The Stone: Why Our Children Don’t Think There Are Moral Fact

The Stonewhy Our Children Dont Think There Are Moral Factsby Justin P

The article discusses the influence of educational curricula on children’s understanding of moral facts, highlighting how teaching practices often conflate facts with opinions, particularly in the context of moral and value claims. Justin P. McBrayer argues that many students are taught that moral claims are merely opinions or beliefs, which undermines the recognition of moral facts and truths, and reveals a contradiction in educational messages. The article also explores the consequences of this confusion, such as moral relativism, and advocates for a more consistent understanding of facts, beliefs, and moral claims, emphasizing the importance of evidence-based reasoning in morality.

Paper For Above instruction

The discussion of moral education in contemporary schools points to a significant philosophical and ethical dilemma about how morality is understood and taught to young students. The core issue raised by Justin P. McBrayer concerns the conflation of facts and opinions within school curricula, especially regarding moral and value claims. This conflation contributes to the development of moral relativism among students, eroding the notion of objective moral truths and influencing social and political behaviors. The implications of these educational practices warrant a thorough philosophical critique, particularly through the lens of moral realism and moral relativism, and a reflection on personal stance toward moral relativism.

At the outset, McBrayer highlights a key discrepancy in education: students are systematically taught that facts are verifiable truths, while opinions are personal beliefs. They are explicitly instructed to distinguish between these categories, yet this dichotomy falters when applied to moral and value judgments. The problem arises because moral claims—such as "lying is wrong" or "all humans are equal"—are often classified as opinions or subjective beliefs, rather than as factual claims that could potentially be true or false independently of individual belief. This teaching methodology implicitly suggests that morality lacks an objective basis and is relative to individual or cultural preferences, leading to moral relativism.

The first major issue with this educational approach is the confusion between truth and proof, which McBrayer emphasizes. Facts, in his critique, should be understood as objective features of the world that can be true independently of our knowledge or proof. Proof, on the other hand, relates to our mental capacity to demonstrate or verify these facts. When students are told that facts require proof for their validity, it implies that many truths—such as the existence of extraterrestrial life—are only true if we can prove them at a given time. However, this perspective mistakenly equates the truth of a fact with our ability to demonstrate it, leading to a subjective and potentially unstable understanding of what constitutes reality.

Applying this confusion to morality further complicates the issue. When moral claims are categorized merely as opinions or beliefs, their status as potentially objective truths becomes undermined. For example, McBrayer notes that students often believe that moral claims like "it is wrong to copy homework" or "it is unjust to discriminate" are opinions because they involve values or judgments of right and wrong. Such classification implicitly denies that moral facts exist independently of individual or societal beliefs, reinforcing a form of moral relativism. This relativism suggests that moral truths are subjective, varying between cultures or individuals, thus rendering moral debates essentially meaningless or purely personal preferences.

A second critical problem arises from the practice of forcing claims into exclusive categories of fact or opinion, without acknowledging that many moral claims are hybrid in nature—they are beliefs that can be true or false based on evidence or reasoning. McBrayer illustrates this with the question, "Is the statement that George Washington was the first president a fact or opinion?" The answer is clearly a fact. However, the comparison to value judgments such as "Copying homework is wrong" reveals a misconception: textbooks often treat moral claims as opinions because they involve value judgments, but this is an overly simplistic and flawed categorization. Moral claims involve normative considerations—what ought to be done—and can be supported or refuted through evidence, reasoning, and philosophical debate, just like factual claims in science or history.

By neglecting this complexity, educational standards inadvertently promote moral skepticism or relativism, implying that morality is a matter of personal preference rather than objective truth. McBrayer points out that such an approach damages the moral fabric of society because it fosters moral ambiguity in critical issues such as justice, rights, and human dignity. When children grow up believing that moral principles are subjective opinions, they may lack the motivation or moral conviction to oppose wrongful acts or uphold justice, which requires a belief in moral facts that transcend individual opinions.

Considering the broader societal implications, McBrayer argues that acknowledging moral facts is essential for social cohesion and ethical accountability. For instance, believing that murder is inherently wrong—independent of cultural attitudes—is fundamental to justice systems and human rights. If moral facts do not exist, then moral outrage, condemnation, and legal action become unjustified or arbitrary. The inconsistency between teaching that there are no moral facts and simultaneously urging moral behavior demonstrates a fundamental contradiction. It suggests that the moral standards teachers uphold are subjective opinions, yet somehow expects children to adhere to certain moral values—this inconsistency undermines the credibility of moral education and weakens societal moral standards.

Arguably, the heart of McBrayer's critique lies in advocating for a coherent, evidence-based understanding of morality—one that recognizes some moral claims as objectively true, based on rational inquiry and moral reasoning. A realist perspective posits that moral facts are grounded in reality, much like scientific facts, and can be discovered through careful reasoning. Relative to this, moral claims about human rights, justice, and equality are not merely opinions but are rooted in objective moral truths that deserve recognition and respect.

Reflecting on personal stance, I reject moral relativism because I believe that certain moral truths are objective and discoverable. Moral relativists argue that moral judgments are relative to cultural, individual, or societal preferences; however, this view leads to moral nihilism or indifference, where atrocities like genocide or slavery are justified if culturally accepted. Recognizing moral facts does not diminish cultural diversity but underscores the universality of fundamental human rights and the necessity of moral reasoning based on rational evidence. For instance, the universal condemnation of torture or slavery across cultures points toward an underlying recognition of objective moral invalidity of such practices.

In conclusion, McBrayer’s article emphasizes the importance of educational clarity regarding the nature of facts and opinions, especially concerning moral claims. Teaching children that moral claims are merely opinions fosters moral relativism and societal irresponsibility, undermining the foundation for justice and human dignity. A more nuanced, evidence-based approach that recognizes some moral claims as objective truths can foster moral integrity and social cohesion. Personally, I contend that moral facts exist, and acknowledging them is essential for moral and societal progress. Rejecting moral relativism aligns with a commitment to rational inquiry, moral consistency, and universal human rights.

References

• McBrayer, Justin P. (2015). Why Our Children Don’t Think There Are Moral Facts. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com
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