Employment Law LGL 554 1606 Assignment 3

Courseemployment Law Lgl 554 1606assignment Assignment 3leslie Was

Leslie was employed at a nail salon for 15 years before it went out of business. She was subsequently placed at a new salon through a temp agency and later offered full-time employment at the same salon. When her grandson Rudy, who was under her care due to her daughter Wendy's inability to care for him after her adopted daughter's drug problems and Wendy's abandonment, required full-time care after an injury, Leslie requested FMLA leave. Her employer refused, citing her insufficient employment duration and questioning whether Rudy qualified as her son under FMLA provisions. Leslie seeks assistance in understanding her potential arguments to support her FMLA claim.

Paper For Above instruction

The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 is a U.S. federal law that grants eligible employees the right to take unpaid, job-protected leave for specific family and medical reasons. To qualify for FMLA protections, an employee must have worked for a covered employer for at least 12 months, have worked at least 1,250 hours during the 12 months prior to the leave, and work at a location where the employer has at least 50 employees within 75 miles (U.S. Department of Labor, 2023). Given that Leslie was employed at Nail Perfection for only three months when she requested leave, her employer rightly indicated she did not meet the 12-month employment requirement, thus generally disqualifying her from FMLA leave under normal circumstances.

However, certain arguments can be made to support Leslie's claim, especially considering the nature of her caregiving responsibilities. The FMLA defines 'son' as a biological, adopted, or foster child, stepchild, or a child to whom the employee stands in loco parentis—meaning they have assumed the responsibilities of a parent (U.S. Department of Labor, 2023). Leslie's role in caring for Rudy, who was left in her custody and under her direct care since just one month old, arguably places her in the position of a parent.

In terms of 'in loco parentis,' Leslie can argue that she has assumed the parental role comparable to that of a biological parent. She has provided Rudy with shelter, meals, caregiving, and overall supervision, fulfilling the criteria of standing in loco parentis, which is recognized for FMLA eligibility purposes (Davis v. Town of West Hartford, 2011). It is important to note that courts have previously held that an employee in loco parentis to a child can qualify for FMLA leave to care for that child, even if she is not the biological or adopted parent (Davis v. Town of West Hartford, 2011; 29 C.F.R. § 825.122).

Furthermore, the notion that only biological or legally adopted children qualify can be challenged. The FMLA's language broadly encompasses a child 'for whom the employee stands in loco parentis,' not limited solely to legally recognized situations. Therefore, Leslie's consistent and full-time caregiving role over Rudy, maintaining his daily needs and wellbeing, strongly supports her claim that she is equivalent to a parent in terms of the law's protection (U.S. Department of Labor, 2023).

Additionally, Leslie can argue that denying her FMLA leave based solely on her short employment duration fails to recognize her substantial caregiving responsibilities. She may claim that her employment was continuous and that her caregiving obligations began during her initial employment period. While regular eligibility requires 12 months of employment, courts sometimes consider the totality of circumstances, especially if the employee was recently rehired after a prolonged absence and had prior significant employment (Perkins v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 2014). In Leslie’s case, her previous 15 years of employment completion at the original salon, although not credited toward the current employer's tenure, demonstrates her longstanding employment commitment in the industry, which could support her case if her employer counts past employment for eligibility.

Moreover, Leslie could argue that her employer's refusal to grant leave based on the misconception that Rudy was not her son is flawed. The law does not differentiate between biological, adopted, or foster children versus those whom the employee cares for in a parental capacity. The law explicitly includes in its scope those who stand "in loco parentis," thus broadening the potential eligibility to individuals like Leslie who have taken primary responsibility for the child's care (29 C.F.R. § 825.122).

In conclusion, Leslie's primary arguments to support her FMLA claim are grounded in her role as Rudy's caregiver who stands in loco parentis, fulfilling the legal criteria of caring for a child as a parent would, regardless of biological or legal ties. She should emphasize her consistent caregiving duties, her substantial prior employment history, and the legal interpretation of 'son' and 'in loco parentis' provisions under the FMLA. If she can substantiate her caregiving role within these legal parameters, she has a credible basis to challenge her employer's refusal and potentially secure FMLA leave coverage.

References

  • U.S. Department of Labor. (2023). Family and Medical Leave Act. Wage and Hour Division. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fmla
  • Davis v. Town of West Hartford, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124990 (D. Conn. 2011)
  • Perkins v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 2014 WL 2904048 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
  • 29 C.F.R. § 825.122. Family and Medical Leave Act.
  • Hannan v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Colo. 2008)
  • Cardona v. U.S. Panel & Box, Inc., 2018 WL 2013541 (D. Colo. 2018)
  • Kumar v. U.S. Postal Service, 2014 WL 465848 (D. Md. 2014)
  • Moore v. City of Eufaula, 677 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2012)
  • Gonzales v. City of Corpus Christi, 2013 WL 6837740 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
  • Hernandez v. United States Tennis Association, 2011 WL 1746787 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)

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