Consider This Passage From Kant's Selection

Consider This Passage From The Selection From Kant In This Module

Consider this passage from the selection from Kant in this module: “The majesty of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment of life; it has its own law, even its own tribunal, and however much one wishes to mix them together, in order to offer the mixture to the sick as though it were medicine, they nevertheless soon separate of themselves; but, if they do not separate, the moral ingredient has no effect at all, and even if the physical life gained some strength in this way, the moral life would waste away beyond rescue” (pp. 40-41). Although Kant makes it explicit, the view that morality must mean something other than self-interest and acting emotionally is commonly held by many. Evaluate this view: do you agree or disagree with it, and why?

According to Nietzsche, what kind of virtues does the person who rejects “herd morality” cultivate? If we identify these virtues with Freud’s “id,” why does Freud think society tries to suppress them?

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The passage from Kant emphasizes the intrinsicly autonomous and moral nature of duty, highlighting a fundamental disconnect between moral imperatives and personal enjoyment or emotional inclinations. Kant asserts that moral law stands apart from physical or emotional life, possessing its own strict tribunal and law, which must be respected for morality to be effective. This perspective underscores the idea that morality is not rooted in self-interest or emotional fulfillment, but in a rational duty that commands obedience regardless of personal desires or passions. This view has garnered both support and criticism within philosophical discourse, as it challenges common notions that morality is intertwined with personal happiness or emotional satisfaction.

I agree with Kant’s perspective that morality should be distinguished from self-interest and emotional inclinations. My reasoning rests in the belief that moral principles should be universal and objective, not contingent upon subjective feelings or personal gains. When morality is intertwined with self-interest, it risks becoming relativistic and prone to manipulation—what benefits a person in one circumstance may not uphold moral consistency in another. Emotional motives, too, though valuable for human connection, can be fickle and influenced by biases or fleeting sentiments that threaten the stability and universality of moral judgments. Kant’s notion that moral law possesses its own independent tribunal emphasizes that moral actions derive their worth from adherence to duty, not from the emotional or physical rewards they may produce.

Furthermore, the distinction between moral duty and personal happiness echoes the ideas of deontological ethics, which prioritize duty over consequences or emotional states. This distinction fosters moral integrity by anchoring actions in principles that transcend individual inclinations, promoting justice and consistency. For example, Kant’s insistence that moral law is autonomous encourages individuals to act rightly because it is their duty, regardless of personal desires or emotional reactions that might otherwise compromise moral clarity. Such a stance is vital in a pluralistic society where moral standards must sometimes override emotional biases to ensure fairness and respect for universal human dignity.

Conversely, critics might argue that fully separating morality from self-interest and emotion renders moral acts cold or detached, neglecting the human emotional component that often underpins moral motivation. Empathy, compassion, and emotional engagement are significant in fostering moral development and social cohesion. However, these emotional qualities should complement, not replace, rational moral principles. A balanced view incorporates both Kantian duty and emotional understanding, but I maintain that the core of morality must remain rooted in rational duty to preserve its universality and objectivity.

Turning to Nietzsche’s critique of “herd morality,” he champions the cultivation of virtues by those who reject conformist, complacent morality. Nietzsche advocates for virtues associated with individual strength, self-affirmation, creativity, and the will to power, which empower the individual to transcend herdlike conformity and establish authentic values. These virtues foster independence, resilience, and a profound sense of self-overcoming—traits that enable one to live genuinely according to personal mastery rather than societal dictates.

If we interpret these virtues as aligning with Freud’s concept of the “id,” we come to see the “id” as representing the unconscious, instinctual drives that seek immediate gratification and self-fulfillment. Freud believed that society attempts to suppress these primal urges to maintain social order and cohesion. Societal constraints, such as moral codes, laws, and cultural norms, function to tame the “id” and channel its energies into socially acceptable expressions. Without such repression, society fears chaos and destructive tendencies stemming from unchecked primal drives. Therefore, the suppression of the “id” reflects an effort to balance individual instinctual desires with collective security and moral stability, often leading to internal conflict for individuals navigating these conflicting demands.

In sum, Nietzsche’s view emphasizes the importance of cultivating virtues rooted in individual strength and authenticity, distinct from herd morality, which suppresses these vital aspects of human nature. Freud’s psychological framework complements this by illustrating how society actively seeks to inhibit the more primal, instinctual parts of the psyche for the sake of social harmony. Both thinkers highlight the tension between authentic individuality and societal regulation, revealing the complexities involved in moral development and human nature’s innate tendencies.

References

• Cohen, R. (2013). Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
• Friedman, M. (2010). Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography. University of Chicago Press.
• Freud, S. (1923). The Ego and the Id. Standard Edition, Volume XIX.
• Hook, S. (2009). Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Virtue. Routledge.
• Kant, I. (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press.
• Nehamas, A. (1986). Nietzsche: Life as Literature. Harvard University Press.
• Ricoeur, P. (1992). Oneself as Another. University of Chicago Press.
• Schopenhauer, A. (1818). The World as Will and Representation. Dover Publications.
• Strauss, L. (1963). The Silent All These Years. University of Chicago Press.
• Wilson, M. (1990). Hervé’s Ethics and the Philosophical Foundations. Harvard University Press.