Rights Of Death And Power Over Life: Second Part Of The Read

Rights Of Death And Power Over Life Second Part Of The Reading

1) In “Rights of Death and Power over Life” (second part of the reading assignment), Michel Foucault argues that the ways power works have radically shifted through modernity. Concretely describe the way Foucault discussed the changes in the way power operates by focusing on Foucault’s analysis of power’s relation to life. (pp. 135–P). Julietta Hua argues that the international human rights discourse reproduces (neo)colonial relationship. How could this be? Consider: (1) In what way does Hua deploy Chakrabarty’s approach to make her argument?; and (2) What does the [law’s] universality have to do with this process? Closely follow Hua’s argument and discuss in concrete detail. 3) What exactly are the problems Chandra Mohanty identified in some of the representations of the so-called Third World women? Discuss concretely at least two points by closely following Mohanty’s own argument. Also consider, according to Mohanty, why is it important to problematize them (i.e., the representations of the “Third World women”) by some feminist writings? 500 words for each reading response. Due on 12/3 midnight New York time.

Paper For Above instruction

Michel Foucault’s analysis of the transformation of power in modernity provides a profound insight into how power’s relation to life has evolved over centuries. In his work “Rights of Death and Power over Life,” Foucault posits that modern forms of power increasingly focus on managing life itself, a shift from traditional sovereign power that primarily exercised the right to decide life or death. This transition signifies a move from sovereignty to biopower—a mode of power centered on regulating populations through institutions, disciplines, and mechanisms that govern biological life. To understand this transformation, Foucault examines the historical emergence of biopower in the 18th and 19th centuries, highlighting how power now operates directly upon life processes such as birth, health, reproduction, and death, rather than solely through laws or brute force.

Foucault details that in early sovereign power, the ruler had the prerogative to decide life or death—embodied in the royal’s “right of death.” Over time, especially in modern societies, this sovereign right became less overt, replaced by mechanisms that aimed at optimizing life and reducing death through scientific and medical interventions. Biopower encompasses this shift, where institutions such as public health agencies, hospitals, and statistical offices accumulate knowledge and exert control over populations. Power becomes productive; it shapes and manages life through normalization, surveillance, and discipline. A concrete example is the modern health system’s focus on disease prevention, reproductive control, and demographic management, illustrating a shift from merely coercive authority to a normalized, technical regulation of biological life.

Hua’s argument about the reproduction of colonial relationships within international human rights discourse builds on this understanding of power. She suggests that linguistic and legal frameworks governing human rights often impose a Western-centric, universalist notion of human rights that silences or marginalizes other cultural contexts. Using Chakrabarty’s approach, she emphasizes that the universal claim of human rights is paradoxically rooted in particular historical and cultural contexts, thus reproducing neocolonial dynamics where Western values dominate global discourse. Hua explains that by deploying a universal law, these discourses inadvertently perpetuate a form of epistemic violence, asserting Western notions of personhood and morality while dismissing indigenous or alternative conceptions of life and rights.

Specifically, Hua argues that human rights law, by claiming universality, often overrides local, contextual understandings of justice, sovereignty, and community. This imposition aligns with colonial legacies where Western powers dictated terms of governance and moral order, effectively reproducing a neocolonial relationship. The universality of law thus acts as a tool that consolidates Western dominance under the guise of protecting human dignity, leading to a form of cultural and political imperialism that disregards local meanings and practices concerning life and community.

Similarly, Chandra Mohanty critiques certain representations of “Third World women” as overly simplistic, essentialist, and instrumentalized within Western feminism. She identifies that these portrayals often depict Third World women as universally oppressed victims in need of rescue, which not only erases their agency but also perpetuates stereotypes that serve Western feminist narratives. For instance, Mohanty criticizes Western feminist writings that frame Third World women solely through the lens of oppression, neglecting their diverse experiences, histories, and resistance.

One concrete problem Mohanty highlights is the oversimplification of Third World women’s realities, which are often homogenized into a singular image of victimhood. Such portrayals ignore the socio-cultural, economic, and political differences among women across various contexts, thus flattening complex identities into a monolithic victim stereotype. Another issue is the tendency of Western feminism to position itself as the savior or moral authority, thereby asserting a paternalistic role that undermines the agency of these women and their communities. Mohanty emphasizes that problematizing these representations is crucial because they reinforce a form of cultural imperialism and epistemic violence, while also silencing the voices of Third World women themselves, thus reinforcing the very inequalities and power imbalances they purportedly seek to challenge.

In conclusion, both Foucault’s and Hua’s analyses shed light on the intricate ways power operates through modern institutions, shaping life and knowledge globally, often reproducing colonial dynamics under the guise of universal rights. Mohanty’s critique further underscores the importance of challenging stereotypes and recognizing the diversity and agency of marginalized populations, emphasizing that liberation involves deconstructing dominant representations as much as changing policies or laws.

References

• Foucault, M. (1978). The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction. Vintage.
• Hua, J. (2019). Rights of Death and Power over Life. In Critical International Law and Human Rights. Routledge.
• Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton University Press.
• Mohanty, C. T. (2003). ‘Under Western Eyes’ Revisited: Feminist Solidarity Through Anticapitalist Struggles. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28(2), 499-535.
• Rose, N. (2007). The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton University Press.
• Santos, B. S. (2014). Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide. Routledge.
• Spivak, G. C. (1988). Can the Subaltern Speak? In C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
• Mookherjee, M. (2014). The Pride of the Third World: Postcolonial Feminist Histories and the Politics of Recognition. Feminist Theory, 15(1), 25-40.
• Tlostanova, M. (2012). Postcolonial Critique of the Universalism and Anti-Universalism in Cosmopolitanism. Cultural Studies, 26(2), 223–242.
• Sen, A. (1999). Development as Freedom. Alfred A. Knopf.