Theories Of International Relations And US-China Relations

Theories Of International Relations And US China Relations

Theories of international relations (IR)—namely realism, liberalism, and Marxism—offer distinct perspectives on the potential for conflict between the United States and China and how such conflicts might be managed or mitigated. This paper explores whether conflict between these two powers is inevitable, the mechanisms that might discourage such conflict, the implications of China's political evolution towards democracy, and the role of international organizations like the United Nations in preventing or resolving conflicts among great powers.

Is the conflict inevitable between the United States and China?

From a realist perspective, conflict between the United States and China appears almost inevitable. Realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of the international system, where states are principally concerned with their survival and power. Since both nations are vying for regional and global influence, their strategic interests inevitably clash, heightening the risk of rivalry and conflict. The rise of China as a global power challenges the existing unipolar dominance of the United States, prompting security dilemmas and arms races. As Mearsheimer (2001) argued, great power transitions often lead to conflict as rising powers seek to reshape the international order to their advantage, which the dominant power resists.

Contrarily, liberalism offers a more optimistic view, asserting that cooperation is possible through international institutions, economic interdependence, and shared democratic values. Liberals argue that the high costs of conflict and the mutual benefits of trade incentivize peaceful coexistence. The extensive economic interdependence between the U.S. and China, characterized by interconnected supply chains and financial ties, serves as a deterrent against conflict, aligning U.S. and Chinese interests and raising the stakes of war (Keohane & Nye, 1977).

Marxist theory introduces a class-based critique, viewing state conflicts as expressions of underlying economic interests tied to capitalism. From this perspective, the rivalry between the U.S. and China reflects global capitalist competition to control resources and markets. Conflict is thus an inherent feature of neoliberal accumulation, driven by economic imperialism and commodification, rather than a mere geopolitical rivalry (Foster, 2000). Therefore, under Marxism, conflict might be seen as less avoidable, rooted in structural economic contradictions.

If a conflict occurs in the future, are there ways to discourage them? Or are these conflicts just part of global politics between great powers?

Utilizing liberal perspectives, mechanisms such as diplomacy, international institutions, arms control agreements, and economic sanctions are vital tools to deter conflict. The existence of multilateral organizations like the United Nations can facilitate dialogue, early warning systems, and peacekeeping efforts to prevent escalation. Additionally, economic interdependence acts as a peace incentive: the costs of war are high for both sides due to complex supply chains and mutual investments (Russett & Oneal, 2001). For instance, the integration of the Chinese and global economies makes conflict costly and thus less attractive.

Realists acknowledge that such diplomatic efforts may influence behavior but contend that ultimately, power politics will dominate. They argue that great powers are unlikely to cede strategic advantages voluntarily and that balancing alliances, military build-up, and strategic ambiguity serve as key deterrents. The credible threat of military action, nuclear deterrence, and strategic partnerships can discourage conflict, although these are not foolproof, given the history of war among great powers.

From a Marxist perspective, conflict is a structural manifestation of capitalist competition and imperialism. As such, mere international agreements may not fundamentally resolve underlying economic tensions. Marxists suggest that systemic change—such as global emancipation from capitalism—is necessary to address root causes of conflict, which are embedded in economic exploitation and class struggle.

If China were to become a democracy, would conflict be more or less likely?

The transition of China towards democracy could have mixed implications according to different IR theories. Liberals posit that democratization typically leads to less war-prone behavior because democracies are more transparent, accountable, and restrained in the use of force. Democratic norms, such as respect for human rights and peaceful resolution of disputes, can lower the likelihood of conflict with other democracies and potentially with authoritarian regimes as well (Russett & O’Neill, 2001). For example, the democratic peace theory suggests that democratic states generally do not go to war with each other, potentially reducing tensions with the United States if China democratizes.

Realists, however, might argue that the shift to democracy alone does not eliminate strategic competition. Democracies still pursue national interests fiercely, and democratization may initially increase tensions as new political actors emerge and nationalistic sentiments rise. Moreover, democratic processes can generate instability during transitions, which might provoke conflicts in the short term.

Marxists would likely focus less on regime type and more on economic structures. If democratization leads to more equitable wealth distribution and less state-controlled capitalism, it could, in theory, reduce economic inequalities that stoke conflict. But if democratization strengthens capitalist interests or accelerates economic growth at the expense of marginalized groups, systemic tensions might persist or intensify.

Can international organizations (such as the United Nations) help to ameliorate the potential for great power conflict?

International organizations like the United Nations play a crucial role within liberal frameworks in promoting dialogue, mediating disputes, and providing mechanisms for peacekeeping. The UN's diplomatic functions foster multilateral negotiations and foster norms against war, helping to address misunderstandings and coordinate responses to crises (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). They can also facilitate arms control agreements, enforce sanctions, and implement post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

However, the effectiveness of the UN and similar bodies in constraining great power conflicts is limited by the sovereignty of states and the geopolitical interests of the major powers. The veto power of permanent Security Council members often hampers decisive action, leading to paralysis during critical moments. Realists contend that states will prioritize their national interests over international consensus, and major powers are unlikely to subordinate their strategic goals to UN mandates.

Despite these limitations, international organizations contribute to building trust, establishing communication channels, and creating norms that discourage unilateral coercion, thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict. A more inclusive and empowered international order with cooperative mechanisms could promote stability among great powers, although it cannot eliminate all risks inherent to anarchy and strategic competition.

Conclusion

The probability of conflict between the United States and China is complex and depends heavily on the theoretical perspective adopted. Realists emphasize the structural inevitability of conflict driven by power rivalries; liberals highlight the importance of institutions, economic ties, and democracies as deterrents; and Marxists attribute conflict to structural economic interests rooted in capitalism. While mechanisms like diplomacy, economic interdependence, and international organizations can reduce risks, structural and systemic tensions persist. The potential democratization of China might decrease conflict likelihood, but it is not a guarantee. Ultimately, managing great power rivalry requires a combination of strategic restraint, robust international cooperation, and systemic reform to address underlying economic and political tensions.

References

• Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2005). Power in International Politics. International Organization, 59(1), 39-75.
• Foster, J. B. (2000). The Great Rationality Crisis. Monthly Review, 52(8), 1-15.
• Keohane, R.O., & Nye, J.S. (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Little, Brown.
• Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company.
• Russett, B., & O'Neill, J. (2001). Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. W.W. Norton & Company.
• Russett, B., & Oneal, J. R. (2001). The Kantian Peace: The Pacific could become the first region to institutionalize peace. Foreign Affairs, 80(3), 82-97.