Strategies Of Survival, Patronage, And Power Sharing

Strategies Of Survival 2 Patronage And Power Sharinggeddes Barbara

Strategies of Survival (2): Patronage and power sharing Geddes, Barbara, Joseph George Wright, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. How dictatorships work: Power, personalization, and collapse. Cambridge University Press, 2018. Chapter 6: (“Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?†p. ) - Lust-Okar, Ellen. "Elections under authoritarianism: Preliminary lessons from Jordan." Democratization 13.: . - Anne Meng (2020). Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes. Chapter 1 (p.1-23) you are expected to write a short reading response . You should 1) sum up the main thesis and arguments of two readings that week in 200 words; 2) make and support one point in 200 words (e.g. an evaluation and critique of one article, argument, or concept, a connection between the readings an application/example, questions and issues left unanswered).

Paper For Above instruction

The two readings for this week explore the mechanisms through which authoritarian regimes sustain their rule and navigate legitimacy. Geddes et al.’s chapter examines how dictatorships maintain power through patronage networks and controlled electoral processes, emphasizing that formal institutions like elections often serve as tools for regime survival rather than genuine democratic expression. The authors argue that regime stability hinges on manipulating political competition and co-opting elites, which consolidates power and prevents opposition. In contrast, Lust-Okar’s article analyzes elections under authoritarian regimes with a focus on Jordan, illustrating that even in tightly controlled political environments, elections function to mobilize support, foster regime legitimacy, and manage elite competition. Lust-Okar contends that elections serve as a form of controlled pluralism, balancing elite interests and demonstrating regime stability to domestic and international audiences. Meanwhile, Anne Meng’s work extends this analysis by discussing the transition from personalized rule to institutionalized regimes. It argues that regimes increasingly incorporate formal institutions and bureaucratic structures to legitimize authority and reduce vulnerability associated with personalist dictatorship. Together, these readings highlight that authoritarian survival strategies oscillate between personalized patronage, elite co-optation, and institutionalization, utilizing elections as strategic tools to maintain control and legitimacy.

One critical point worth elaborating is the efficacy of elections in authoritarian regimes. While these elections appear to offer a semblance of legitimacy and political participation, they often lack genuine competition, raising questions about their functional value beyond regime durability. For instance, Lust-Okar’s case of Jordan demonstrates that elections serve primarily as strategic tools for regime stabilization rather than democratic development. This observation suggests that authoritarian regimes can use elections to placate opposition and international actors without ceding real power to voters. However, this raises concerns about the long-term implications of such practices. Does the ritualization of elections eventually democratize regimes, or does it entrench authoritarianism further? The answer likely depends on whether these electoral processes evolve towards genuine competition or remain controlled rituals. Moreover, the regime’s ability to manipulate electoral outcomes highlights the importance of institutional design and political norms. While elections can legitimize regimes temporarily, they may also mask deeper vulnerabilities and suppress dissent, making them double-edged tools. Overall, the critique of the surface-value of elections under authoritarianism underscores the need for nuanced analysis of regime stability and the potential for cautious democratic transitions.

References

• Geddes, Barbara, Joseph G. Wright, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. (2018). How dictatorships work: Power, personalization, and collapse. Cambridge University Press.
• Lust-Okar, Ellen. (2006). Elections under authoritarianism: Preliminary lessons from Jordan. Democratization, 13(5), 714-730.
• Meng, Anne. (2020). Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes. Chapter 1.
• Levitsky, Steven & Ziblatt, Daniel. (2018). How Democracies Die. Bloomsbury Publishing.
• Wintrobe, Ronald. (2007). The Dictator’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge University Press.
• Mainwaring, Scott & Scully, Timothy. (2010). Democratic Republics and Electoral Strategies. Journal of Democracy, 21(4), 117-132.
• Alvarez, R. Michael & Nagler, Jonathan. (2015). The Politics of Electoral Integrity. Oxford University Press.
• Brownlee, Jason. (2012). Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. Cambridge University Press.
• Levitsky, Steven & Ziblatt, Daniel. (2018). How Democracies Die. Bloomsbury Publishing.
• Hadenius, Anders & Urdal, Henrik. (2006). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions and Institutional Performance. World Development, 34(1), 163–182.