Theories Of Accident Causation Test ✓ Solved

Theories Of Accident Causation Tem

Over the years, several theories of accident causation have evolved that attempt to explain why accidents occur. Today, I would like to discuss about accident/incident theory of accident causation. This theory is an extension of human factors theory. A variety of pressures such as deadlines, peer pressure, and budget factors can lead to unsafe behavior. Overload of work, ergonomic traps or managerial error leads to human error.

Incident theory of accident causation mostly happen when the management systems fail. We can talk about the management where they do not establish a comprehensive safety policy. Also, that place where employees do not receive proper orientation and are not given sufficient safety training. Link to Accident Publication Summary of Accident This incident happened in a plant operated, owned and managed by Union Carbide India Limited. On 3rd December, 1984, methyl isocyanate gas was leaked form the plant which results death toll of approx. 5200 and many thousands to permanent and partial disability. It was concluded that the accident was caused by the excessive amount of water that enter the plant’s tank which caused a spike in temperature to over 212-degree Fahrenheit and ultimately increase in pressure causing the massive release of gas. During investigation, it was reported that employees discovered initial leaked which they decided to deal after the tea break. In the next hour, the reaction in storage tank went out of control. The leak occurred after an untrained worker was ordered to wash out the pipe that had not been properly sealed, which was breach to the plant rules.

Relation Between Theory and Accident Accident/ incident theory of accident causation refers to the human error which leads to the unsafe behavior and cause accidents. According to this theory, accidents happen when the system fails to operate such as in this case. Employee do not have any idea if the pipe was fully sealed or not because he was not given proper orientation and sufficient safety training. According to this theory, the system fails when the safety procedures such as inspection, correction, and investigation are ignored or given insufficient time. Exactly same case was with this incident. Employees were aware about water leak which they ignored and went for a tea break. Within an hour, the plant was out of control which damages the plant including the deaths of thousands.

Sample Paper For Above instruction

The Bhopal Gas Tragedy: An Illustration of Accident Causation Theory

In the realm of industrial safety, understanding the causes of accidents is paramount to preventing future tragedies. The Bhopal gas leak disaster of December 1984 stands as a stark reminder of how systemic failures and human error converge to produce catastrophic consequences. This paper explores the incident through the lens of the accident/incident theory of accident causation, emphasizing the critical role of management lapses, insufficient safety training, and human factors in precipitating the disaster.

The incident occurred at the Union Carbide India Limited pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, where a leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas resulted in the deaths of approximately 5,200 individuals and left thousands more with long-term disabilities. Investigations revealed that the disaster was primarily caused by a series of management failures, including inadequate safety measures, poor maintenance practices, and lack of proper safety training for workers. The plant was designed with safety protocols that were either ignored or not properly implemented, illustrating systemic shortcomings that align with the accident causation theory.

According to the accident/incident theory, accidents often transpire when systemic failures and human errors intersect. In the Bhopal case, process safety systems such as vent gas scrubbers and safety relief valves malfunctioned or were bypassed due to poor maintenance and operational oversight. Additionally, the workers' lack of proper training and awareness about the hazards contributed to unsafe behaviors. For instance, the workers were aware of a water leak in the storage tank but chose to ignore it, believing it was insignificant. This decision exemplifies unsafe behavior fueled by inadequate training and unsafe organizational culture, leading to the escalation of the leak into a full-blown disaster.

The root causes of the disaster can be traced to management decisions that prioritized cost-cutting and production over safety. For example, the plant’s safety systems were not properly maintained, and the emergency response mechanisms were inadequate. Moreover, the safety culture was weak, and employees were not sufficiently trained to recognize or respond to potential hazards. The incident underscores how systemic failures—lack of safety policies, poor training, ineffective maintenance, and organizational neglect—created the conditions for human errors to result in a catastrophic event. These elements are central to the accident/incident theory, which posits that accidents are often the culmination of active failures (unsafe acts) and latent conditions (systemic flaws).

The tragic Bhopal incident demonstrates the importance of a comprehensive safety management system, robust training programs, and a proactive safety culture. Implementing rigorous safety procedures, regular inspections, and emergency preparedness can mitigate the human and systemic faults that lead to disasters. The incident also underscores the need for organizations to foster an environment where safety is prioritized, and employees are empowered and equipped to identify and address potential hazards. Ultimately, applying the accident causation theory to the Bhopal disaster highlights how systemic organizational lapses, combined with human errors, can culminate in irreversible tragedy, emphasizing the vital importance of safety at all levels of industrial operations.

References

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