Individual Problems 15-1 Mr. Ward And Mrs. Ward Typically Vo

Individual Problems 15-1 Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward Typically Vote Oppo

Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections, so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain 10 units of utility from a vote for their positions and lose 10 units from a vote against their positions. However, voting costs each 5 units of utility.

The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Fill in the payoffs for each cell: for example, in the top-left cell, fill in the payoffs if they both vote; be sure to include negative signs if the payoff is negative.

Paper For Above instruction

The decision-making processes of Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward exemplify the strategic considerations in voting behavior, especially under the influence of personal utility and voting costs. By analyzing their strategic interaction via game theory, we gain insight into voting patterns where mutual opposition leads to a neutralization of the electoral outcome, yet with individual utilities impacted by their choices and the associated costs.

In the given scenario, each individual has two strategies: vote or do not vote. The payoffs depend on whether they vote and how the other responds. Since each values voting positively if it aligns with their position, but also incurs a cost, the resulting payoffs can be computed systematically.

If both vote, each gains a utility of +10 for winning (their position), loses 10 if they lose (vote against), but also incurs a cost of 5. Assuming they are oppositional, the payoff for each when both vote is typically structured as: utility of winning minus voting cost, and similarly for losing. When one votes and the other does not, payoffs adjust accordingly, reflecting the strategic impacts and mutual influence.

By constructing a payoff matrix—assuming, for simplicity, that both voting results in their utilities canceling, and considering the cost—one can assign values to each cell. For example, if both vote, each might have a payoff like 10 (if they win), minus 10 (if they lose), minus 5 (cost), adjusted for the opponent’s decision. The general goal is to fill these payoffs coherently considering these utility gains/losses and costs, to analyze the strategic stability of voting behaviors and potential equilibria.

Understanding such interactions provides a lens into collective decision-making and the influence of personal incentives, illustrating why rational actors might choose to abstain or vote oppositely based on the anticipated actions of others. These insights are foundational in political science and game theory, highlighting the delicate balance between individual rationality and collective outcomes.

Analysis of the Payoff Matrix and Voting Strategies

Let's formalize the payoff matrix. Assume the strategies: "Vote" (V) and "Don't Vote" (N). The payoffs derive from successful advocacy (utility +10), unsuccessful (utility -10), minus voting costs ($5). Since Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward tend to vote oppositely, their strategies mirror this behavior and influence expected payoffs.

Sample payoff calculations:

• Both vote (V, V): Each gains 10 units from their position, but since votes oppose, their utility may cancel or be reduced, plus each pays the voting cost: payoff = (utility from vote) minus cost, e.g., 10 - 5 = 5. However, since votes oppose, the net effect might be zero depending on interpretation, so for simplicity, assign payoffs as (0, 0) in this case.
• One votes, the other doesn't: the voter gains utility for voting (10), minus voting cost (5), totaling 5, while the non-voter's payoff remains zero or negative depending on their utility considerations.

Constructing the full payoff table requires defining these payoffs explicitly and analyzing equilibrium strategies, typically via Nash equilibrium analysis, to predict the likely outcome of voting behaviors within this strategic context.

This analysis underscores how individual incentives and costs mold collective voting outcomes, highlighting strategic voting's role in democratic processes.

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