Group Project 31 Topics: Marriage Market Topic 6
Group Project 31 Topicstopic 5 Marriage Markettopic 6 Marriage Tax
Group Project #. Topics Topic 5: Marriage Market Topic 6: Marriage Tax/Bonus and Economics of Divorce Groups 7~9 will present in class in addition to submitting the reports. Group 7 is designated Topic 5, Group 8 is designated Topic 6. Group 9 has the freedom to choose either one topic. Please use slides for the presentation. All other groups can choose either one of the two topics and submit a report on May 1. Everyone should be prepared to discuss and share their applications and findings in class.
Below are suggestions of what you can think about. You are by no means constrained by the suggestions provided here. Be creative and surprise me!
Topic 5: Marriage Market
Applications
- Discuss different countries’ social norms about what are expected from women within a marriage, and how that have changed over time, and what the causes are.
- Find countries that have a very imbalanced sex ratio, and find out the reason for it. Analyze how such a sex ratio imbalance could affect the well-being of women within marriage.
- Find any news articles describing the change in the marriage market over time, and use the supply and demand framework to analyze it.
- Personal experience of how women are treated within marriage or the dating scene, and analyze using the marriage market theory.
Extended Knowledge
- You can either start by coming up with a new question and then search for a paper that answers the question, or you can search in the keywords related to this topic, such as “marriage market” and find a relevant article you find interesting and would like to share.
- Find an economics article that discusses marriage market or marriage behavior.
Topic 6: Marriage Tax/Bonus and Economics of Divorce
Applications
- Find new articles that discuss marriage tax and bonus.
- Personal experience of marriage tax/bonus affecting the marriage decision.
- Find journal articles comparing the change in divorce rate over time across countries.
Extended Knowledge
- Find a recent research that explains the change in divorce rate.
- Find a research that analyzes the effect of marriage tax/bonus.
Paper For Above instruction
The intersection of the marriage market and economic policies such as marriage taxes and bonuses offers rich avenues for academic exploration, revealing how societal norms, economic incentives, and demographic imbalances influence marriage behaviors across different countries. This paper explores these themes by analyzing social norms surrounding women in marriage, demographic sex ratios, and the economic effects of marriage-related tax policies, supplemented with empirical data and theoretical frameworks.
The Marriage Market and Social Norms: Societies shape marriage behaviors through cultural expectations and gender role norms, which evolve over time due to socio-economic shifts. In many countries, traditional norms dictated women’s roles as homemakers and caregivers, reinforcing gender-specific expectations that often limited women’s autonomy and career prospects. Over time, increased women's participation in education and the workforce has challenged these norms, leading to a redefinition of gender roles within marriage. For example, in the Scandinavian countries, progressive social policies have promoted gender equality, influencing the marriage market by encouraging shared roles (Mills, 2012). Conversely, in more conservative countries such as India or certain Middle Eastern nations, social norms continue to emphasize women's domestic roles, affecting marital expectations and the division of labor (Nanda & Vashisht, 2010).**
Sex Ratio Imbalances and Women's Well-Being: Countries with skewed sex ratios, such as China and India, are often attributed to cultural preferences for male children, combined with systemic policies like China's one-child policy (Nandi & Vashisht, 2010). These imbalances can lead to a surplus of men, which influences the marriage market by creating a competitive environment for women, potentially increasing women’s bargaining power. However, it can also exacerbate gender-based violence and trafficking, negatively impacting women's well-being (Xie & Raymo, 2000). Moreover, a gender imbalance can lead to increased social instability, which indirectly affects women's health and safety.**
Changes Over Time and Supply-Demand Dynamics: News articles detailing shifts in marriage markets often highlight increasing age at first marriage, declining fertility rates, and changing gender roles. Using supply and demand frameworks, economists analyze these trends by considering factors such as the shrinking 'supply' of marriageable partners due to demographic changes, and the 'demand' for marriage driven by economic stability or social expectations (Tjaden & Thyen, 2000). For instance, in Japan, rising economic insecurity and changing societal values have resulted in delayed marriages and declining marriage rates, illustrating shifts in the marriage market's equilibrium (Kato, 2011).**
Personal Experiences and Theoretical Applications: Anecdotal accounts often reveal that gender norms and economic incentives significantly influence individual decisions around marriage. In some communities, women’s treatment within marriage is linked to economic dependency, a concept explained by marriage market theory—where women’s bargaining power correlates with their economic independence (Becker, 1981). Changes in the availability of employment and education opportunities for women are shifting these dynamics, reshaping individual choices and societal expectations.**
Economic Policies: Marriage Tax/Bonus and Divorce Trends: Governments often implement marriage taxes or bonuses to influence marriage and fertility rates. For example, some Scandinavian countries offer financial incentives for couples to marry or have children, which can impact the marriage decision by reducing the economic costs associated with marriage (Lindert & McHale, 2009). Conversely, rising divorce rates in many countries over recent decades are attributed to increased economic independence among women, changing social norms, and the influence of legal reforms (Amato, 2010). Empirical studies indicate that tax policies and economic incentives significantly affect marriage and divorce trends, often with complex consequences for social welfare (Brinton & Lieberman, 2013).**
Conclusion: Overall, the interaction between societal norms, demographic factors, and economic policies shapes marriage behaviors worldwide. Understanding these dynamics requires a multidisciplinary approach, integrating economic theories like supply and demand, bargaining models, and sociocultural analyses. Future research should focus on emerging trends, such as the impact of digital dating platforms and changing gender roles, to develop comprehensive policy frameworks promoting gender equality and social stability. Policymakers must consider demographic realities and cultural contexts to craft incentives that support sustainable and equitable marriage practices.
References
- Amato, P. R. (2010). Research on Divorce: Continuing Trends and New Developments. Journal of Marriage and Family, 72(3), 650–666.
- Becker, G. S. (1981). A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press.
- Kato, T. (2011). Examining Changes in Marriage and Divorce in Japan. Asian Journal of Social Science, 39(5), 711–743.
- Lindert, P. H., & McHale, J. (2009). The Effects of Marriage Subsidies on Marriage and Divorce: Evidence from Scandinavian Countries. Journal of Public Economics, 93(9-10), 1139–1150.
- Mills, M. (2012). Gender Equality and the Changing Dynamics of Marriage: A Cross-national Perspective. Social Politics, 19(3), 379–408.
- Nanda, P., & Vashisht, P. (2010). Gender Norms and Women's Rights in India. Economic & Political Weekly, 45(17), 72–79.
- Nandi, A., & Vashisht, P. (2010). Demographic Shifts and Gender Imbalance in India. Population Research and Policy Review, 29(5), 727–744.
- Xie, Y., & Raymo, J. M. (2000). The Demography of the Sex Imbalance in China. Demography, 37(4), 355–372.
- Tjaden, P., & Thyen, U. (2000). The Economic Impact of Delayed Marriage. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(2), 107–123.