Week 2 Project: Warrantless Search Of Vehicles And Officers

Week 2 Project: Warrantless Search of Vehicles An officer noticed a car with its tail light out and stopped it. He asked the driver for license and registration and noticed that there was a passenger in the car. The driver informed the officer that he was driving his friend home and the car belonged to his friend. The officer asked both of them to come out of the car and look at the tail light. When they stepped out, the officer noticed that the man who owned the car was intoxicated. He stumbled while stepping out of his car and had slurred speech. The officer flashed his light around in the car and saw a few empty beer cans. The owner was sitting on the grass near the car and looking nauseous. The officer asked him if it was all right to look inside his car. The owner put his hand up, waved, and said "Whatever, go." Then the officer searched the car. He looked in the area between the seats and reached under them. There he found crack cocaine rocks. After this discovery, he arrested both the driver and the owner of the car. Prepare a report in Microsoft Word to advise the prosecution on the admissibility of the evidence. Cover the following points: Was the officer given proper consent to search the car under Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973)? Explain. Should the officer have asked the driver or car owner for consent under Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990)? Why? If proper consent was provided, was the officer allowed to search under the car seat under Florida v. Jimeno? Explain. What factors could be added to the scenario to strengthen the admissibility of the cocaine seizure? Why? What factors, if added, would weaken the admissibility of the cocaine seizures? Explain. Name your file SU_MCJ6410_W2_A2_LastName_FirstInitial.doc. Submit your document to the Submissions Area by the due date assigned.

Paper For Above instruction

The question of whether the evidence obtained from a warrantless search of the vehicle is admissible in court hinges upon the constitutionality of the search under established legal standards concerning consent and reasonable searches. This case involves analyzing the legality of the officer’s search based on consent, the circumstances under which consent was given, and the relevant case law that dictates permissible searches without a warrant.

Initially, the primary legal consideration under Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) is whether the officer was given proper voluntary consent to search the vehicle. In this scenario, the officer asked the owner if he could look inside the car. The owner responded with a wave and "Whatever, go," which can be interpreted as consent under the reasonable person standard. However, the voluntariness of this consent must be evaluated. The Supreme Court emphasized that consent must be given freely and voluntarily, without coercion, intimidation, or deception. Given the context—an officer observing signs of intoxication, minor exposure of empty beer cans, and the owner’s apparent nausea—there is a question whether these circumstances could impair the voluntariness of consent. Nonetheless, since the owner expressed a willing attitude and did not explicitly refuse, courts often consider such acquiescence as valid consent. Therefore, under Schneckloth, if the consent was freely given, the search would be lawful.

The second consideration involves Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990), which clarified the circumstances under which consent is valid, especially when another individual may have authority or apparent authority over the property. Under this case, consent by a person who does not have actual authority may still be considered valid if the officer reasonably believed the individual had authority. In this case, the owner’s apparent consent, given after the officer’s request, and the fact that the driver also identified the car owner, could support an argument that the officer’s reliance on consent was reasonable. If the officer reasonably believed the owner had authority to consent to the search, then the search would be justified under Illinois v. Rodriguez.

Assuming proper consent was obtained, the subsequent search of the interior of the vehicle, including under the seats, is evaluated under Florida v. Jimeno (1991). In Jimeno, the Court held that if the search is within the scope of the consent given, then the evidence obtained is admissible. The officer’s search of the area between the seats and under them can be justified if it aligns with the object of the consent—namely, inspecting the vehicle for contraband or evidence of illegal activity. Given that the owner indicated "go ahead," and the area under the seats is commonly associated with hiding contraband, such a search is likely within the scope of consent, and the evidence obtained—crack cocaine rocks—would be admissible.

To strengthen the admissibility of the cocaine seizure, additional factors could be introduced. For example, the officer could have expressed his intent to search in a specific manner, such as explicitly stating he would search under the seats and interior compartments, thereby clarifying the scope. Furthermore, establishing the owner’s awareness of the illegal activity or possession of drugs could bolster the case. The owner’s suspicious behavior, smell of alcohol, and the visible empty cans already suggest illicit activity, which could be used as supporting evidence to justify the search. Additionally, if the officer had probable cause based on the owner’s intoxication and the visible empty beer cans, this could further legitimize the search without explicit consent.

Conversely, certain factors could weaken admissibility if added to the scenario. For example, if the owner had explicitly refused consent or appeared mentally incapacitated, the validity of the consent would be compromised. If the officer had not articulated the scope or had conducted the search beyond what was reasonably implied by the consent, the evidence might be suppressed. If the search was performed without regard to the owner’s statements or if the officer fabricated or exaggerated his claim to have obtained consent, the marketability of the cocaine evidence would be challenged. Also, the presence of more clear and explicit warnings of the owner’s rights prior to the search—or a lack thereof—could impact admissibility under the Fourth Amendment.

References

• Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
• Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990)
• Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)
• Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)
• Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009)
• United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)
• Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996)
• Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
• Maryland v. Dyson, 481 U.S. 264 (1987)
• Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987)