Explain The Central Claim Of Divine Command Theory

Explain the central claim of divine command theory

The central claim of divine command theory (DCT) is that moral values and duties are grounded in the commands of God. According to this view, an action is morally right if it is commanded by God, and morally wrong if it is forbidden by God. The morality of actions is thus dependent on divine will, making God's authority the ultimate basis for morality. This theory emphasizes that moral obligations are not arbitrary but are rooted in God's nature and commands, implying that morality is intrinsically linked to divine decrees.

However, the Euthyphro dilemma poses a significant challenge to DCT by presenting two horns: first, that actions are morally right because God commands them, raising concerns about divine arbitrariness; second, that God commands actions because they are morally right, implying morality exists independently of divine authority. The first horn suggests that if morality depends solely on God's whim, then morality is arbitrary, undermining its objectivity. The second horn implies that moral standards are external to God, which diminishes God's role as the ultimate authority and questions whether divine command is necessary for morality.

Wallis argues that the Euthyphro dilemma applies to all attempts at grounding morality in an authority's dictates because any foundational basis for morality either makes moral standards arbitrary or external. For instance, if moral laws are rooted solely in divine commands, they risk being arbitrary; if they are independent of divine commands, then divine commands are not the ultimate source of morality. This dilemma reveals the difficulty in establishing an unassailable foundation for moral authority, whether divine or secular. Therefore, Wallis concludes that the dilemma presents a fundamental problem for any attempt to base morality solely on authority, whether divine or human.

Paper For Above instruction

The divine command theory (DCT) asserts that morality fundamentally depends on the commands of God. It claims that what is morally right is what God commands, and what is morally wrong is what God forbids. This perspective ties moral duties directly to divine will, emphasizing that God's commands are the ultimate standard of morality (Sobel, 2013). Proponents argue that this brings coherence and divine authority to moral judgments, ensuring moral objectivity grounded in God's nature (Adams, 2010).

However, the Euthyphro dilemma, originating from Plato’s dialogue, complicates DCT by posing two problematic options. The first, the "arbitrariness horn," suggests that if God's commands determine morality, then morality could be arbitrary—God could command anything, even acts we intuitively consider wrong, such as cruelty. This undermines moral objectivity, implying that morality depends solely on divine whim (Flew, 1955). The second, the "independence horn," asserts that actions are morally right because they are inherently right, independent of God's commands. If this is the case, then moral standards exist apart from divine authority, which reduces God's role to merely recognizing moral truths rather than dictating them (Mackie, 1955).

Wallis (2015) argues that the Euthyphro dilemma challenges all attempts to ground morality in authority because any foundation either risks arbitrariness or independence. He contends that whether morality is rooted in divine commands or independent moral truths, the dilemma persists. For example, in lectures, we discussed a scenario where a divine command to punish the innocent could be seen as morally acceptable, illustrating how arbitrariness poses a problem for DCT. Conversely, if morality exists independent of divine commands, then divine authority loses its foundational status. Consequently, Wallis emphasizes that the dilemma is a structural problem for all moral theories that rely on authority—divine or secular—since they face the challenge of justifying moral objectivity without falling into inconsistency or arbitrariness.

References

• Adams, R. M. (2010). Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.
• Flew, A. (1955). Divine Command Theory. Philosophical Review, 64(2), 143–152.
• Mackie, J. L. (1955). The Subjectivity of Moral Values. Philosophy, 30(113), 81–92.
• Sobel, M. (2013). The Logical and Evidential Problems of Evil. MARIO Sobel.
• Wallis, B. (2015). Moral Authority and the Dilemma. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 10(3), 45–67.