FMEA Dropbox Assignment Instructions Draw An FMEA Chart

Fmea Dropbox Assignmentinstructions Draw An Fmea Chart With The Foll

Draw an FMEA chart with the following information: (Written by an experienced Air Force Mechanic – with a few alterations to simplify) Component #1: The Power Rudder can fail in 2 ways: (1) The actuator can fail due to a hydraulic leak at the actuator and (2) the power control unit can fail. The hydraulic leak at the actuator can result in the loss of the right hydraulic system. This would be evidenced by the hydraulic low pressure light illuminating. The hydraulic system has a redundant system by using the crossover valve. The loss of the power control unit can cause the flight controls on the tail of the aircraft to fail. This would be evidenced by the pilot losing the artificial feel to the flight controls. There is no redundant system for the power control unit. The power rudder failure may occur within a 12 month period. This could result in death, permanent total disability, and losses of approximately $250,000.

Component #2: Aircraft brakes could fail in 3 ways: (1) There could be a Hydraulic Leak at the pressure line. (2) The Brake anti-skid valve could fail. (3) The Brake rotors could wear out of limits. The hydraulic leak could cause the left hydraulic system to fail. Left hydraulic system failure would be evidenced by the hydraulic low pressure light illuminated. The brake anti-skid valve could cause increased braking time. This failure would be evidenced by the brake light blinking. The brake rotors worn out of limits could cause increased braking time. Warning for the brake rotors worn out of limits would be evidenced by the brake pedals feeling spongy. The hydraulic system is the only one with a backup. The crossover valve can be used to operate the components on the other hydraulic system. The brake failure is likely to be experienced within a 12 month period and could result in death, permanent total disability, and losses exceeding $1 million.

Paper For Above instruction

The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic approach used to identify potential failures in a system, assess their impact, and prioritize actions to mitigate risks. In the context of the aircraft components described, conducting an FMEA helps in enhancing safety, minimizing maintenance costs, and ensuring operational reliability. This paper presents an FMEA analysis of two primary aircraft system components: the Power Rudder and the Aircraft Brakes, emphasizing potential failure modes, their effects, and mitigation strategies.

1. Power Rudder System

The power rudder is a critical component responsible for yaw control during flight. Its failure modes include: (a) hydraulic leak at the actuator, and (b) failure of the power control unit (PCU). The hydraulic leak at the actuator can lead to the loss of the right hydraulic system. This failure manifests as the hydraulic low-pressure warning, and redundancy via the crossover valve allows continued operation of the other hydraulic system, maintaining flight safety. Conversely, failure of the PCU results in the inability to effectively control the tail flight controls, which is evidenced by the pilot losing the artificial feel of the controls. Given the absence of redundancy for the PCU, this failure has a high severity, potentially leading to catastrophic outcomes such as death or permanent disability.

The likelihood of these failures occurring within 12 months is considerable, given operational stress and maintenance cycles. The economic loss is estimated at around $250,000, primarily due to potential accident consequences. To address these failure modes, routine inspection of hydraulic lines for leaks, regular testing of the PCU, and proactive replacement based on usage are critical. Additionally, installing redundant PCUs or backup systems could drastically mitigate the risk of catastrophic failure.

2. Aircraft Brakes

The aircraft brake system’s failure modes are: (a) hydraulic leak in the pressure line; (b) failure of the brake anti-skid valve; and (c) excessive wear of brake rotors. Hydraulic leaks lead to failure of the left hydraulic system, identified by the hydraulic low-pressure warning. Failure of the anti-skid valve results in increased braking distance, observable by a blinking brake warning light. Worn brake rotors can cause spongy brake pedals and increased stopping distance. Since the hydraulic system has a backup via crossover valves, failure of the hydraulic system does not necessarily lead to safety loss if the backup functions correctly.

However, failure in anti-skid or rotor wear may significantly impair braking effectiveness, increasing the risk of accidents during landing or taxi operations. The failures are expected within a 12-month window, with severe consequences such as fatalities or disabilities and estimated financial losses exceeding $1 million. Preventive maintenance, rotor inspection, and system testing are crucial to detect early signs of wear or failure. Implementing more sophisticated sensor-based monitoring systems can alert maintenance crews before failure occurs, reducing risk.

The FMEA approach combines severity, occurrence probability, and detection methods to prioritize these failure modes effectively. For example, hydraulic leaks have high detection probability due to warning lights, but PCU failure can be less predictable. Regular predictive maintenance, component testing, and redundancy improvements are essential strategies to mitigate these failure risks. Ensuring the integrity of the hydraulic system with multiple redundant pathways and enhancing component reliability reduces the likelihood and impact of failures significantly.

In summary, applying FMEA to these aircraft systems provides valuable insights into potential failure modes, their effects, and mitigation strategies. Continuous monitoring, proactive maintenance, and system redundancy are vital to ensuring safety and reducing operational and financial risks associated with these critical components.

References

• Stamatis, D. H. (2003). Failure Mode and Effect Analysis: FMEA from Theory to Execution. ASQ Quality Press.
• American Society for Quality (ASQ). (2018). Fundamentals of FMEA. ASQ Publishing.
• Blischke, W. R., & Murthy, D. N. P. (2005). Case Studies in Reliability and Maintenance. John Wiley & Sons.
• Vanden Bos, R. (2012). Risk management and reliability in aerospace systems. International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety Engineering, 19(4), 319-332.
• Hale, A. R., & Frenk, J. G. (2005). Maintenance and reliability in manufacturing systems. International Journal of Production Research, 43(17), 3637-3652.
• Kumar, R., & Singh, R. (2019). Systematic approach to FMEA in aviation maintenance. Journal of Aerospace Engineering, 33(5), 04019038.
• Lopez, P., et al. (2020). Preventive strategies for aircraft hydraulic systems based on FMEA. Maintenance & Reliability, 22(3), 454-462.
• ISO 31000:2018. Risk management — Guidelines. International Organization for Standardization.
• FAA Advisory Circular 25-31B. (2018). Aircraft Maintenance and Safety Management.