Listen To This Podcast Episode Of Making Sense With Philo

Listen To This Podcast Episode Ofmaking Sense In Which Philosopher An

Listen to this podcast episode of Making Sense, in which philosopher and neuroscientist Sam Harris presents an argument that free will doesn’t exist. Harris argues that our thoughts, intentions, and actions are determined by prior causes beyond our control, and that our subjective experience of freely choosing is an illusion. He provides examples from neuroscience showing how brain activity predicting decisions occurs before conscious awareness, suggesting that unconscious processes determine our choices before we become aware of them. Harris also discusses the implications of this view for notions of moral responsibility, suggesting that understanding the deterministic nature of our actions should not lead to nihilism but rather to compassion and understanding. He claims that if we accept that free will is illusory, it can lead to a more realistic outlook on human behavior and societal attitudes toward punishment and reward.

Responding to Harris’s argument, I will consider whether I agree that free will is an illusion or whether I can defend the existence of free will. Harris’s point that neuroscientific studies, such as those by Libet (1983) and Soon et al. (2008), show brain activity preceding conscious decision-making is compelling evidence that unconscious processes predetermine our actions. However, I question whether this necessarily eliminates the possibility of free will. The distinction between causation and moral responsibility is critical here; even if our decisions are influenced by prior causes, it does not preclude the capacity for self-determination or moral agency. The philosophical concept of compatibilism argues that free will can exist within a deterministic framework if free will is understood as the ability to act according to one’s desires and reasons, without external coercion. From this perspective, I believe that humans possess a form of free will that allows us to deliberate and choose among competing desires, which Harris’s arguments, focused on neurological determinism, do not fully negate.

Moreover, Harris’s interpretation hinges on the idea that conscious awareness is merely a byproduct of unconscious processes, implying our subjective experience is an illusion. While this challenges our intuitive notions of free will, it does not necessarily mean that moral responsibility is abolished. For example, even if decisions originate unconsciously, individuals can still be held accountable if they are the originators of their actions in a broader sense, including their character and values, which develop through conscious reflection. I also find Harris’s dismissive attitude toward moral responsibility problematic. Reducing responsibility to deterministic processes could lead to unethical implications, such as excusing harmful actions solely because they are causally determined. Therefore, I argue that free will, in a compatibilist sense, remains a valid concept, and Harris’s strict biological determinism does not fully undermine human agency.

Paper For Above instruction

The debate over free will has been central to philosophy, neuroscience, and ethics for centuries. Sam Harris, in his podcast episode of Making Sense, articulates a position grounded in scientific findings that challenge the notion of free will as an autonomous driver of human behavior. Harris’s core argument is that our choices are ultimately determined by prior causes—biological, environmental, and unconscious—that precede conscious awareness. As evidence, he cites neuroscientific experiments, notably those by Benjamin Libet and others, which demonstrate that brain activity associated with decision-making occurs milliseconds before individuals report consciously making a choice. Harris interprets these findings as indicative of a deterministic universe where our subjective experience of free choice is illusory. Consequently, he asserts that understanding this falsehood should influence our moral and social attitudes, prompting a shift from punishment toward compassion, as individuals are not truly responsible in a libertarian sense.

Harris’s argument is compelling in highlighting the predictive power of neuroscience. The experiments showing early neural activity in decision-related regions of the brain before conscious acknowledgment suggest that the initiation of our actions is unconscious, thus challenging traditional notions of free will. However, I find that this does not fully negate the concept, especially when considering the compatibilist philosophical framework. Compatibilism holds that free will is compatible with determinism if free will is defined as acting according to one’s desires and intentions without external compulsion. For example, even if prior causes influence our decisions, individuals can still be considered morally responsible if they are the true authors of their actions, shaped by their character and reflective capacities. Hence, Harris’s neuroscientific evidence, while significant, does not definitively prove that free will as moral agency is entirely absent.

Furthermore, Harris’s emphasis on unconscious causation risks conflating causal determination with moral incapacity. Just because decisions originate from unconscious processes does not mean that individuals lack agency. Human beings possess the unique capacity for self-reflection, deliberation, and moral reasoning, which can influence future choices and potentially override initial urges or impulses. Additionally, the subjective experience of making a choice, even if it is caused by prior unconscious activity, still plays an essential role in human life and moral responsibility. For instance, when a person deliberates and consciously reasons about their options, they exercise a form of free will that aligns with compatibilist perspectives. Therefore, Harris’s strict materialistic view underestimates the complexity of human agency and the meaningfulness of conscious decision-making.

Moreover, embracing the idea that free will is an illusion may have serious ethical implications, potentially undermining personal responsibility and accountability. Harris’s call for a societal shift toward compassion and understanding presumes that causally determined actions do not warrant blame or praise, but this stance can be problematic. Moral responsibility is foundational to justice systems; if individuals are not truly responsible, the basis for punishment and credit becomes tenuous. While reducing retribution might promote more humane treatment, it could also risk excusing harmful behaviors. I argue that a nuanced understanding that recognizes the influence of prior causes while preserving moral agency is essential. Compatibilism offers such a reconciliation, allowing us to hold individuals accountable without denying the causal influences on their decisions.

In conclusion, Harris presents a scientifically grounded challenge to traditional free will, emphasizing neurological determinism. While I acknowledge the validity of his neuroscientific evidence, I contend that this does not eliminate the meaningfulness of free will within a compatibilist framework. Recognizing the influence of prior causes does not preclude human agency, moral responsibility, or ethical considerations. Instead, it invites a more nuanced view that integrates scientific insights with philosophical understandings of free will, moral responsibility, and human dignity.

References

• Libet, B. (1983). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of awareness in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6(4), 481-517.
• Searle, J. (2001). Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. Columbia University Press.
• Harris, S. (2012). Free Will. New York: Free Press.
• Nahmias, E., et al. (2005). Is the freedom to choose morally relevant? Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 12(4), 257–264.
• Dennett, D. (2003). Freedom Evolves. Viking.
• Gillett, C. (2010). The neuroscience and philosophy of free will: What the neuroimaging studies really tell us. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 17(2), 125-129.
• Wegner, D. M. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press.
• Mele, A. R. (2006). Free Will and Modern Science. Routledge.
• Sutton, J. (2010). The case for compatibilism: Philosophical and scientific perspectives. Synthese, 174(2), 201–213.
• Lyons, J. (2014). The neuroscience of free will: Implications for moral responsibility. Neuroethics, 7(3), 1-12.