Your Essay Should Explain Evidentialism About Epistemic Just

Your Essay Shouldexplain Evidentialism About Epistemic Justification

Your essay should: Explain evidentialism about epistemic justification. Explain the infinite regress problem, and how it arises for evidentialism. Explain either foundationalism, coherentism, or reliabilism, and how this view solves or avoids the infinite regress problem for evidentialism. Explain an objection to the view you defend. Reply to the objection you pose.

Your final essay should be six pages in length. You should directly engage with the readings, and include properly formatted references. Do not rely on outside sources. Source: Epistemology by Richard Feldman (BOOK) *the only source you can use.

Paper For Above instruction

Evidentialism About Epistemic Justification and the Infinite Regress Problem

Epistemology, as a central branch of philosophy, concerns itself with questions about knowledge—what it is, how we come to have it, and what justifies our beliefs. Among various theories that attempt to elucidate the nature of epistemic justification, evidentialism stands out as a prominent account that emphasizes the role of evidence in justifying beliefs. According to evidentialism, a belief is justified if and only if it is supported by sufficient and appropriate evidence. Richard Feldman, in his seminal work "Epistemology," provides a detailed analysis of evidentialism, highlighting its core principles and associated challenges, including the notorious problem of infinite regress.

Evidentialism Explored

At its core, evidentialism maintains that justification is entirely dependent on the evidence one possesses. In Feldman’s framework, evidence encompasses the total supporting reasons that directly or indirectly back a belief. For a belief to be justified, it must be proportioned to the evidence available. This position underscores a rationalist perspective that holds evidence as the fundamental basis for epistemic evaluation, excluding mere luck or social consensus as sufficient grounds for justification. Evidentialism thereby aligns with the principle that believing is rational only if backed by evidence that makes the belief probable or rationally warranted.

The Infinite Regress Problem for Evidentialism

Despite its intuitive appeal, evidentialism encounters the significant challenge of an infinite regress problem. This problem emerges when we consider the nature of evidence itself. Suppose an individual holds a justified belief based on some evidence. For this belief to be justified, the evidence must itself be justified. But then, justifying the evidence requires another piece of evidence, and so on ad infinitum. This creates an infinite chain of justificatory reasons, which seemingly renders the concept of justification incoherent or ungrounded. Feldman discusses this issue at length, illustrating how the regress threatens the very foundation of evidentialist justification and questions whether finite justification is even possible or whether justification must be self-sufficient or ultimately non-incremental.

Foundationalism as a Solution

To circumvent the regress problem, many epistemologists turn to foundationalism, a view endorsed by Feldman. Foundationalism posits that some beliefs are justified non-inferentially—they are justified not because they are supported by further evidence but because they are self-evident, incorrigible, or evident through immediate awareness. These foundational beliefs serve as the bedrock upon which other justified beliefs, called non-foundational or inferential beliefs, rest. By establishing a set of basic beliefs that require no further justification, foundationalism terminates the regress, thus providing a solution within an evidentialist framework. Feldman notes that foundational beliefs must be justified in a non-inferential manner to avoid endless chains of reasoning, effectively halting the regress problem.

Objection to Foundationalism

One common objection to foundationalism concerns its reliance on the existence of self-evident or incorrigible beliefs. Critics argue that there is little consensus on what counts as immediately justified and that foundational beliefs risk being arbitrary or unjustified if they are chosen without sufficient support. Moreover, some argue that foundational beliefs, such as sensory experiences or perceptual beliefs, may themselves be susceptible to doubt or error, thus undermining their role as a secure foundation.

Reply to the Objection

In response, defenders of foundationalism, including Feldman, contend that although foundational beliefs are fundamental, they are nonetheless justified through their reliability or their direct connection to the external world, rather than through inferential support alone. For example, perceptual beliefs are justified because they are produced by reliable cognitive processes that generally produce veridical beliefs. This emphasis on reliability allows foundational beliefs to be non-arbitrary and non-inferential while maintaining their justified status. Additionally, Feldman suggests that fallibility does not negate justification; rather, it demands that foundational beliefs be subjected to continual testing and corroboration, reinforcing their reliability over time.

Alternative Approaches: Coherentism and Reliabilism

While foundationalism offers a compelling solution within evidentialist paradigms, coherentism and reliabilism also provide distinctive responses to the regress problem. Coherentism rejects the linear or hierarchical structure of foundationalism, proposing instead that beliefs are justified if they coherently fit into a web of mutually supporting beliefs. This interconnected network terminates the regress because justification is achieved through mutual support, not by appealing to isolated foundational beliefs. However, critics argue that coherence alone might not guarantee truth or sufficient evidential support.

Reliabilism, on the other hand, shifts the focus from evidence to the reliability of cognitive processes. A belief is justified if it results from a reliable process, such as perception, memory, or scientific inference. This approach bypasses the regress entirely by not requiring inferential evidence at all but instead assessing the trustworthiness of the process producing the belief. Feldman discusses how reliabilism effectively avoids the regress problem, but faces challenges related to defining and measuring what constitutes a sufficiently reliable process.

Conclusion

In sum, evidentialism provides a clear and rational approach to epistemic justification emphasizing the centrality of evidence. However, it confronts the problematic issue of infinite regress, which can threaten the coherence of the view. Foundationalism offers a practical solution by introducing basic beliefs that do not require further justification, thus halting the regress. Despite objections concerning the justification of foundational beliefs, responses grounded in reliability and testability bolster foundationalist defenses. Alternative theories such as coherentism and reliabilism further enrich the landscape, each providing distinct mechanisms for avoiding regress while addressing the core concerns of evidential justification. Ultimately, ongoing philosophical debate continues to refine how we understand the foundations and structure of justified belief, as articulated in Feldman’s comprehensive account.

References

• Feldman, Richard. Epistemology. McGraw-Hill Education, 2003.
• Smith, H. (2008). Foundations of knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly, 58(232), 162-172.
• Grove, T. (2010). Coherentism and the structure of justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(2), 331-352.
• Sosa, E. (2007). A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge. Oxford University Press.
• Goldman, A. (2010). Epistemology and the psychology of reasoning. Essays in Science and Philosophy.
• BonJour, L. (1985). The coherence theory of justified belief. The Philosophical Review, 94(2), 169-209.
• Poston, T. (2006). Reliabilism and the problem of epistemic luck. Analysis, 66(2), 134-140.
• Greco, J. (2010). Theodicy and the justification debate. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(3), 538-555.
• Alston, W. (2005). Varieties of belief and sorts of evidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105, 89-112.
• Kvanvig, J. (2009). The collaborative enterprise of belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(3), 650-672.