The Ravens Changed Their Logo For The 1999 Season But They ✓ Solved

The Ravens changed their logo for the 1999 season, but they

The Ravens changed their logo for the 1999 season, but they used the 1996–1998 logo in highlight films shown in the stadium, on their website, and on their television channel. Is the Ravens' use of the 1996–1998 logo in the highlight films protected by the fair use doctrine? Explain how the evolution of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution affects businesses and the Ravens in particular. Address the categories of intellectual property protected by the U.S. Constitution. Use at least two outside sources and APA formatting for citations and references. No abstract is needed.

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Introduction

This case study examines whether the Baltimore Ravens' use of the 1996–1998 logo in highlight films is protected by the fair use doctrine, places that question within the legal context of the Commerce Clause evolution, and summarizes which categories of intellectual property are protected by the U.S. Constitution. The analysis draws on statutory law, Supreme Court fair use precedent, and the pertinent Fourth Circuit decision addressing the Ravens' dispute with artist Art Bouchat (Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P’ship) (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 1994; 17 U.S.C. § 107, 1976).

Background and Core Legal Issues

Art Bouchat created a logo that the Ravens used in team branding during 1996–1998. When the Ravens changed their logo in 1999, highlight films that contained footage from the earlier seasons continued to display the Bouchat design. The Ravens argued their use of the earlier logo within retrospective highlight films was fair use. Fair use is a statutory defense codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107, which requires balancing four factors: (1) purpose and character of the use (including whether the use is transformative), (2) nature of the copyrighted work, (3) amount and substantiality of the portion used, and (4) effect on the market or value of the copyrighted work (17 U.S.C. § 107, 1976; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 1994).

Application of the Fair Use Factors

1. Purpose and Character. The Ravens’ highlight films were broadcast in the stadium, on the team’s website, and on its television channel—contexts that typically advance the team’s commercial interests by promoting team brand, ticket sales, and merchandise. Although the films document historical events, courts distinguish between purely informational or scholarly uses (more likely to be fair) and commercial promotional uses (less likely to be fair). Where a use is primarily commercial or not sufficiently transformative, this factor disfavors fair use (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 1994).

2. Nature of the Work. Logos are typically highly creative, graphical works that may receive robust protection under copyright and trademark law (Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 1991). Because the logo is original and expressive, the second factor leans toward protection of the original author.

3. Amount and Substantiality. The highlight films reproduced the logo intact and prominently. Use of the whole work—especially when it is the heart of the expression—cuts against fair use (Campbell, 1994).

4. Market Effect. The use of the logo in the Ravens’ commercially distributed materials likely affects the market for licensed uses of the logo and could displace potential licensing revenue to the artist. The more the impersonation or display functions as licensing-free commercial exploitation, the more this factor weighs against fair use (17 U.S.C. § 107; Feist, 1991).

Balancing these factors, courts are likely to find the Ravens’ use is not fair. Indeed, in Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P’ship, the Fourth Circuit treated the logo as protectable and examined whether the team’s use fell within fair use, considering the commercial nature of the use and whether it was transformative (Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 2001). The decision underscores that using a copyrighted logo in promotional content and distribution channels tied closely to the owner’s commercial activities is unlikely to be excused by fair use.

Commerce Clause Evolution and Its Effects on Businesses Like the Ravens

The Commerce Clause has evolved from early broad federal regulatory power (Gibbons v. Ogden) through expansive mid-20th century readings (e.g., Wickard v. Filburn) to a post-Lopez environment where some limits on federal power were reasserted (United States v. Lopez, 1995). For businesses like the Ravens, this evolution matters in two ways.

First, federal statutes that affect intellectual property and interstate commerce—such as the Copyright Act and federal broadcasting and digital distribution regulations—derive much of their practical reach from federal power to regulate commerce among the states. The team’s online streaming, merchandising, and media distribution cross state lines; thus federal laws apply and provide uniform remedies for copyright and trademark disputes (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.).

Second, the Commerce Clause’s fluctuation affects ancillary federal regulatory schemes (taxation, antitrust, and broadcasting regulation) that shape how franchises and sports teams operate nationally. Where federal authority is clear, national remedies and preemption can simplify enforcement and licensing; where federal limits are tightened, state-by-state litigation and patchwork protections can increase compliance complexity for teams operating across jurisdictions (Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824; United States v. Lopez, 1995).

Categories of Intellectual Property Protected by the Constitution

The Constitution grants Congress the power to secure exclusive rights for authors and inventors (Article I, Section 8, Clause 8), which led to the federal patent and copyright systems. The principal categories of intellectual property relevant to the Ravens’ case are:

• Copyright: protection for original artistic and graphic works, such as logos, subject to doctrines like fair use (17 U.S.C. § 107; Feist, 1991).
• Patent: protection for inventions (less relevant here).
• Trademark: not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution but protected under federal statute (Lanham Act) and state common law; trademarks protect brand identifiers such as team names and logos against consumer confusion.
• Trade secret: typically protected under state law and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act; relevant to proprietary business information rather than public logos.

Conclusion

Applying statutory fair use factors to the Ravens’ use of the 1996–1998 logo in highlight films suggests fair use is an unlikely defense given the commercial context, the complete reproduction of the logo, and the likely market effect on the artist’s licensing opportunities (Campbell, 1994; 17 U.S.C. § 107). The Commerce Clause’s historical expansion and occasional contraction matter because they determine the federal reach of intellectual property and interstate media regulations that govern sports franchises’ nationwide activities. Finally, the Constitution’s intellectual property grant underpins federal copyright and patent law while trademark and trade secret protections operate through statute and state law to protect brand assets like team logos (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Lanham Act).

References

• Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 241 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2001).
• Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
• Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
• United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
• Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
• U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Copyright and Patent Clause).
• Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1976), including § 107 (fair use).
• Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (Trademark protection).
• Nimmer, M. B. (2019). Nimmer on Copyright (Rev. ed.). Matthew Bender & Company.
• Litman, J. (2001). Digital Copyright. Prometheus Books.