Hunt disliked firing anyone, but he felt the previous engineering director was too confrontational. “I spent too much time smoothing out arguments when he was here,” Hunt thought shortly after Choy was hired. “Frank, on the other hand, seems to fit into our culture of collegiality.” Hunt was groomed by the company’s founder and took great pride in preserving the organization’s family spirit.

He also discouraged bureaucracy, believing that Resonus operated best through informal relationships among its managers. Most Resonus executives were similarly informal, except Jacqui Blanc, the production director, who insisted on strict guidelines. Hunt tolerated Blanc’s formal style because, soon after joining Resonus five years ago, she discovered and cleaned up fraudulent activity involving two production managers and a few suppliers. The organizational chart shows that Frank Choy oversees two departments: ESD and research. In reality, “Doc” Kalandry, the research director, informally reports directly to the CEO (Hunt) and has never considered the director of engineering as his boss.

Hunt actively supports this informal reporting relationship because of Doc’s special status in the organization. “Doc Kalandry is a living genius,” Hunt told Choy shortly after he joined the firm. “With Doc at the helm of research, this company will continue to lead the field in innovation.” Hunt’s first job at Resonus was in the research group, and Choy suspected Hunt still favored that group. Everyone at Resonus seemed to love Doc’s successful products, his quirky style, and his over-the-top enthusiasm, but some of Choy’s ESD staff were also privately concerned. One engineer commented, “Doc is like a happy puppy when he gets a new product idea. He delights in the discovery but also won’t let go of it. He also gets Hunt too enthusiastic. But Doc’s too optimistic; we’ve had hundreds of production change orders already this year. If I were in Frank’s shoes, I’d put my foot down on all this new development.”

Soon after joining Resonus, Choy realized that ESD employees get most of the blame and little of the credit for their work. When production staff find a design fault, they directly contact the research design engineer who developed the technology, rather than the ESD group who prepare the specifications. Research engineers willingly work with production because they don’t want to lose their projects. “The designers seem to feel they’re losing something when one of us [ESD] tries to help,” Choy explained. Meanwhile, production supervisors regularly critique ESD staff, whereas they tend to accept explanations from higher-status research department engineers. “Production routinely complains about every little specification error, many of which are due to design changes made by the research group,” said one frustrated ESD technician. “Many of us have more than 15 years’ experience. We shouldn’t have to prove our ability all the time, but we spend as much time defending ourselves as we do getting the job done.”

Choy’s latest troubles occurred when Doc excitedly told Hunt about new nanoprocessor technology he wanted to install in the forthcoming high-end hearing aid product. As with most of Doc’s previous last-minute revisions, Hunt endorsed this change and asked Choy and Blanc (the production director) to show their commitment, even though production was scheduled to begin in less than three weeks. Choy wanted to protest, knowing that his department would face unexpected incompatibility design errors. Instead, he quietly agreed to Hunt’s request to avoid acting like his predecessor and risking possible dismissal.

Blanc curtly stated that her group was ready if Choy’s ESD unit could deliver accurate production specifications on time and if the sales director would stop making wild delivery promises to customers. When Doc’s revised design specs arrived more than a week later, Choy’s group discovered numerous incompatibilities that had to be corrected. Despite working 12-hour days on revisions, the final specifications weren’t ready until a few days after the deadline. Production returned these specs two days later, noting some elements were too costly or difficult to manufacture. By then, the manufacturing process was delayed by at least two months, provoking the sales director to furious accusations blaming Frank Choy’s incompetence.

Paper For Above instruction

The case study of Resonus Corporation and the leadership challenges faced by Frank Choy illustrates complex organizational dynamics that influence decision-making, power distribution, and interdepartmental relations. Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive understanding of organizational power sources, influence tactics, and strategic management of internal politics to improve overall efficiency and reduce delays.

Sources and Contingencies of Power

In the context of Resonus, power is distributed among various individuals and departments, rooted primarily in expertise, position, and informal influence. Frank Choy’s formal authority as director of engineering provides him with legitimate power; however, his real influence is limited by the informal organizational structures and the informal reporting relationships, notably with Doc Kalandry, who reports directly to the CEO. This informal power dynamic reflects French and Raven’s (1959) sources of power, particularly expert power, as Doc is regarded as a “living genius” whose insights and innovations drive the company’s technological leadership.

Furthermore, Hunt's personal influence—stemming from his long tenure, respected leadership, and informal relationship-building—serves as a powerful contingency, often enabling informal channels that bypass official hierarchies. The CEO’s support of informal relationships enhances the power of those like Doc Kalandry, who possess expert power and are perceived as indispensable to innovation. Conversely, Blanc’s strict adherence to formal guidelines signifies positional power rooted in organizational hierarchy and control over production processes.

Departments also differ in their sources of power. The research department holds informal influence due to its authority over innovation, driven by Doc’s reputation, whereas the engineering department’s power is constrained both by its perceived lack of influence and the organizational culture that favors informal over formal authority structures. The production department’s power is mainly derived from its control over manufacturing capability and operational expertise, yet its influence is limited by prestige and hierarchical status relative to research.

Influence Tactics and Organizational Politics

Various influence tactics are evident throughout the case. Hunt’s endorsement of Doc’s late-stage product changes exemplifies coalition-building and legitimization tactics—aligning organizational support behind Doc’s initiatives, leveraging his reputation and informal influence to push for technological innovations. Choy’s silent acquiescence to Hunt’s directives reveals impression management tactics—trying to maintain harmony and avoid confrontation to keep his job, aligning with the organization’s culture of collegiality.

Meanwhile, the production department’s critique of ESD specifications and the blame game following delays embody political behaviors such as impression management and coalition formation. The sales director’s angry reaction underscores the role of organizational politics—aligning personal or departmental interests over collaborative problem-solving, often leading to finger-pointing during crises.

Some influence tactics could be classified as political acts because they serve to protect personal or departmental interests rather than organizational objectives. For instance, the research department’s informal reporting to Hunt might be seen as an exercise of power based on personal influence, potentially bypassing formal authority to maintain autonomy and control over research outcomes.

Recommendations for Addressing Organizational Problems

As a consultant, improving the delays and interdepartmental conflicts at Resonus requires realigning power dynamics and promoting more effective communication, accountability, and collaborative decision-making. A key strategy involves formalizing the reporting relationships, reducing reliance on informal channels that currently favor influential individuals like Doc Kalandry. Establishing clear authority lines helps ensure that project decisions balance innovation with operational feasibility.

Implementing multidisciplinary project teams—including representatives from research, engineering, and production—can foster shared responsibility and mutual respect. This encourages collaborative problem-solving, reduces blame, and promotes a culture of transparency. Additionally, developing structured processes for handling late-stage design changes—such as a formal review and approval process—can minimize last-minute revisions that disrupt manufacturing schedules.

From a power perspective, it’s important to balance expert power with positional authority, ensuring that influential individuals like Doc Kalandry do not bypass formal channels. This can involve establishing explicit guidelines for innovation and change management, which require cross-departmental approval for significant modifications late in the product development cycle.

To manage organizational politics effectively, leadership must promote a culture of accountability and open communication. Recognizing and rewarding team efforts, rather than individual influence or informal dominance, can shift focus toward organizational goals. Training managers and staff in conflict resolution and influence tactics can mitigate power struggles, encouraging constructive rather than political behaviors.

Finally, fostering a culture that values both innovation and operational practicality helps align departmental objectives. By integrating research, engineering, and production teams through regular, structured communication and shared performance metrics, Resonus can minimize delays, improve product quality, and strengthen interdepartmental relationships.

Conclusion

The case of Resonus underscores the importance of understanding organizational power, influence tactics, and internal politics in managing complex product development processes. Effective organizational change requires balancing informal influence channels with formal authority structures, encouraging transparent communication, and aligning departmental goals through collaborative practices. Implementing these strategies can help reduce delays, improve interdepartmental relations, and enhance the organization’s overall performance.

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