Econs 101 Wa 4 Page 1 Of 2 Good For Me, Good For You, Bad Fo

Econs 101 Wa 4page1of2good For Me Good For You Bad For Usduein Nett

Econs 101 Wa 4page1of2good For Me Good For You Bad For Usduein Nett

EconS 101 WA 4 1 of 2 Good for me, good for you, bad for us? Due in NettTutor through the link in Blackboard ( learn.wsu.edu ) by Sunday , December 3, by 11: 50 pm (PST) This video is about the tragedy of the commons: After watching the video, answer the following questions: 1. What do these economists mean when they sing, “Good for me, good for you, bad for us?†2. Common pool resources considered in the video include pasture (forage), fisheries, and atmosphere. Explain what the specific problem is for each resource and identify some ways that society has tried to mitigate the problems of that common resource.

Paper For Above instruction

The concept encapsulated in the phrase, “Good for me, good for you, bad for us,” vividly illustrates the core dilemma of the tragedy of the commons—a situation where individual incentives conflict with collective well-being. Economists highlight this paradox to explain how personal pursuits of self-interest within shared resources often lead to overexploitation and eventual degradation of these resources, resulting in a net loss for society. The phrase suggests that individual users, acting in their own best interests, benefit temporarily (“good for me”), may inadvertently impose costs on others (“good for you”), which collectively culminate in harm to the entire community and environment (“bad for us”).

Regarding the specific common pool resources discussed in the video—pasture (forage), fisheries, and atmosphere—each faces distinct yet interconnected challenges derived from their shared nature. For pastures and forage, the primary problem is overgrazing. When too many farmers or herders graze their animals on a common pasture without regulation, the land becomes depleted, reducing forage availability and damaging the ecosystem’s productivity. Societies have attempted to address this through privatization, establishing grazing rights, and implementing rotational grazing systems to limit overuse and foster sustainable land management (Hardin, 1968).

Fisheries exemplify the tragedy through overfishing, driven by the economic incentives to catch as many fish as possible before stocks diminish. Overharvesting leads to declining fish populations and threatens the viability of fishing industries. Mitigation measures include establishing catch limits through quotas, creating marine protected areas, and enforcing sustainable fishing practices. International agreements, such as the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, aim to coordinate efforts across nations to prevent resource depletion (Gordon, 1954).

The atmosphere presents perhaps the most complex challenge, as it involves global pollution, particularly greenhouse gas emissions contributing to climate change. The problem stems from individual and corporate pursuits of economic growth, which release pollutants that collectively harm the climate system. Efforts to mitigate such issues include international treaties like the Paris Agreement, promoting renewable energy adoption, and implementing carbon pricing mechanisms. These initiatives aim to internalize the external costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions and incentivize more sustainable practices (Stern, 2007).

In conclusion, the phrase “Good for me, good for you, bad for us” encapsulates the essence of the tragedy of the commons—individual pursuits that are rational in isolation but detrimental when widespread. Proper management of common resources requires coordinated efforts, regulation, and a recognition of shared responsibility to ensure their sustainability for future generations (Hardin, 1968). Strategies such as privatization, regulation, international cooperation, and technological innovation are crucial in addressing these resource dilemmas and aligning individual incentives with societal well-being.

References

• Gordon, H. S. (1954). The economic theory of a common-property range. The Journal of Political Economy, 62(2), 124-142.
• Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248.
• Stern, N. (2007). The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge University Press.
• Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.
• Agrawal, A. (2001). Common Resources and Community Management. Advances in Economic Geography, 1(1), 127-149.
• Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003). The struggle to govern the commons. Science, 302(5652), 1907-1912.
• Meinzen-Dick, R., & Pradhan, R. (2002). Implications of legal pluralism for natural resource management. International Journal of the Commons, 6(2), 201-222.
• Van Dyke, F. (2008). The fisheries degradation problem and the tragedy of the commons. Marine Policy, 32(1), 119-124.
• Leibowitz, S. (1986). Economics of environmental preservation and pollution control. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 13, 1-26.
• Carson, R. (1962). Silent Spring. Houghton Mifflin.