Jeremy Phillips With The Dissolution Of The Soviet Union

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With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a significant proliferation of weapons and nuclear materials became a global concern. Research from the 1960s aimed to miniaturize nuclear weapons, resulting in portable devices often called “suitcase nukes” that were unaccounted for after the Soviet collapse. These devices, potentially controlled by Soviet Special Forces or the KGB, were small, easily transportable, and lacked the safeguards to prevent accidental or unauthorized detonations. The danger posed by these weapons was compounded by uncertainties about their control and whereabouts, raising fears of nuclear proliferation and security breaches (Warinner, 2012).

While these "suitcase nukes" raise alarm, current concerns have shifted toward radioactive materials such as plutonium and enriched uranium, which are more readily available and pose a substantial threat if acquired by malicious actors. These materials are harder to secure and are susceptible to theft or diversion, particularly in the chaotic post-Soviet landscape. North Korea, with its historical ties to the Soviet Union, has long been suspected of receiving nuclear support, although the extent and nature of aid remain uncertain. The proliferation of nuclear materials to North Korea raises the risk of its developing nuclear weapons, which could further destabilize regional security (Warinner, 2012).

North Korea's nuclear program has been characterized by frequent demonstrations of missile and nuclear capabilities, but the actual viability of a nuclear threat from them remains questionable due to technological and resource constraints. Nevertheless, the potential for malicious use by terrorist organizations represents an even more alarming concern. Terrorists acquiring fissile material could resort to radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) rather than aiming to develop full-scale nuclear weapons, primarily because constructing an operational nuclear device requires extensive expertise, resources, and clandestine activities that are difficult to conceal. The small quantities of radioactive material (about one to four kilograms) needed for creating an RDD make the threat conceivable, yet such devices would produce detectable footprints that investigations could trace (FAS, n.d.).

Despite these concerns, the overall threat of nuclear weapons being obtained and used in terrorist attacks remains relatively low. This is due to the robust security measures, international treaties, and intelligence efforts aimed at securing nuclear materials. United States agencies such as the FBI and the Department of Energy dedicate substantial resources to prevent theft and proliferation. The complexity and high costs associated with acquiring or developing nuclear weapons act as significant barriers to terrorist organizations, which typically lack the resources and expertise necessary for such endeavors. Additionally, the international community's efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, along with diplomatic measures, further diminish the likelihood of terrorists obtaining functional nuclear weapons (Joint Publication 3-11).

Nevertheless, the possibility that terrorist groups might attempt to acquire radiological materials for dirty bombs or RDDs is a persistent concern. Groups like ISIS (DAESH) have shown resource limitations and are unlikely to pursue nuclear weapons, instead relying on asymmetric tactics like IEDs, VBIEDs, and tunnels to sustain their insurgencies. This focus on less sophisticated methods is driven by their operational constraints and the high barriers inherent in nuclear weapon development. The perception of nuclear threat is influenced by political rhetoric and media, which may exaggerate the actual risk posed by terrorist groups aiming to develop nuclear capabilities (Huessy, 2013; Wilner, 2012).

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The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked a pivotal moment in global security, bringing about profound concerns over nuclear proliferation and the potential for nuclear weapon dissemination. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in a significant security vacuum, with lost or unaccounted for nuclear devices and materials scattered across former Soviet states and beyond. Among the most alarming of these were the so-called "suitcase nukes," small portable nuclear devices that could have fallen into unauthorized hands or been weaponized by rogue actors. The threat of these weapons, although not fully realized, remains a concern for international security, especially considering their potential to be used by terrorists or unaligned states (Warinner, 2012).

Research and development during the Cold War era led to the miniaturization of nuclear warheads, facilitating their transportability and concealment. Soviet efforts to produce small, portable nuclear devices aimed to ensure strategic advantages, but the chaos following the Soviet collapse interfered with control and security measures, leading to fears that some of these weapons could have been stolen or lost. These “suitcase nukes,” approximately 1 to 4 kilograms of fissile material in weight, lacked the extensive safeguards of larger, more controlled nuclear arsenals. Their uncontrolled dispersion posed an increased threat of nuclear material proliferation and terrorist acquisition (FAS, n.d.).

The control and security of nuclear weapons and materials are central to minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation and theft. The international community has implemented numerous treaties, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, national agencies, including the U.S. Department of Energy and FBI, implement rigorous security protocols to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear materials. Despite these efforts, the risk remains, particularly with radioactive materials such as plutonium and uranium, which are more accessible than complete nuclear weapons (Joint Publication 3-11). This concern is heightened by the possibility of these materials being acquired by rogue states or terrorist organizations, which could use them in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs).

North Korea's nuclear ambitions exemplify these proliferation concerns. With its clandestine development of nuclear weapons and missile technology, North Korea remains under suspicion of receiving covert support from the Soviet Union and later from other states. While North Korea demonstrates its potential to threaten regional and global stability, its technological and resource limitations restrict the development of functioning nuclear arsenals comparable to nuclear-armed states. Nonetheless, the possibility of North Korea transferring nuclear technology or materials to non-state actors remains a significant concern for international security (Warinner, 2012).

The threat posed by terrorist organizations to acquire nuclear or radiological materials is considered the most pressing security challenge. However, evidence suggests that such groups are more likely to resort to less sophisticated methods, such as IEDs and VBIEDs, rather than developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. The high costs, technical barriers, and the risk of detection make nuclear weapons an unattractive pursuit for terrorists. Instead, groups like ISIS focus on asymmetric tactics, deploying explosives and guerrilla warfare to sustain their insurgencies (Huessy, 2013). Nonetheless, the potential for terrorists to obtain radiological materials for RDDs remains an ongoing concern, as even a small device could cause widespread panic and economic disruption.

Overall, despite the proliferation of nuclear technology and materials, a significant barrier remains in the form of security measures, international treaties, and law enforcement efforts that drastically reduce the likelihood of terrorists acquiring and deploying nuclear weapons. The global community’s vigilance and cooperation over decades have been pivotal in maintaining these barriers, though the threat of nuclear terrorism continues to influence policy and security strategies. Continued investment in securing nuclear materials, monitoring proliferation activities, and international cooperation are essential to mitigate the risks associated with nuclear terrorism in the post-Cold War era (Wilner, 2012).

References

• FAS. (n.d.). Nuclear Weapon Design. Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved from https://fas.org
• Huessy, P. (2013). Nuclear Zero: World Peace or World Chaos. Family Security Matters.
• Warinner, A. (2012). How many nuclear weapons were unaccounted for after the collapse of the Soviet Union? Federation of American Scientists.
• Wilner, A. S. (2012). Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Proxies. Comparative Strategy, 31(1).
• Joint Publication 3-11. (Date unknown). International Security and Nuclear Security Protocols.