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In Descartes' "Meditations on First Philosophy," he explores foundational questions about the nature of reality, knowledge, and the self. One significant inquiry is why Descartes does not rely solely on sensory experience to determine what is real. He reasons that the senses can deceive us; illusions, hallucinations, and dreams all challenge the reliability of sensory perception as a basis for knowledge (Descartes, 1641/1993). For example, when we see a mirage or a crooked stick in water, our senses mislead us into false beliefs about the world. Because of such potential deception, Descartes argues that external senses cannot serve as a certain foundation for knowledge. Instead, he advocates for a method of radical doubt, stripping away all beliefs that could be subject to doubt until he arrives at something indubitable.

Regarding his own existence, Descartes famously states in Meditation II that "I am; I exist—this is certain." He claims that this knowledge cannot be doubted because the very act of doubt presupposes a thinker or a subject that doubts. To doubt or think, one must exist as something that performs these acts. Thus, even if an all-powerful deceiver were to manipulate our perceptions, the very fact that we are being deceived implies a thinking being. Descartes concludes that the certainty of his own existence as a thinking thing is the first and most fundamental truth (Descartes, 1641/1993). This insight forms the basis for his epistemological project, establishing the self's existence as certain and indubitable, beyond any possibility of doubt.

The nature of the "I" for Descartes is that of a thinking substance, or "res cogitans." He asserts that the true essence of the "I" is thought—deliberation, understanding, willing, and consciousness. Importantly, Descartes emphasizes that this "I" is not identical with the physical body or the material substance ("res extensa"). While the body is a physical, extended thing susceptible to decay and deception, the "I" as a thinking entity is immaterial and non-extended. This distinction leads to a dualist view where mind and body are separate substances. The "I" does not refer solely to the physical body because the body can be doubted as real, yet the thinking "I" remains undeniable, thus establishing the primacy of mind over matter in his philosophy (Descartes, 1641/1993).

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Descartes' skepticism about sensory perception as a reliable source of knowledge stems from the inherent fallibility and susceptibility to deception that the senses exhibit. Our senses often deceive us, as seen in illusions or dreams, which challenge their authority as definitive indicators of reality. As Descartes explains in Meditation I, the fact that senses can deceive indicates that they are not completely reliable. Because of this, he dismisses sensory information as a foundation for certain knowledge, opting instead for a method of radical doubt that seeks to find an indubitable point of certainty (Descartes, 1641/1993).

In Meditation II, Descartes' assertion that "I am; I exist—this is certain," serves as the bedrock of his epistemological framework. He argues that even if an all-powerful deceiver were trying to fool him, the very act of deception presupposes a thinker or a subject engaging in thought. This realization leads to the famous cogito argument, establishing the "I" as an indubitable thinking entity. He trusts this knowledge because it is derived from the very act of doubt and thought, which are impossible to deny once they occur. Therefore, the certainty of his own existence as a thinking being is the first foundation of true knowledge (Descartes, 1641/1993).

The concept of the "I" for Descartes is that of a thinking substance that is immaterial and distinct from the physical body. He describes the "I" as essentially a thinking thing, characterized by consciousness, understanding, and willing. This immaterial "I" does not depend on the body for its existence; rather, it is separate and fundamentally different from the physical substance. Descartes' dualism underscores that while the body is extended and subject to change, the "I" as a thinking entity remains constant and indubitable. This distinction allows Descartes to prioritize the mind's certainty over the unreliable nature of the physical body, positioning the mind as the true self (Descartes, 1641/1993).

References

• Descartes, R. (1993). Meditations on First Philosophy (J. Cottingham, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1641)
• Hatfield, G. (2013). Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy. Routledge.
• Garrett, D. (2014). Descartes’ First Meditation: Skeptical doubt and the possibility of knowledge. Oxford University Press.
• Cottingham, J. (Ed.). (1996). The Cambridge Companion to Descartes. Cambridge University Press.
• Rorty, R. (2002). The illuminate of the mind: Descartes’ metaphysics. University of Chicago Press.
• Williams, B. (2001). Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. Routledge.
• Kenny, A. (2012). The Routledge Guidebook to Descartes’ Meditations. Routledge.
• Gaukroger, S. (1999). Descartes' Natural Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
• Stroll, A. (2000). Descartes’ Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.
• Goldstein, L. (2011). Descartes’s Meditations: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.