Final Project Incident Response Exercise Report Your Task

Final Project Incident Response Exercise Reportyour Taskyou Have Be

You have been assigned to work incident clean-up as part of the Sifers-Grayson Blue Team. Your task is to analyze and document a cybersecurity incident involving the theft of sensitive design documents and source code, as well as the infiltration of malware into the company’s systems and a test vehicle. The incident resulted from a penetration test performed by a Red Team, which exploited unprotected network connections, utilized stolen credentials, and installed malware that compromised critical components of the company’s operations. Your report should use the NIST incident handling process to guide your analysis, document your assumptions, and develop recommendations for remediation and future prevention. You are required to prepare a professional incident report including a summary of the incident, analysis, impact, and suggested mitigations, with an accompanying filled incident report form as specified in the assignment.

Paper For Above instruction

Introduction

The cybersecurity incident at Sifers-Grayson underscores the vulnerabilities that can exist within even well-established organizations that handle sensitive information and operate complex enterprise systems. This report provides a detailed analysis of the incident, utilizing the NIST Incident Handling Process to structure the investigation, containment, eradication, recovery, and post-incident activities. The goal is to identify how the attack occurred, evaluate its impacts, and propose effective mitigation strategies aligned with regulatory requirements, especially DFARS and NIST standards.

Incident Overview and Timeline

The Red Team penetration testing revealed critical weaknesses in Sifers-Grayson’s cybersecurity posture. Initially, the Red Team exploited an unprotected network connection to access the R&D servers, resulting in full exfiltration of design documents and source code for the AX10 Drone System. Keylogging equipment found in the employee lounge facilitated the theft of login passwords for 20% of employee accounts. Using stolen credentials, the Red Team installed malware on a workstation connected to a PROM burner within the R&D DevOps Lab. This malware was embedded into a PROM device and deployed onto a test drone, which was manipulated remotely via a cellular connection. The malware 'phoned home' to the Red Team, enabling remote control of the test vehicle, culminating in its safe landing at the headquarters parking lot.

Analysis of the Attack Vector and Vulnerabilities

The incident unfolded through multiple attack vectors. First, inadequate network defenses allowed the initial breach. The reliance on an unprotected network connection created an entry point for the Red Team. Second, human factors played a role; employees' friendliness and open-door policies for new staff inadvertently facilitated social engineering exploits. Third, physical security lapses, such as leaving keyloggers unattended on employee tables, enabled theft of login credentials. Fourth, inadequate system security measures, including outdated operating systems—Windows 8.1 in the SCADA Lab—and a lack of comprehensive backup systems, exacerbated the incident's impact and recovery difficulty.

Impact Assessment

The theft of 100% of design documents and source code compromises intellectual property and could lead to significant financial and reputational damage. The malware deployment on a live test vehicle has immediate operational risks, including potential unauthorized remote control or sabotage of critical assets. The breach also jeopardizes compliance with federal cybersecurity mandates such as DFARS and NIST SP 800-171, with potential legal penalties and loss of federal contracts. Additionally, the incident exposes systemic weaknesses that could be exploited further if not addressed promptly.

Incident Response and Recommendations

Applying the NIST Incident Handling Process, the initial step involved confirming the breach through evidence collection, such as logs and forensic data. Containment strategies included isolating compromised systems, disabling access points, and revoking stolen credentials. Eradication efforts focused on removing malware, patching vulnerabilities, and strengthening authentication mechanisms. Recovery entailed restoring affected systems from verified backups, implementing system updates, and monitoring for recurrence.

Key recommendations include:

• Enhance network security by deploying robust firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems, and encrypting data in transit.
• Implement strict access controls, multi-factor authentication, and regular password changes to mitigate credential theft.
• Upgrade outdated systems, such as Windows 8.1, to supported, more secure versions promptly.
• Establish comprehensive backup and disaster recovery plans, including off-site backups, to minimize data loss and downtime.
• Conduct cybersecurity awareness training to mitigate social engineering risks and reinforce security protocols among employees.
• Adopt continuous monitoring to detect anomalies promptly and improve incident response times.
• Ensure compliance with all federal regulations and conduct regular audits to improve security posture.

Conclusion

The Sifers-Grayson incident exemplifies how vulnerabilities across technical, physical, and human domains can be exploited by malicious actors. A thorough incident response aligned with NIST guidelines can significantly reduce the risk of future incidents. Moving forward, a holistic approach incorporating technology upgrades, policy enhancements, employee training, and rigorous compliance monitoring is essential for safeguarding sensitive information and maintaining operational integrity.

References

• NIST Special Publication 800-61r2, “Computer Security Incident Handling Guide,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012.
• NIST Special Publication 800-171, “Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations,” 2016.
• NIST Special Publication 800-82, “Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2015.
• NIST Special Publication 800-64, “Security Considerations in the System Development Life Cycle,” 2008.
• Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) clauses 252.204-7012 and 252.204-7009, 2019.
• "Threat Landscape for Critical Infrastructure," Department of Homeland Security, 2020.
• Schneier, B. (2015). “Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World.” W.W. Norton & Company.
• Brandom, R. (2017). “The Importance of Employee Cybersecurity Awareness Training,” Cybersecurity Magazine.
• IBM Security. (2020). “Cost of a Data Breach Report.”
• ISO/IEC 27001:2013, “Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management systems — Requirements.”