Return To Your Submission For Progress Check 1 And Expand Up ✓ Solved

Return to your submission for Progress Check 1 and expand up

Return to your submission for Progress Check 1 and expand upon your event’s historical significance, describe two secondary sources you could use to research your event (along with search terms you used to locate those sources), and support your research question with secondary and primary sources. Specifically, submit the following elements of your Project 1: Writing Plan for review: I. Describe the historical event you selected and why this event is significant. II. Describe at least two secondary sources that you could use to research your historical event. For each source, explain similarities and differences in content, why they are appropriate and relevant, and your thought process and search terms when locating them. IV. Based on your review of primary and secondary sources, develop a research question related to the historical event you selected. You do not need to describe primary sources or the audience and message for your historical analysis essay in this submission.

Paper For Above Instructions

Topic: The Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962)

This paper expands upon the event’s historical significance, describes two secondary scholarly sources and the search terms used to locate them, and develops a research question supported by primary and secondary materials.

1. Description of the Historical Event and Its Significance

The Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) was a 13-day confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over Soviet ballistic missiles deployed to Cuba. Triggered by U.S. reconnaissance that discovered offensive Soviet missiles on the island, the crisis brought the two superpowers to the brink of nuclear war before a negotiated settlement was reached: the USSR agreed to remove the missiles in exchange for a U.S. public pledge not to invade Cuba and a secret U.S. removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Fursenko & Naftali, 1997).

The event is significant because it was the closest moment to full-scale nuclear conflict during the Cold War and reshaped nuclear diplomacy, crisis management, and superpower communication. It led to institutional reforms (hotline establishment, arms control dialogues) and generated historiographical debates on decision-making, intelligence interpretation, and the influence of personal leadership styles (Gaddis, 1997; Blight & Welch, 1989).

2. Two Secondary Sources, Relevance, and Search Terms

3. Similarities and Differences Between the Two Sources

Similarities: Both works are scholarly, well-cited, and aimed at academic and advanced public audiences. Each addresses chronology, key actors, and implications for Cold War policy (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Fursenko & Naftali, 1997).

Differences: Allison & Zelikow emphasize analytical models and comparative explanation; their work is interpretive and theoretical. Fursenko & Naftali emphasize archival narrative, especially Soviet internal documents, which yields richer detail on Soviet motives. Using both permits triangulation: theoretical framework + archival evidence (Gaddis, 1997).

Thought process in searching: I prioritized peer-reviewed books and monographs, searched university library catalogs and Google Scholar, then consulted primary document collections to verify claims. I selected sources balancing theory (decision models) and empirical archival work to support both explanatory and evidentiary demands.

4. Primary Sources to Support the Research Question

While this submission does not require full primary-source listings, effective primary documents to corroborate secondary interpretations include: President John F. Kennedy’s televised Address to the Nation (Oct 22, 1962), Khrushchev’s letters to Kennedy (Oct 1962), and contemporaneous State Department and National Security Council documents published in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series and the National Security Archive (FRUS, 1961–1963; Kennedy, 1962).

These documents provide direct evidence of leaders’ public and private positions, offer timelines for decisions, and allow critical testing of secondary narratives (May & Zelikow, 1997; Savranskaya et al., 2002).

5. Proposed Research Question

Research Question: To what extent did institutional decision-making processes within the Kennedy administration, as opposed to personal leadership decisions, determine the United States’ choice of a naval quarantine and the terms of the negotiated settlement during the Cuban Missile Crisis?

Rationale: This question derives from juxtaposing Allison & Zelikow’s models (organizational and governmental politics) with archival evidence suggesting both institutional constraints and personal initiative (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Fursenko & Naftali, 1997). It allows an inquiry that tests theoretical models with primary documents (memoirs, meeting transcripts, tapes) and secondary syntheses.

6. How Sources Will Support the Research Question

Allison & Zelikow’s theoretical framework will provide hypotheses about how organizational routines and interagency bargaining could explain choices (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Fursenko & Naftali and FRUS documents will supply chronological and factual evidence to evaluate whether decisions followed bureaucratic procedures or reflected Kennedy’s personal crisis management style (Fursenko & Naftali, 1997; FRUS, 1961–1963). Primary sources such as taped White House meetings and Kennedy’s public statements will be used to test the relative role of presidential leadership versus institutional dynamics (May & Zelikow, 1997; Kennedy, 1962).

Combined, this approach will permit a balanced, evidence-based argument about causation in high-stakes decision-making.

Conclusion

This Progress Check expands the event description, identifies two complementary secondary sources and search strategies, and frames a research question that can be tested with primary and secondary evidence. The chosen sources and primary documents are well-suited to a paper that evaluates competing explanations for U.S. crisis behavior during October 1962.

References

• Allison, G. T., & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 3rd ed. Longman.
• Fursenko, A., & Naftali, T. (1997). One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964. W. W. Norton.
• Gaddis, J. L. (1997). We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford University Press.
• May, E. R., & Zelikow, P. (Eds.). (1997). The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis. W. W. Norton.
• Savranskaya, S., Blanton, T., & Zubok, V. (Eds.). (2002). The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader. Central European University Press.
• Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI: Cuba, 1961–1963. (U.S. Department of State).
• Kennedy, J. F. (1962, October 22). Address to the Nation on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba. Presidential Papers, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
• Khrushchev, N. S. (1974). Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Little, Brown and Company.
• Blight, J. G., & Welch, D. A. (1989). On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. Hill and Wang.
• National Security Archive at George Washington University. (Various documents and collections on the Cuban Missile Crisis). Retrieved from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/