Writing Assignment 5: Game Theory In The Movie A Beautiful M

Writing Assignment 5 Game Theory In The Movie A Beautiful Mind

Writing Assignment #5: Game Theory in the movie “A Beautiful Mind”. You are to watch a video clip, which is a part of the movie “A Beautiful Mind”. This is one movie you must see. A Beautiful Mind loosely chronicles the life of John Nash, a mathematician at Princeton who changed the way economists view the world. In the movie, Nash’s eureka moment occurs while he is with his friends in a bar. Five girls enter the establishment, and Nash and his friends start contemplating who will get the blonde. Eventually, the conversation turns to Adam Smith and one of his famous quotes, “In competition, individual ambition serves the common good.” “Every man for himself, gentlemen,” says one of Nash’s friends. And another adds, “And those who strike out are stuck with their friends.” Eventually, the blonde looks over at Nash, and he joins the conversation saying, “Adam Smith needs revision.” Nash goes on to state that no one should pursue the blonde because they will all end up interfering with one another and no one will get her. What’s worse, none of her friends will want them either because no one likes to be the second choice. However, if they all stay away from the blonde, no one interferes, no one gets insulted, and that is the only way to “win.” Nash’s friends accuse him of making an attempt to get the girl all to himself, but Nash continues to make his point. He asserts that what Adam Smith said was incomplete. Instead of everyone in a group doing what is best for himself, everyone should do what is best for himself and the group. At this point, Nash rushes out of the bar and spends the next few months writing his treatise on general equilibrium theory. Once you finish watching the video, you are to answer the following question and submit your answer, and reasons by uploading your document on Canvas.

Question:

The video clip seems to claim that what John Nash described to his friends was the Nash equilibrium that no one should pursue the blonde. Please discuss why this cannot be the Nash Equilibrium according to what we learned from this module.

Paper For Above instruction

The scenario depicted in the movie “A Beautiful Mind” presents a classic example often discussed in game theory, particularly in relation to Nash equilibrium. The group’s decision not to pursue the blonde, in theory, might seem like a stable strategic outcome, but in fact, it cannot be a true Nash equilibrium. To understand why, we must analyze the fundamental principles of Nash equilibrium and how they apply to this situation.

Nash equilibrium occurs when no player can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy, given the strategies chosen by the other players. In the context of the scenario, the strategies include whether to pursue or not pursue the blonde, and their respective payoffs depend on the choices of others. If all players agree to stay away from the girl, each individual’s payoff remains the same—no one gets what they might desire, but importantly, no one can do better by changing their strategy alone.

However, the critical flaw in considering this “stay-away” outcome as a Nash equilibrium is that individual incentives still play a pivotal role. If some players decide to pursue the blonde despite the group's agreement, they might increase their chances of winning her. This incentive to deviate exists because the payoff for pursuing the girl could be higher than abstaining, especially if others are staying away. Conversely, if everyone fears that others will pursue her, they might all choose to interfere, risking a clash where no one gains. This incentive to deviate from the collective strategy precludes the “no-pursuing” outcome from being a true equilibrium.

Furthermore, in game theory, the equilibrium relies on the idea that players are rational and strategy-proof in the sense that no player benefits from unilaterally altering their choice given others’ strategies. But in this scenario, since individual players can benefit from deviating—by trying to pursue the blonde alone or in smaller numbers—the “stay away” outcome is unstable. This instability is what characterizes a non-equilibrium state in game theory, as players would be tempted to deviate, disrupting the presumed equilibrium.

Additionally, the concept of Pareto efficiency must be considered. The group’s collective decision not to pursue the girl is not Pareto optimal if at least one individual could be better off by pursuing her, while others' outcomes remain unchanged or improve. Therefore, rational individual incentives and the potential for unilateral gains mean that the “no pursuit” scenario cannot constitute a stable Nash equilibrium in this context.

In conclusion, the scenario where no one pursues the blonde cannot be a Nash equilibrium because individual incentives to defect exist, making the outcome unstable. Rational players will always have an incentive to deviate from the collective agreement, seeking to improve their own payoff, which undermines the stability required for a true Nash equilibrium. This analysis highlights the importance of strategic stability and rationality principles in understanding such social dilemmas in game theory.

References

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