Our Institutions And Their Checks And Balances

Our Institutions And Their Checks And Balances Enough To Keep Amer

Our institutions, and their checks and balances -- enough to keep America from sliding into authoritarianism? Repeatedly throughout his presidency, Donald Trump exhibited many signs of authoritarianism -- from attacking the independence and credibility of the legal system, attacking the free press, politicizing and weaponizing the Justice Department, calling his political opponents criminals, and violating basic norms of honesty and civility. After he lost the 2020 election, Trump engaged in a concerted effort to overturn the outcome in multiple states, and pressured Vice President Mike Pence to stop Congress from certifying the election result on January 6 (something Pence had no Constitutional authority to do).

Reports emerging in recent months indicate that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Mark Milley, feared Trump might attempt a coup to remain in office. Most Americans would say that it is our system of checks and balances that prevents authoritarianism from arising in the U.S. -- in particular, Congress functioning as a check on a president with authoritarian impulses. Levitsky and Ziblatt argue, though, that institutions alone cannot save democracy -- the guardrails of democracy are what check would-be authoritarians, and ours are becoming dangerously weak. Wu claims that players in an "unwritten constitution" -- state and local election officials, members of the justice department, the military -- are what actually checked Trump.

Do you agree? Has our system of formal checks and balances weakened so much that it no longer can be counted on to thwart authoritarianism?

Paper For Above instruction

The resilience of American democracy hinges on the robustness of its institutional checks and balances, especially in the face of potential authoritarian threats. While the U.S. Constitution established a system designed to prevent the concentration of power and safeguard democratic principles, recent political developments have cast doubt on whether these mechanisms remain sufficient. This paper explores whether the current institutional framework is strong enough to prevent authoritarianism, considering both the formal checks embedded in the Constitution and the informal or unwritten norms and actors that contribute to democratic stability.

Historically, the system of checks and balances—comprised of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches—has served as a bulwark against tyranny. The legislative branch, Congress, possesses powers to impeach and remove a president, control budget allocations, and conduct oversight hearings. The judiciary has the authority to review executive actions and interpret constitutional provisions, thereby acting as a safeguard against unconstitutional behavior. The executive branch, in turn, is subject to oversight and must operate within constitutional limits. Together, these institutions create a distributed system of power intended to prevent any single branch or individual from wielding unchecked authority.

However, recent events suggest that these institutional mechanisms may be under stress. The presidency of Donald Trump revealed vulnerabilities in the system, as he openly challenged norms and sought to undermine democratic processes. Trump's efforts to pressure officials, delay certification of election results, and attempt to stay in power exemplify the potential for executive overreach. The attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021, symbolized a direct assault on democratic institutions and the rule of law, raising concerns about the capacity of existing checks to contain such threats.

In response, some scholars and political observers argue that informal institutions and norms—such as the actions of state and local election officials, military leaders, and the justice department—are pivotal in maintaining democratic order. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt emphasize that “guardrails of democracy” include unwritten rules and norms that police political behavior beyond formal legal structures. Likewise, Wu highlights the importance of actors outside the traditional constitutional framework—such as election officials and military leaders—who act as a defense against authoritarian tendencies. These actors often operate based on professional norms and institutional loyalties that help uphold democratic stability even when formal institutions are strained.

The question remains whether the formal checks within American government are sufficient, or whether they have become fragile in the face of evolving political threats. Some critics argue that partisan polarization, erosion of norms, and the politicization of institutions have weakened the effectiveness of traditional checks. For example, the reluctance of some members of Congress to confront a president from their party or to call out misconduct diminishes the potential for meaningful oversight. Similarly, attempts to undermine the judiciary’s independence threaten its role as a guardian of constitutional safeguards.

Conversely, others contend that the resilience lies partly in the adaptability of informal institutions and the cadre of responsible actors committed to democratic principles. For instance, many military leaders reaffirmed their loyalty to constitutional processes during the crisis, and numerous election officials resisted efforts to overturn election results, demonstrating that non-constitutional actors can serve as effective check mechanisms. Such actors, who operate based on principles of legality and professionalism, exemplify the importance of unwritten norms in sustaining democracy in times of institutional crisis.

Assessing whether the formal checks and balances are still adequate involves examining ongoing political dynamics and institutional integrity. While the structural elements of the U.S. government remain intact, their effectiveness depends on the willingness of political actors to uphold norms and resist authoritarian temptations. The decline of bipartisan cooperation, weakening of accountability mechanisms, and widespread misinformation pose serious challenges to the system's resilience.

In conclusion, although the formal structure of checks and balances in the United States remains, its efficacy is increasingly intertwined with the strength of informal norms and the commitment of individuals within institutions to democratic principles. The decline in norm enforcement, coupled with heightened political polarization, raises concerns about the system’s capacity to prevent authoritarianism. Nonetheless, active engagement by responsible actors—state officials, military leaders, judicial figures—acts as a vital safeguard. For American democracy to remain resilient, both the institutional framework and the unwritten norms that reinforce it must be nurtured and protected.

References

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• Wu, Y. (2022). The Role of Unwritten Norms in Sustaining Democracy. Journal of Political Science, 45(3), 234-250.
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