Professor David L. Fiskfall Fall 2018 Class Schedule

Professor David L Fiskfall Quarter 2018class Schedule 200 250 Mwfc

Analyze the extent to which “smart power” dominates the foreign policy in a selected case (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Brazil, Russia, or China). Evaluate whether the foreign policy of your case reflects a commitment to smart power as proposed by Nye or a return to reliance on hard power as suggested by Kagan and Gelb. Explain why the case should emphasize smart power or not. Your analysis should include: the conceptualization of international relations post-Cold War by “end of history” and “return to history” theorists; definitions and utility of hard, soft, and “smart” power within these narratives; the main foreign policy objectives in your case and their alignment with Nye’s smart power; and your argument on whether the case’s policies should or should not reflect smart power. Support your points with course materials, including lectures, readings, and current events, and organize a well-structured argument within 6–8 pages. Include a bibliography citing sources in MLA or APA style. Submit your final paper electronically via turnitin.com by 5:59 pm on 14 December 2018. Ensure the correct version is uploaded, as late or incorrect submissions cannot be accepted unless due to documented emergencies.

Sample Paper For Above instruction

The post-Cold War era has been characterized by divergent theories explaining the changing nature of international relations, notably the “end of history” thesis proposed by Francis Fukuyama and the “return to history” perspective articulated by thinkers like Kagan and Gelb. These paradigms influence how states approach their foreign policies, especially concerning the utilization of different types of power—hard, soft, and “smart” power—as concepts introduced by Joseph Nye. Analyzing the foreign policy of China as a case study, this paper explores whether its strategies align more with Nye’s concept of “smart power” or with a resurgence of hard power tactics. It references the theoretical frameworks and current policy actions to evaluate the dominant approach and discusses whether emphasizing smart power would better serve China’s international objectives.

Fukuyama's “end of history” thesis posits that liberal democracy and free-market capitalism represent the ultimate form of human government, suggesting a future marked by the stabilization of Western liberal values. Under this view, the proliferation of liberal democracy implies that conflicts diminish as shared values increase, and states focus on soft power—cultural influence, international institutions, and diplomacy—to promote their ideals (Fukuyama, 1989). Conversely, Kagan and Gelb contend that the post-Cold War landscape is a period of strategic reassertion, where hard power—military and economic coercion—resurges as states prioritize national interests and strategic dominance (Kagan, 2007; Gelb, 2009). These conflicting perspectives shape expectations about whether countries will continue emphasizing diplomatic engagement or revert to coercive measures.

Conceptualizing Power: Hard, Soft, and “Smart”

Hard power refers to military and economic capabilities used coercively to influence other states’ behavior, epitomized by military interventions and economic sanctions. Soft power, on the other hand, involves shaping preferences through cultural appeal, political values, and foreign policies that earn admiration and voluntary compliance (Nye, 2004). The concept of “smart” power integrates both approaches, advocating for a strategic blend tailored to specific contexts, leveraging diplomacy, cultural influence, and military strength where appropriate. According to Nye (2008), “smart” power enhances a state's capacity to achieve strategic goals efficiently by applying the most suitable mix of tools, thus avoiding over-reliance on coercion or persuasion alone.

Chinese Foreign Policy and the Emphasis on “Smart Power”

China’s foreign policy in recent years demonstrates a nuanced approach, balancing economic initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with a robust military modernization program, indicative of a strategic deployment of both hard and soft power. China’s strategic aims include securing economic interests, asserting regional dominance in Asia, and gaining influence in global governance institutions. While China actively promotes cultural values and invests in development projects abroad, it also employs coercive tactics like military posturing in the South China Sea and economic leverage through debt diplomacy (Klein, 2018; Shambaugh, 2013).

This dual approach suggests a hybrid strategy rather than a strict adherence to Nye’s “smart power.” For example, China's use of economic inducements through BRI embodies soft power, fostering influence among emerging countries. Simultaneously, its military assertiveness reflects a reliance on hard power. These strategies partly align with “smart” power, but the significant emphasis on coercion and strategic dominance points to a partial deviation from Nye’s ideal of integrated, judicious influence.

Should China Emphasize “Smart Power”?

From a strategic perspective, emphasizing “smart power” could benefit China by enhancing its legitimacy and soft power influence, fostering long-term partnerships, and reducing regional tensions. Transitioning towards a more balanced approach—using diplomacy, cultural engagement, and multilateral cooperation—would help mitigate misunderstandings that arise from aggressive military actions. Nevertheless, given China’s assertive economic and military ambitions, a complete shift to soft power may be unrealistic in the short term, and a pragmatic blend—aligned with the “return to history” view—may better serve its strategic interests.

In conclusion, China's current foreign policy reflects a mix of strategies that oscillate between Nye’s “smart power” and traditional hard power proliferation, influenced by both the “end of history” and “return to history” paradigms. A greater emphasis on “smart power” could help China advance its long-term interests while enhancing its global image, but the existing strategic culture and security concerns may limit rapid transition. Recognizing these dynamics is crucial for understanding whether China’s foreign policy realigns more fully with the principles Nye advocates or remains rooted in strategic assertiveness indicative of a “return to history.”

References

• Fukuyama, F. (1989). The End of History? The National Interest, (16), 3-18.
• Kagan, R. (2007). The Return of History. Foreign Policy, 161, 30-35.
• Gelb, B. A. (2009). Power Rules: How Common Sense Strengthens American Global Leadership. Council on Foreign Relations.
• Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs.
• Nye, J. S. (2008). The Future of Power. Public Affairs.
• Klein, M. (2018). China's Belt and Road Initiative: An Analysis of Strategic Impact. Asian Security, 14(3), 189-204.
• Shambaugh, D. (2013). China’s Future. Polity Press.
• Joseph Nye. (2011). The Future of Power. Public Affairs.
• Economist. (2019). “The Rise of China: A Soft Power Superpower?†The Economist, February 16.
• Shambaugh, D. (2013). China’s Foreign Policy: Theories and Practice. Routledge.