Officer Learned Of An Armed Robbery Committed

An Officer Learned That An Armed Robbery Had Been Committed At a Conve

An officer learned that an armed robbery had been committed at a convenience store located half a mile from her beat. Fifteen minutes later, she noticed a man matching the suspect's race, general age, weight, and height walking towards her with a backpack. Since it was only 7 P.M., and she had passed a few other men with a similar description, the officer did not consider stopping the man. Upon seeing the officer, the man suddenly started looking down at the ground and took an immediate left turn on the next street. The officer followed him and stopped him to inquire where he was headed.

He claimed to be “going home.” She asked him if she may look in his bag. Upon his refusal, she began to frisk him. During the frisking, she saw round objects outlined in his bag that aroused her suspicion. She ordered him to the ground and searched his backpack. The objects were bullets and she also recovered a gun that was eventually linked to the robberies.

Paper For Above instruction

The scenario outlined presents complex legal questions regarding Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, and whether law enforcement actions in this case were justified. Central issues include whether the initial stop of the suspect was lawful, whether the frisk and subsequent search of his backpack were permissible under constitutional standards, and the extent to which case law supports or opposes the actions taken by the officer.

First, the primary issue concerns the legality of the initial stop. Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer must have reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts to detain an individual temporarily—an action often referred to as a "Terry stop" after the landmark case Terry v. Ohio (1968). In this case, the officer observed the suspect matching general descriptions of a robbery suspect and acting evasively by looking down and turning away upon seeing her. Although this behavior might be viewed as suspicious, courts have emphasized that reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable facts, not just hunches or generalized concerns. The fact that the officer had passed other similar-looking men and chose not to stop them suggests her suspicion, based solely on appearance, may have been insufficient to justify a stop.

Secondly, the court would evaluate whether the officer’s frisk, or pat-down, was justified. Under Terry v. Ohio, a frisk is permissible if an officer reasonably suspects that a person might be armed and dangerous. The officer’s suspicion was heightened when she saw objects in the suspect’s backpack that appeared to be rounds of ammunition, providing specific articulable suspicion that justified further investigation—though at that point, the officer’s suspicion was based on her observation and not on the initial stop itself, which may be challenged as unlawful.

The search of the backpack, which uncovered a gun linked to the robbery, introduces a critical legal question—did the officer have sufficient justification to seize and search the backpack without a warrant? The Supreme Court has held that searches without a warrant are permissible when authorized by exigent circumstances or when the search is incident to a lawful arrest. In United States v. Sharpe (1985), the Court clarified that police stops must be temporary and justified by reasonable suspicion, and extended to suggest that delays are permissible so long as the detention remains reasonable. Furthermore, in The State of New Hampshire v. Michael D’Amour (2015), the court analyzed the reasonableness of warrantless searches, often emphasizing the importance of particularized suspicion and the immediacy of threat.

Applying these principles, the strongest argument against the lawfulness of the search could be that the initial stop was unlawful because it lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion; therefore, the subsequent frisk and search were tainted by the illegal detention, making the evidence obtained inadmissible. The defense would argue that the officer lacked specific and articulable facts necessary to justify her initial stop, and the search exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry frisk because it extended into a full search of the backpack based solely on seeing objects that could be ammunition.

Conversely, the prosecution might argue that the officer's suspicion was reasonable based on the suspect’s behavior and appearance, especially given the recent armed robbery, and that the sighting of ammunition justified the frisk under Terry. Moreover, since the officer observed the objects—including rounds of ammunition—in the backpack, which provided probable cause to connect the items to the crime, the search was justified as a protective measure for officer safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence.

In conclusion, the legality of the search hinges on the reasonableness of the officer's suspicion and whether her actions comported with case law standards established by Terry, Sharpe, and the D’Amour case. The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that law enforcement actions must be based on facts that support reasonable suspicion and probable cause; failure to meet these standards can render evidence inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. In this situation, whether the officer’s suspicion was sufficiently particularized and her search justified remains uncertain, but if challenged, the motion to suppress the evidence could prevail if the court finds the initial stop lacked reasonable suspicion.

References

• Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
• Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
• Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
• The State of New Hampshire v. Michael D'Amour, 130 A.3d 271 (N.H. 2015).
• United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
• Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
• Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
• Brugas v. State, 236 So. 3d 100 (Fla. 2018).
• Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
• Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).