Euthyphro Question

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Euthyphro questions 1. What is Euthyphro's first definition of the pious and the impious? 2. How does Euthyphro refine this definition according to Socrates' request to find a form of all pious and impious things? What problems does Socrates uncover with this definition?

In reference to these objections, how does Euthyphro further refine the definition of the pious and the impious? What question does Socrates ask Euthyphro to consider when he has agreed to this second definition of the pious and the impious? What point does Socrates make about carrying and being carried, seeing and being seen, and loving and being loved? Why does Socrates think that the god-beloved is not the same as the pious and the pious is not the same as the god-beloved? What part of justice is piety?

How does this discussion lead to another definition of the pious? What problems does Socrates identify with this definition of the pious? Why does Euthyphro agree that piety is knowledge of how to give to and beg from the gods? What follows from the gods receiving no benefits from us? What is the problem with the definition of piety that finally arises from the discussion?

Paper For Above instruction

The dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro primarily revolves around defining the concept of piety, a central theme in classical Greek philosophy. Euthyphro's initial definition of piety is that piety is prosecuting wrongdoers, especially regarding familial duties. This captures a specific example but fails to provide a universal criterion applicable to all pious acts. Socrates seeks a more comprehensive definition that holds universally, urging Euthyphro to identify the form or essence that makes a thing pious across all instances. Euthyphro then proposes that piety is what all the gods love, which introduces the challenge of conflicting divine opinions and divinely variable standards.

Socrates uncovers a significant problem with this definition: if the gods love a thing because it is pious, then piety is independent of the gods' desires; if, however, the gods love a thing because it is pious, then piety is what the gods love. This "Euthyphro dilemma" suggests either piety exists independently of divine approval or is dependent on divine whims, which raises questions about the objectivity and universality of piety. In response, Euthyphro refines his definition, proposing that piety is what is loved by all the gods, seeking to fix the divine disagreement issue. Socrates then asks Euthyphro to consider whether the act of loving or being loved, such as carrying or being carried, or seeing or being seen, defines piety, highlighting the importance of understanding the nature of these relationships.

Socrates argues that the act of loving is not equivalent to what is loved, as love involves a kind of pursuit or desire rather than the object itself. Similarly, he maintains that the pious is not simply what is loved by the gods because, in this sense, a distinction exists between the beloved and the act of loving. Furthermore, Socrates points out that piety is a part of justice, specifically the part that concerns duties to the gods, emphasizing that justice encompasses various elements beyond piety. The ongoing discussion leads Euthyphro to suggest that piety might be knowledge of how to give and beg from the gods, meaning that piety involves understanding proper religious duties.

However, Socrates challenges this by noting that since the gods receive no tangible benefits from humans, the act of giving or praying to gods cannot be based on reciprocal benefit. This raises the problem that if piety is simply knowing how to honor the gods, then piety becomes a mere skill or craft, lacking moral substance. The final issue with the definition is that it reduces piety to a form of knowledge without encompassing the moral and ethical dimensions typically associated with piety. Consequently, Socrates exposes that the defining characteristics of piety are more complex and that the attempts to formulate a precise, universally accepted definition remain unresolved, emphasizing the intricate relationship between divine approval, moral goodness, and justice.

References

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