The Old Saint Tells Zarathustra Now I Love God Man

1 The Old Saint Tells Zarathustra Now I Love God Man I

What point is Nietzsche making in this passage about the belief system of Christianity? The excerpt from "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" presents a character expressing a dichotomy between love for God and love for man. The old saint declares love for God but not for man, considering humanity too imperfect to be loved fully. Nietzsche’s portrayal here underscores a critique of Christian morality, which often emphasizes divine love and sacrifice while neglecting human vitality and strength. Nietzsche suggests that an exclusive love for God, divorced from appreciation for human life, leads to a denial of earthly existence and human nature. This critique aligns with Nietzsche's broader philosophy that emphasizes the afirmation of life, vitality, and the rejection of ascetic ideals that devalue worldly existence. The Christian emphasis on divine transcendence can thus be seen as a form of nihilism that undermines human beauty and strength, according to Nietzsche. Therefore, the passage highlights Nietzsche’s concern that Christian morality promotes a spiritual belief system that diminishes human greatness in favor of otherworldly ideals, ultimately leading to life-denying values.

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Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of Christianity, as exemplified in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," centers on the idea that Christian moral values promote a form of life-denial that suppresses natural human instincts and vitality. The passage where the old saint states, "Now I love God; man I love not," exemplifies this critique. The saint’s love for God reflects the Christian focus on divine transcendence and spiritual purity, often at the expense of appreciation for earthly human existence. Nietzsche interprets this as a manifestation of ressentiment and moral ressentiment, which results in the suppression of human instincts such as strength, vitality, and assertions of power (Nietzsche, 1883/2006). He contends that Christian morality venerates weakness, humility, and suffering, framing these qualities as virtues, which ultimately leads to the devaluation of natural human drives that are essential for growth and vitality.

The concept of love for humanity, central to Christian teachings, is here portrayed as a double-edged sword. While compassion is celebrated, Nietzsche criticizes the denial of human flaws and imperfections, which he considers vital for authentic life. The saint’s inability to love man because of man’s imperfection echoes Nietzsche’s assertion that authentic love and affirmation of life require accepting human frailty and strength alike. Christian love, in this context, becomes a form of moral weakness, an effort to elevate spiritual ideals at the expense of embracing human instincts. Nietzsche’s critique highlights that Christian morality fosters guilt and self-denial, inhibiting individuals from realizing their full potential and affirming their biological and psychological drives (Koshy, 2010).

Additionally, Nietzsche’s critique extends to the metaphysical underpinnings of Christianity, which elevate the idea of divine justice and moral order above observable reality. Christian doctrine presents a metaphysical universe governed by divine will, where moral laws are rooted in divine commandments rather than inherent human nature or natural law. This aligns with Plato’s theory of forms, which posits transcendental ideals as more real than their earthly manifestations, and Augustine’s interpretation of divine law as a reflection of divine order (Augstine, 397/1998; Plato, 380 BCE). Nietzsche challenges this view by asserting that such metaphysical constructs distract humans from the affirmation of their immediate, earthly existence. He criticizes the metaphysical elevation of moral ideals as an exploitation that enslaves human instincts under a divine or idealist hierarchy.

In contrast, Nietzsche advocates for a reevaluation of values rooted in life-affirming principles, where the earthly and the individual take precedence over transcendental ideals. The “overman” or “Superman” becomes an existential archetype representing a being who creates their own values, affirming life in the face of meaninglessness (Nietzsche, 1883/2006). The overman is thus a symbol of the possibility of human self-overcoming and the realization of authentic power, vitality, and creativity—values that are suppressed under Christian morality. Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysical morality points toward an ethic grounded in individual strength, self-creation, and an embracing of life’s inherent chaos and imperfection.

Turning to the connection between King’s definition of a just law and the metaphysical framework of Plato and Augustine, King emphasizes that a just law aligns with moral truth—an eternal or absolute standard of justice. In his "Letter from Birmingham Jail," King states that a just law squares with moral law and uplifts human dignity. This resonates with the Platonic idea that justice corresponds to a higher, unchanging form, an abstract perfect idea that transcends human opinion (Plato, 380 BCE). Similarly, Augustine’s moral theology posits that divine law, rooted in divine justice, reflects a higher metaphysical order that guides moral reasoning (Aquinas, 1274/1947).

King’s conception of justice as connected to a higher moral law echoes these metaphysical views. He sees laws that are unjust as those that distort moral truth or violate divine or natural law, thereby creating a disconnect between human law and a universal standard of justice. This perspective elevates law beyond mere social consensus or human convention, imbuing it with a transcendental or divine authority. Such a view entails that laws must conform to a moral order that exists independently of human opinions, a fundamental tenet of metaphysical thought. Consequently, King’s argument reflects a belief that justice is rooted in an eternal moral order, and that any law that contravenes this order is inherently unjust—a metaphysical assertion about the nature and origin of justice.

References

• Augustine. (1998). Confessions. (Henry Chadwick, Trans.). Oxford University Press. (Original work published 397 AD)
• Aquinas, T. (1947). Summa Theologica. Benziger Bros.
• Nietzsche, F. (2006). Thus Spoke Zarathustra. (R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Penguin Classics. (Original work published 1883)
• Koshy, S. (2010). Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality: A philosophical analysis. Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 41, 22-45.
• Plato. (380 BCE). The Republic. (G. M. A. Grube & C. D. C. Reeve, Trans.). Hackett Publishing Company.
• King Jr., M. L. (1963). Letter from Birmingham Jail. The Atlantic Monthly, 212(2), 78–88.
• Nietzsche, F. (2006). Beyond Good and Evil. (R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Random House. (Original work published 1886)
• Nietzsche, F. (2006). The Birth of Tragedy. (R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Penguin Classics. (Original work published 1872)
• Hölderlin, F. (2004). Essays and Letters on Theory and Practice. State University of New York Press.
• MacIntyre, A. (1981). After Virtue. University of Notre Dame Press.