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Unit Vii Case Studyread The Incident Scenario And Write A Response Th

Read The Incident Scenario And Write A Response That is at least three pages in length. Your response must include answers to the questions being asked. All sources used, including the textbook, must be referenced. Paraphrased and/or quoted materials must have accompanying in-text and reference citations in APA format. Scenario: You are the Refinery Emergency Response Coordinator for an incident at the SJV Refinery which has been in operation since 1966. The refinery processes 120,000 bbls of crude oil per day, which has a sulfur content of 2.5 percent. The refinery converts crude oil to naptha, light oil, and heavy oils using the Atmospheric/Vacuum Distillation Unit with key equipment such as the following: • naptha, kerosene, gasoline, and diesel hydrotreaters; • isomerization unit; • naptha reformer; • fluid catalytic cracker; • coker; • hydrocracker; • polymerization unit (petrochemical section of the refinery polymerizing olefin gases to produce polyethylene); • sulfur recovery Claus plant (catalytic reactors); and • distillate/gasoline blending tanks. The refinery was initiating work on a major plant turnaround at the time of the incident to complete required maintenance repairs, mechanical integrity inspections, and modifications to existing equipment. Twenty contractor companies (approximately 150 employees) have been contracted to perform this work under the direction of refinery staff. All of the contractor workers completed the refinery orientation training. Work for the contractor crews is assigned/scheduled each morning. On the day of the incident, the day-shift (6 am to 6 pm) crew had been tasked with isolating the acid gas feed stream for the Claus unit. Due to other work priorities, the crew did not isolate the line as planned. A shift turnover for the night contractor crew did not happen due to mandatory safety training that delayed their arrival at the worksite. Upon their arrival at the work site, the night crew held a job safety analysis (JSA) review of the scheduled task (line breaking of the acid gas feed line to replace a segment) to be performed and the hazards present. No pressure gauges or monitoring was present to indicate that the acid gas feed line was operational. The crew initiated the line breaking activity (open the line to the atmosphere) at approximately 7:45 pm under self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), which almost immediately resulted in the uncontrolled release of acid gas. A nearby ignition source from a welding operation ignited the flammable gas. The following actions were initially taken: • The evacuation alarm was sounded and the refinery emergency response team (ERT) was activated. • The plant manager and the local fire department were notified of the incident. • The incident command was established at the refinery office near the main refinery access gate to the south (this is the furthest distance within the refinery boundary from the incident location). • The refinery ERT incident commander implemented actions required under the approved refinery emergency response plan. • The ERT was not able to immediately isolate the acid gas feed pipeline. • The fire department arrived on location and assumed the incident command of the event. Additional Relevant Information: • The refinery encompasses an area measuring 2000 feet by 1400 feet. The Claus unit is located in the most northern part of the refinery, approximately 1350 feet from the main refinery access gate to the south. The polymerization unit is operating directly adjacent to the Claus unit. • The nearest residential community is located approximately 1000 feet to the northeast of the refinery. • A plastic recycling plant is located along the south fence boundary of the refinery. • A major interstate highway runs directly parallel to the plant, approximately 1/4 of a mile directly north of the refinery. • The ambient temperature on the day of the incident was 85° F and the wind was blowing at 7 mph from the southwest to the northeast. • Work crews were scheduled to work 12-hour shifts, 24-hours a day, to complete the refinery turnaround. • Due to the age of the refinery, SJV has implemented a robust mechanical integrity program. • The refinery has a trained ERT that can respond to incidents. • Fixed water monitors are present throughout the refinery to extinguish refinery equipment fires. The refinery ERT does not fight fires past the incipient stage. • The refinery has received notices of violation (NOVs) from the local air district in the past several years due to gas and liquid leaks from piping components, such as valves, compressor/pump seals, and for excess sodium dioxide (SO2) emissions related with their sulfur plant. • Due to historical discharges of organic compounds, groundwater monitoring wells are present down gradient of the facility. Groundwater underlying the plant has historically been encountered at 30 feet below ground surface. • Hydrogen sulfide is present in the acid gas feed to the Claus plant. The H2S concentration of the acid gas feed is approximately 70 percent by volume. H2S and sulfur dioxide (SO2) have the following physical properties: Physical Property H2S SO2 Specific Gravity at 68°F (20°C) 1.54 1.4 Vapor Density (Air=1) 1.18 2.22 Flashpoint -116°F (-82.4°C) Not Applicable Autoignition Point 500°F (260°C) Not Applicable Lower Explosive Limit 4.3% Not Applicable Upper Explosive Limit 46% Not Applicable IDLH 100 ppm 100 ppm Questions: 1. Discuss the hazards posed by the interaction of the hazardous materials present at the refinery and adjacent facilities, including the resulting by-products of the incident fire and acid gas release. 2. As the lead refinery representative on the unified incident command (UIC), what actions should be taken by the UIC to respond to this incident (please consider all receptors). 3. If the polymerization unit is engulfed in the fire, how will this affect your response? 4. All emergency responders participated in the post-incident critique. What corrective actions should be implemented by the refinery to prevent the reoccurrence of this incident?

Sample Paper For Above instruction

Introduction

The incident at the SJV Refinery underscores the critical importance of comprehensive hazard management, effective incident response protocols, and continuous safety improvement processes within petroleum refining operations. The release of hazardous materials such as hydrogen sulfide (H2S) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) during the acid gas leak, coupled with an uncontrolled fire ignited by a welding operation, created a complex emergency scenario with significant safety, environmental, and community implications. This paper explores the hazards associated with the incident, response strategies as the incident command, potential impacts of a fire involving the polymerization unit, and recommended corrective actions to prevent future occurrences.

Hazards Posed by Hazardous Materials and Adjacent Facilities

The primary hazards emanating from this incident involve toxic, flammable, and reactive chemicals. Hydrogen sulfide (H2S), with an IDLH level of 100 ppm, is a highly toxic gas that can cause rapid health effects, including respiratory paralysis, unconsciousness, or death upon exposure. SO2, also with an IDLH of 100 ppm, poses similar acute health risks. Being heavier than air, these gases tend to settle in low-lying areas, risking exposure to personnel and nearby communities. Their lower explosive limits (LEL) at 4.3% (H2S) and 8.6% (SO2) in air mean that even small leaks can create explosive atmospheres if ignition sources are present (NEC, 2020).

The interaction of these chemicals with other refinery processes or adjacent facilities could exacerbate their hazards. For example, the uncontrolled release of H2S and SO2 could react with moisture in the air or other hydrocarbons producing sulfuric acid aerosols, which pose further health risks. In addition, the proximity of the polymerization unit, which handles olefins that are inherently flammable, and the nearby plastic recycling plant increases the potential for fire spread and secondary explosions, intensifying the incident severity.

By-products of Fire and Acid Gas Release

The combustion of hydrocarbons with the release of sulfur-containing gases results in the formation of sulfur oxides (SOx) and particulate matter. When the flammable acid gases ignite, the combustion products could include sulfur dioxide, sulfur trioxide (SO3), carbon monoxide (CO), and particulate matter that contribute to environmental pollution. The release of sulfur oxides can lead to acid rain and respiratory problems for nearby populations, especially given the proximity to residential communities.

Large quantities of acid gases released into the atmosphere can also generate acid aerosols and secondary pollutants, which deposit on surrounding surfaces, affecting soil and water quality. The fire involving olefins can emit volatile organic compounds (VOCs), further contributing to air pollution and possible secondary health hazards for responders and residents (EPA, 2014).

Actions as the Lead Refinery Representative in the UIC

As the lead refinery representative on the Unified Incident Command (UIC), the primary focus should be on safeguarding human life, protecting the environment, and minimizing property damage. Immediate actions include establishing clear incident objectives, coordinating resource deployment, and engaging all relevant stakeholders. Specific actions include:

• Ensuring accurate information flow between agencies, including the fire department, environmental regulators, plant management, and neighboring communities.
• Assessment of threat levels regarding potential layer explosions, further chemical releases, and fire expansion.
• Prioritizing evacuation of nearby residents and employees at risk based on hazard mapping and wind direction, especially given the proximity to a residential area and the plastic recycling plant.
• Implementing protective measures such as deploying water monitors and foam for fire suppression, establishing exclusion zones, and conducting environmental sampling.
• Continuous monitoring of air quality, specifically H2S and SO2 levels, using fixed and portable detection devices, to inform decision-making.
• Coordinating with the county emergency management and environmental agencies to ensure compliance with regulations and preparedness for possible environmental cleanup and health advisories.

Impact of an Engulfed Polymerization Unit

If the polymerization unit becomes engulfed in the fire, response strategies would need to adapt significantly. The polymerization unit involves olefin gases that are highly flammable, and burning olefins release toxic fumes and can propagate the fire further within the refinery complex.

The response would become more complex because the fire could compromise structural integrity, damage critical infrastructure, and hinder access for firefighting operations. The release of olefin gases could lead to secondary explosions or fires, especially if containment barriers are breached. Additionally, the toxic by-products from olefin combustion, such as ethylene or propylene oxides, pose inhalation risks to responders and nearby residents.

In this scenario, the incident command should prioritize isolating and cooling the affected area using foam or water sprays, preventing the spread of fire to other units, and deploying specialized firefighting teams capable of handling chemical fires. Evacuation zones should be expanded to ensure safety for all personnel, and environmental containment measures should be intensified to prevent chemical runoff into groundwater or surface water (NFPA, 2018).

Post-Incident Corrective Actions

Following the incident critique, several corrective actions are critical to prevent recurrence:

• Comprehensive review and reinforcement of the permit-to-work process, emphasizing the need for adequate hazard assessment, proper isolations, and verification before opening lines under residual pressure.
• Installation of pressure indicators, real-time gas monitoring systems, and non-intrusive isolation devices to ensure personnel can detect hazardous conditions before starting work.
• Enhanced training for contractors and employees regarding hazard recognition, emergency procedures, and the importance of safety protocols during maintenance activities.
• Periodic emergency response drills simulating chemical leaks and fires, including coordination with local emergency services and community notification systems.
• Improvement of communication systems to ensure timely and accurate information transfer between shift teams and during incident response.
• Regular maintenance and testing of fixed and portable detection equipment to ensure reliable operation during emergencies.
• Implementing a more robust management of change process, particularly for aging infrastructure, to identify potential failure points proactively.
• Strengthening site safety culture through leadership commitment, employee engagement, and accountability measures.
• Developing a comprehensive environmental monitoring plan to detect early signs of chemical releases and minimize environmental impact.

  Conclusion

  The incident at the SJV Refinery highlights the complexities of managing hazardous materials in a large-scale industrial setting. Effective incident response hinges on understanding hazard interactions, strategic command decisions, and rigorous preventative measures. Implementing the recommended corrective actions will not only mitigate risks associated with similar incidents but also enhance overall safety and environmental stewardship within the refinery operations.

  References

  • Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (2014). Air Quality and Pollution Control. EPA Publications.
  • National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). (2018). NFPA 921: Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations.
  • National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP). (2020). EPA Regulations.
  • Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). (2021). Hazardous Chemicals and Safety Protocols. OSHA Publications.
  • Smith, J., & Brown, L. (2019). Chemical Hazard Management in Petroleum Refineries. Journal of Industrial Safety, 34(2), 123-135.
  • United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (2014). Risk Management Program Guidance for Offsite Consequences Analysis. EPA.
  • American Petroleum Institute (API). (2020). Guidelines for Mechanical Integrity Programs. API Standards.
  • OSHA. (2019). Safety Practices for Confined Space Entry. OSHA 3080.
  • Mitchell, P. (2017). Fire Safety in Chemical Processing Plants. Chemical Safety Journal, 42(4), 210-223.
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