MG2650 Week 5 Organizational Control Research Course

Mg2650 Week 5 Organizational Controlresearch 51off Course Case Study

Analyze the case of the Queen of the North ferry incident, focusing on the organizational control aspects that contributed to the event. Identify the internal control failures, communication issues, safety protocol adherence, and safety culture deficiencies. Discuss how organizational control mechanisms such as management oversight, safety standards, training, and safety culture influenced the incident. Provide recommendations for improving organizational controls to prevent similar occurrences in maritime safety operations.

Paper For Above instruction

The Queen of the North ferry disaster serves as an instructive case study in examining the critical role of organizational control within complex operational environments such as maritime transportation. Organizational control involves the processes and mechanisms by which an organization directs, regulates, and monitors its activities towards achieving specific goals, while ensuring compliance with standards, safety protocols, and regulatory requirements (Anthony & Govindarajan, 2007). In this context, the incident underscores how deficiencies in organizational control can lead to catastrophic outcomes, and highlights areas for improvement in safety management systems, communication practices, and organizational culture.

One of the primary organizational control failures evident in the Queen of the North incident pertains to safety oversight and adherence to established safety protocols. Although the ferry passed an annual safety inspection less than a month prior to the accident, the internal investigation revealed that crew members were unfamiliar with newly installed steering equipment and had turned off critical monitors due to operational difficulties. This suggests a lapse in technical controls and inadequate training, which are vital components of safety management. Effective organizational control demands rigorous training programs, regular drills, and clear procedures to maintain operational readiness. The fact that crew members lacked familiarity with new equipment indicates a deficiency in training controls, which compromised situational awareness and navigation safety (Reason, 2000).

Furthermore, communication controls within the organization and across agencies played a crucial role. The incident transcript noted that music was playing on the bridge and that crew members failed to maintain proper lookout, which points to lapses in communication discipline and operational behavior. Additionally, the absence of a master key for sleeping cabins and the failure to search all cabins reflect gaps in procedural controls meant to ensure passenger safety and thorough evacuation. These lapses suggest a weak safety culture where safety procedures may not have been strictly enforced or emphasized (Schein, 2010). A strong safety culture promotes vigilance, accountability, and continuous improvement, which appeared lacking in the ferry's operational environment.

Management oversight, another critical aspect of organizational control, was challenged by the breakdown in safety monitoring and corrective action. The crew's casual watch-standing behavior, noted during the investigation, indicates a normalized deviation from safety norms. Management controls should include oversight mechanisms such as regular audits, performance evaluations, and safety audits to identify such issues proactively. The failure to recognize declining safety behavior, or to correct it, contributed to the incident. This highlights the importance of leadership in fostering a safety-first culture through consistent enforcement of safety standards and accountability (Vaughan, 1996).

Additionally, the incident exposed the organizational control challenge of effectively integrating safety technology with human factors. The crew's difficulty in using and understanding new navigation equipment underscores the need for better controls regarding technological updates and their implementation. Proper change management, including comprehensive training and familiarization with new systems, is essential. The lack of such controls can lead to operational errors and increased risk, as demonstrated in this case.

To address these organizational control deficiencies, the ferry operators and regulators should implement several key recommendations. First, establish robust training programs that are recurrent and include simulations and drills for new and existing equipment, ensuring crew familiarity and competence. Second, develop clear, standardized operating procedures and enforce strict compliance through regular audits and supervision. Third, foster a safety-oriented culture that emphasizes vigilance, accountability, and open communication, supported by leadership commitment. Fourth, integrate advanced safety management systems that monitor operational behaviors and flag deviations proactively. Finally, improve passenger safety protocols by ensuring accurate record-keeping, such as passenger manifests, and conducting thorough searches during emergencies.

These improvements align with established safety management principles outlined by the International Maritime Organization (IMO, 2002), which advocate for comprehensive safety culture, continuous training, technological integration, and effective communication controls. Moreover, organizational control in maritime safety must be proactive and dynamic, adapting to technological advancements and operational challenges. Cultural change, leadership commitment, and rigorous safety protocols are interdependent elements necessary to prevent tragedies like the Queen of the North incident.

In conclusion, the Queen of the North disaster exemplifies how weaknesses in organizational control—deficient safety protocols, poor communication, inadequate training, and weak safety culture—can culminate in tragic outcomes. Strengthening these control mechanisms is imperative for ensuring safety in maritime operations. Organizations must embrace a comprehensive approach that embeds safety into all levels of operations, promotes accountability, and continuously evaluates safety performance. Doing so will not only prevent similar incidents but also foster a culture of safety that respects technological, human, and organizational factors.

References

• Anthony, R. N., & Govindarajan, V. (2007). Management Control Systems (12th ed.). McGraw-Hill.
• International Maritime Organization (IMO). (2002). ISM Code: International Safety Management (ISM) Code. IMO Publishing.
• Reason, J. (2000). Human error: models and management. British Medical Journal, 320(7237), 768–770.
• Schein, E. H. (2010). Organizational Culture and Leadership. Jossey-Bass.
• Vaughan, D. (1996). The Challenger launch decision: risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA. University of Chicago Press.