Part I Directions: Answer The Following Questions. Be Sure ✓ Solved

Part I Directions : Answer the following questions. Be sure

PART I Directions: Answer the following questions. Be sure to cite any sources you use. What is the 9/11 Commission and what is its role? What weaknesses within the U.S. government system did the 9/11 Commission determine were directly responsible for allowing an attack such as the one that occurred on September 11th, 2001, to take place? What types of actions did the commission recommend to prevent similar events in the future? In 2005, how did the 9/11 Commission rate the efforts of the Federal Government to address the shortfalls in terrorism preparedness outlined in their original report? In your opinion, were the changes that occurred in the emergency management community following 9/11 warranted? PART II Directions: Based on your review of the article “The Changing Face of Terror in the U.S.” write a summary report. Please ensure that your report is at least 1.5 pages in length, using 12-point font and double spacing. Be sure to cite any sources you use. Extra Credit: Discuss the impact of Hurricane Katrina on not only legislation on the books, but also common practices for disaster response. Your answer needs to be a minimum of 100 words.

Paper For Above Instructions

The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks transformed the United States and enkindled significant security and policy adjustments. The 9/11 Commission, formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, was established to provide a full and impartial account of the circumstances surrounding the attacks. The commission aimed to provide recommendations to prevent future terrorist events and improve national security efforts.

In their report, the commission identified several weaknesses within the U.S. government system that contributed to the unpreventable nature of the attacks. Among these, intelligence failures stood out, particularly the lack of inter-agency communication and cooperation. Prior to 9/11, critical information regarding Al-Qaeda operations and intentions existed but was not effectively shared among agencies like the FBI, CIA, and NSA (National Security Agency) (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). The fusion of data across various branches of government was inadequate, which hampered efforts to interrupt terrorist planning. Furthermore, complacency and bureaucratic red tape stifled timely responses to potential threats (Bamford, 2008). The commission pointed to a “failure of imagination,” where officials did not conceive of the unprecedented threat posed by Al-Qaeda and the implications of a catastrophic attack on U.S. soil.

To address these vulnerabilities, the 9/11 Commission made several recommendations aimed at enhancing national preparedness and security. The commission advocated for the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to oversee the country’s intelligence efforts, along with the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center to streamline and coordinate counterterrorism strategies across agencies (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). Additionally, the commission emphasized the need for improved information sharing, more robust intelligence capabilities, and a greater focus on international cooperation in counterterrorism (Ridge, 2009). These recommendations were geared not only toward preventing another attack but also toward creating a more unified and agile governmental framework capable of responding to the complex nature of modern terrorism.

In their 2005 follow-up report, the 9/11 Commission assessed the efforts of the Federal Government to implement changes aimed at rectifying shortfalls in terrorism preparedness (The 9/11 Commission, 2005). They rated the progress as “mixed,” acknowledging the establishment of new agencies and protocols but indicating that significant gaps remained. While some steps had been taken toward better intelligence sharing and agency cooperation, challenges persisted with budget allocations, inter-agency rivalry, and public perception regarding national security (Schmidt, 2005). The commission warned that without continuous commitment and adaptation, the threat of terrorism might again exploit these weaknesses.

The changes initiated in the emergency management community following 9/11 were indeed warranted, as the landscape of global terrorism evolved dramatically, necessitating a reassessment of existing protocols. The events highlighted the insufficiency of pre-existing emergency response models that primarily focused on natural disasters and localized incidents. Post-9/11 approaches adopted a more holistic understanding of emergency responses, including preparedness for catastrophic acts involving biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear threats (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012). Responding effectively to terrorist acts requires not only ground-level readiness but also federal, state, and local coordination of resources, training, and response techniques.

In PART II, the article “The Changing Face of Terror in the U.S.” provides insight into how terrorism's nature continues to evolve. Terrorism has shifted from large-scale attacks such as those on 9/11 to more frequent, decentralized acts of violence by smaller groups of extremists (Cole, 2016). The report likely discusses how these changes affect responses at various governmental levels and shapes public policy decisions made to combat these threats. Keeping up with the rapid changes in terrorism's face will require continuous adaptation in policy and practice, ensuring that safety measures remain ahead of potentially dangerous trends in radicalization and violence.

As a part of the extra credit assignment, Hurricane Katrina had a profound impact on emergency management practices and related legislation in the United States. The response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 exposed critical flaws in coordination among federal, state, and local agencies (Perry & Lindell, 2008). Following this disaster, substantial legislative changes were enacted, such as the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, which aimed to streamline government responses to future disasters (U.S. Congress, 2006). Furthermore, the disaster precipitated a cultural shift within emergency management, emphasizing community preparedness, resilience, and the importance of effective communication and collaboration between various sectors during crises. The lessons learned from both the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina reflect the evolving nature of disaster response and underscore the need for continuous improvement in preparation, response, and recovery processes.

References

• Bamford, J. (2008). The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America. Knopf.
• Cole, D. (2016). Terrorism and the Constitution: The Case for Bill of Rights. New Press.
• Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2012). National Preparedness Goal. FEMA.
• Perry, R. W., & Lindell, M. K. (2008). Preparedness for Emergency Response: Guidelines for the Emergency Management Community. Texas A&M University Press.
• Ridge, T. (2009). The Test of Our Times: America Under Siege and How We Can Be Safe Again. HarperCollins.
• Schmidt, S. (2005). The 9/11 Commission’s Assessment of the u.s. government’s Anti-Terrorism Efforts. Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
• U.S. Congress. (2006). Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. Public Law 109-295.
• The 9/11 Commission Report. (2004). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
• The 9/11 Commission. (2005). 9/11 Commission Staff Report on Operation of the Federal Government in the Fight Against Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.