Tietenberg And Lewis Discuss The Tragedy Of The Commons
Tietenberg And Lewis Discuss The Tragedy Of The Commons In Chapter 2
Tietenberg and Lewis discuss the tragedy of the commons in Chapter 2, a situation that exists in many open access fisheries. For this week’s forum, please address the following questions after looking at the videos listed below. Why is open access fishing a problem from both an economic and environmental perspective? What policies can be used to address these problems? Are there government policies intended to help fishermen that can actually make things worse? 300 word minimum Plagiarism free At least 2 scholarly sources CSF Video – Intro to Fisheries Management CSF Video – Maximum Economic Yield CSF Video – A Closer Look at Fisheries CSF Video – Fisheries Subsidies and Taxes CSF Video – Individual and Transferable Quotas
Paper For Above instruction
The tragedy of the commons, as discussed by Tietenberg and Lewis in Chapter 2, exemplifies the challenge of managing shared resources like fisheries that are open access. In open access fisheries, no single entity owns the resource, leading to overexploitation driven by individual incentives. From an economic perspective, this results in the "tragedy" because fishers pursue maximal catches without regard for sustainability, leading to depletion of fish stocks. Economically, this results in inefficient resource allocation, diminishing future yields and reducing overall economic welfare (Gordon, 1954). Environmentally, overfishing devastates marine ecosystems, reduces biodiversity, and can cause the collapse of fish populations, ultimately threatening the resilience of aquatic environments (Clark, 2010).
Several policies have been proposed and implemented to address these problems. One prominent approach is the implementation of catch limits and quotas, which restrict total allowable catches to sustainable levels. For example, Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), as explained in the CSF video on this topic, offer transferable rights to fishers, incentivizing efficient harvests and stock conservation (Arnason & Antón, 2021). Additionally, economic instruments such as taxes on fishing effort or subsidies to promote sustainable practices can align individual incentives with resource preservation. The CSF video on fisheries subsidies emphasizes that subsidies often exacerbate overfishing by encouraging excessive fishing effort, but targeted taxes on effort can help mitigate this issue (Sumaila et al., 2019).
However, some government policies may inadvertently worsen the situation. For instance, certain subsidies aimed at supporting fishermen, such as fuel subsidies, can lead to increased fishing effort, pressure on stocks, and environmental degradation (Sumaila et al., 2019). Thus, well-intentioned policies need careful design to prevent unintended consequences. Sustainable fisheries management requires a combination of scientifically based quotas, economic incentives, and vigilant regulation to balance economic viability with ecological health (FAO, 2021). Effective governance and international cooperation are essential to ensure the longevity of marine resources.
References
- Arnason, R., & Antón, J. (2021). Fisheries Economics and Management. Routledge.
- Clark, C. W. (2010). Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable Resources. Wiley.
- FAO. (2021). The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2021. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
- Gordon, H. S. (1954). The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery. Journal of Political Economy, 62(2), 124–142.
- Sumaila, U. R., et al. (2019). Rationalizing fisheries subsidies to achieve sustainability. Nature Communications, 10(1), 1-7.