Politics Of The World Economy: The Post

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Politics of the World Economy – -A18/19 AS2 ‘In the post-war period, the desire to control Middle Eastern oil has driven US politics in the region’. Discuss. Wordcount: 2338 Petroleum is an essential resource for the productivity of economies, from everyday life to industries, oil has been central since it became a commodity during the 20th century. What has made it so crucial and shaped the geopolitics of the 20th century concerns its geographical limitations as not every country possess their own oil reserves. I will argue that to an extent United States (U.S.) politics in the Middle East has been driven for the securitisation of fossil fuels.

The U.S. desire to contain the spread of communism within this region can also be linked to the securitisation of oil within this region. However, within the Middle Eastern region, the U.S. did go against its interest in oil due to structural power within its domestic politics. I will delimit my post-war era from 1945 to 1989, as well as, the analysis won’t be studied chronologically. Firstly, I will present the theoretical background of modern mercantilism and realism. Secondly, I will briefly present the US geopolitical background in the Middle East before the post-war era.

Thirdly, I will analyse three main U.S. policies (Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower Doctrine and Carter Doctrine). Fourthly, I will counterargue through neo-classical realism that the irrational U.S. backing of Israel alienated to an extent its vital interest in the Middle East. Lastly, I will conclude that the shaping of U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East is the correlation of its desire and necessity for Middle Eastern oil, but also, the need to block communist expansion within this region. However, structural power has affected U.S. politics within the Middle East and strayed away from its vital interest in oil.

According to Robert Gilpin (1975), economic nationalism represents the modern mercantilist model, where states use the economy in order to boost their interest. Such interest can be internal affairs or foreign policies. He argues that “the essence of mercantilism … is the priority of national economic and political objectives over considerations of global economic efficiency” (Gilpin, 1975; cited in Cohen, 2005, p. 45-46; Pryke, 2012). Moreover, he argues that economic policies are therefore a means for power in the chaotic world of international politics (Gilpin, 2001, p.14; cited in Pryke, 2012, p.283). This view is emphasised by O’Brien and Williams (2017) by portraying economic nationalism in the international political economy as the twin of realism in international relations (O’Brien and Williams, 2017; cited in Pryke, 2012, p. 283).

In addition, according to Hans Morgenthau (1948), realism regards states as the principal rational actor in the anarchical world as there is no higher governing body than states themselves. States are primarily concerned with their national security. So, the making of foreign policy targets the reinforcement of one’s national security, but also, its vital interests (Morgenthau, 1948). I believe that such theoretical depiction reinforces the case that I will make regarding U.S. policies towards the Middle-East; states are central to the analysis of foreign policies as through the latter they seek to maximise their power for their own interest and security.

But also, it leads my analysis towards the realist theory which will portray the U.S. containment policy towards the Soviet Union in the Middle Eastern region. The geopolitics of oil took a turn when the US government realised its own petroleum reserves might deplete due to its over extraction for the wartime effort during WWII. As a result, Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to explore the possibilities of importing oil to the U.S. and securing the U.S. reserves for a future war (Klare, 2012, p. 32).

The non-affiliation of Saudi Arabia with any western country led to the first diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and the US government. Such a relationship can be termed as a ‘lethal embrace’, coined by Michael Klare (Klare, 2004, p.26). From this point onward, Saudi Arabia’s oil has been regarded as a national interest and the U.S. sought to defend its security and strategy no matter the cost, reflected in the 1945 Roosevelt-Ibn Saud Agreement. Consequently, the U.S. major owned Saudi oil for political and military protection of the Saudi Crown (Klare, 2012, p.32). This agreement is the foundation of U.S. involvement in the Middle East to secure its shipping routes and access to petroleum in the region.

Compared to the U.S. production, Middle Eastern petroleum was a bargain; the production and importation of a barrel to the U.S. was $0.75 per barrel in exchange for $2.40 domestically, yielding a profit of $1.65 per barrel before rent and other costs (Erenow, n.d.). As a consequence, the U.S. became rapidly dependent on Middle Eastern oil, which boosted the U.S. economy and helped position it as a superpower. However, until the 1970s, U.S. involvement was limited due to British influence, which changed with the withdrawal of Britain from the Suez Canal in 1971 (Klare, 2012, p.33). The post-war period corresponds with the Cold War, characterized by rising tensions between Washington and Moscow.

To contain Soviet expansion, policies such as the Truman Doctrine and Eisenhower Doctrine were enacted. These policies aimed to contain the Soviet Union and secure U.S. strategic and economic interests, especially oil shipping routes. The Truman Doctrine (1947) aimed to contain Soviet aspirations, notably in Iran, which was under threat after the nationalization of oil resources and Soviet influence in Azerbaijan in 1946 (Klare, 2004, p.39). This Soviet expansion posed a threat to U.S. oil interests, as control over Iranian oil and access to strategic ports was vital for U.S. security interests in the region.

The rise of Iranian nationalism and subsequent oil nationalization led the U.S. to back a coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953, restoring the pro-Western regime and countering Soviet influence (Sampson, 1975, p.121; cited in Halabi, 2009, p. 34). This intervention exemplifies Cold War logic of containment and the prioritisation of oil access. The domino theory emerged in the 1950s, emphasizing that the fall of one country to communism would lead to regional destabilization, threatening U.S. and Western interests.

The Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), introduced after the Suez Crisis of 1956, reinforced containment policies, providing economic and military aid to Middle Eastern countries to resist Soviet expansion (Halabi, 2009, p. 62). These policies reflect the broader Cold War framework, subtly securing U.S. interests in oil and regional stability without explicitly stating so. Yet, underlying these policies was the need to protect vital oil shipping lanes and the region’s oil resources, which was only made explicit in the Carter Doctrine (1980).

The Carter Doctrine explicitly declared that any outside attempt to control the Persian Gulf would be regarded as an assault on U.S. vital interests, warranting the use of force if necessary (Carter, 1980). This marked a shift to a more aggressive stance, with military deployment and the establishment of bases in the region, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz, the most critical global oil shipping route. The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the fall of the U.S.-backed Shah of Iran further heightened the significance of protecting regional interests through military means (Halabi, 2009, p.62).

Throughout this period, U.S. foreign policy was shaped by a combination of strategic calculations about oil, regional stability, and containment of Soviet influence. The Cold War context provided cover for policies that prioritized oil security but also reflected the broader geopolitical rivalry. Domestic political considerations, especially the influence of pro-Israeli lobbyists, complicated U.S. foreign policy, sometimes causing contradictions and undermining interest-based decisions.

Neo-classical realism emphasizes domestic influences on foreign policy. In the U.S., domestic politics, notably the influence of pro-Israeli lobby groups, often conflicted with country’s vital interests in the Middle East. Support for Israel, although rational from a domestic political perspective, sometimes conflicted with strategic interests, as exemplified by the Oil Embargo of 1973. U.S. support for Israel in the October War led Arab oil-producing countries to retaliate by decreasing oil exports, creating a global energy crisis that undermined U.S. and global economies (Halabi, 2009, p.63-64). This event highlights how domestic political forces, driven by powerful lobby groups, influenced U.S. policies, sometimes at odds with strategic oil interests.

This complexity in domestic politics has sometimes led the U.S. to pursue policies that are inconsistent with its core economic and security interests, causing instability and challenges to long-term regional stability. Ultimately, U.S. politics in the Middle East during the post-war period was driven by a mixture of pragmatic interests in controlling access to oil and ideological concerns about stopping Soviet expansion. Structural domestic power and lobbying exerted significant influence, often complicating the pursuit of coherent oil security policies.

Paper For Above instruction

The politics of the post-war Middle East have been profoundly shaped by the United States’ desire to secure access to vital oil resources while also countering Soviet influence through containment policies. The interplay between economic interests, geopolitical strategy, and domestic political influences has driven U.S. actions in the region, reflecting a complex balance of motivations rooted in both realist principles and domestic power dynamics.

Petroleum’s geopolitical significance in the 20th century cannot be overstated. Oil's geographical concentration in the Middle East, a region lacking sufficient reserves of its own, placed it at the center of global strategic calculations. U.S. policymakers recognized early on that control over Middle Eastern oil was essential for maintaining economic stability and projecting power globally. This realization underpins much of America’s military and diplomatic engagement in the region, especially during the Cold War era, when the threat of Soviet expansion prompted proactive strategies aimed at securing vital shipping routes and preventing Soviet gains.

The theoretical frameworks of mercantilism and realism offer valuable insights into U.S. foreign policy in this context. Gilpin’s concept of economic nationalism underscores how states leverage economic resources, particularly strategic commodities like oil, to enhance political power and secure national interests (Gilpin, 1975). Similarly, Morgenthau’s emphasis on states as rational actors pursuing security and power elucidates why the U.S. prioritized regional stability and oil access. These theories suggest that U.S. actions in the Middle East, from forming alliances to intervening militarily, were driven by a fundamental desire to bolster national strength and deter adversaries.

Post-war U.S. engagement with the Middle East was initially driven by strategic necessity. The Roosevelt-Ibn Saud agreement of 1945 cemented the alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, securing access to oil and the strategic advantage of controlling shipping routes, especially the Suez Canal. The dependence on Middle Eastern oil grew rapidly, making the region indispensable to U.S. economic and national security strategies. This dependence was reinforced as American oil reserves diminished due to wartime consumption, prompting efforts to diversify supply sources.

The Cold War context intensified U.S. interest in the region’s stability. The Truman Doctrine aimed to contain Soviet expansion into Iran and Eastern Mediterranean ports, with Iran’s oil reserves playing a key role in this strategy. The 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh reflected the prioritization of oil interests, as nationalization threatened Western access, and was justified within the broader containment policy to prevent Soviet influence. The domino theory further justified U.S. intervention, emphasizing that the fall of one state could trigger broader regional destabilization detrimental to American interests.

The Eisenhower Doctrine extended containment further by providing military and economic aid to pro-Western regimes, aiming to thwart Soviet attempts to expand influence. These policies were reflective of a broader effort to secure regional stability and oil supplies, though their explicit link to oil was often veiled within Cold War rhetoric. The Suez Crisis of 1956 was a turning point, prompting the U.S. to take a more active role in regional security, culminating in the Carter Doctrine of 1980.

The Carter Doctrine marked a significant escalation, explicitly declaring that any attempt to control the Persian Gulf would be regarded as an assault on U.S. vital interests, warranting the use of force (Carter, 1980). The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz and the broader Persian Gulf region made it a focal point of U.S. military posture. The Iran–Iraq War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the fall of the Shah further underscored the need for military presence and readiness to ensure access to oil flows and regional stability.

However, domestic politics complicated this strategic calculus. U.S. domestic political influence, especially the power of pro-Israeli lobbies, often conflicted with the country’s vital interests in the region. Support for Israel, though motivated by domestic political considerations, led to policies that sometimes alienated Arab states and jeopardized regional stability. The Oil Embargo of 1973, triggered by U.S. support for Israel during the October War, vividly demonstrated how domestic political pressures could undermine strategic interests, leading to energy crises and economic downturns.

This event illustrates the complex influence of domestic political power on foreign policy, often resulting in contradictions and strategic setbacks. The influence of powerful lobby groups further complicated the pursuit of a consistent policy framework focused solely on securing oil supplies. These domestic factors contributed to a scenario where U.S. policies, initially driven by strategic necessity, became entangled with domestic political interests that sometimes undermined long-term regional stability and energy security.

In conclusion, the post-war U.S. politics in the Middle East has been fundamentally driven by a dual desire: securing access to the region’s vital oil resources and deterring Soviet expansion. The theoretical frameworks of realism and mercantilism help explain how strategic and economic objectives are intertwined in shaping policy decisions. Yet, domestic political influences—particularly the pro-Israeli lobby—have often complicated and undermined these interests, leading to contradictory policies and regional instability. The legacy of these policies continues to influence contemporary Middle Eastern geopolitics, underscoring the enduring importance of controlling Middle Eastern oil in U.S. strategic calculations.

References

• Carter, J. (1980). Address to the Nation on the Persian Gulf. The American Presidency Project.
• Clare, M. T. (2004). Blood and Oil. London: Penguin Books.
• Clare, M. T. (2012). The Changing Geopolitics of Oil. In R. E. Looney (Ed.), Handbook of Oil Politics (pp. 30-33). Routledge.
• Gilpin, R. (1975). Three Models of the Future. International Organization, 29, 37-60.
• Gilpin, R. (2001). Global Political Economy. Princeton University Press.
• Halabi, Y. (2009). US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From Crises to Change. Ashgate Publishing Limited.
• Klare, M. T. (2004). Blood and Oil. London: Penguin Books.
• Klare, M. T. (2012). The Changing Geopolitics of Oil. In R. E. Looney (Ed.), Handbook of Oil Politics (pp. 30-33). Routledge.
• Morgenthau, H. (1948). Politics Among Nations. New York: A. A. Knopf.
• Sampson, G. (1975). The Coup D’état in Iran. Middle East Journal, 29(3), 301-317.