Introduction To Questions Often Associated With Discussions
Introductiona Question Often Associated With The Discussion Of Continu
Introduction a question often associated with the discussion of continuity of operations (COO) and continuity of government (COG) planning is the relationship of the two as they relate to each other and as they relate to an emergency operations plan (EOP) as a whole. As we have seen throughout the course so far, part of the answer relates directly to the fact that there, again, is no universally accepted set-up for an EOP. As such, the inclusion of a COO or a COG plan in an EOP specifically will vary, depending largely on the jurisdiction or organizational-structure being planned for. Successful response to a community-wide disaster requires the local emergency response system to be able to mobilize its personnel and resources rapidly.
This, in turn, requires a predetermined concept of operations and its elaboration in the jurisdiction’s EOP. This concept of operations is a summary statement of what emergency functions are to be performed and how they are accomplished. In almost every case, this demands centralized planning for command and control across a variety of local public sector, private sector, and NGOs. It also requires a strategy for coordinating their collective response, as well as specification of how extra-community resources will be mobilized and integrated into the response effort. This section discusses seven specific functions that are the core of the incident management function.
As noted in the previous chapter, the local emergency response organization is defined by the EOP in terms of the emergency functions performed, assignment of responsibility for emergency function performance to local organizations, and an explicit identification of functions performed by external organizations upon which local response is dependent. In addition, the organizational structure must be defined in terms of the title and duties of each of the positions within the emergency response system and the reporting relationships among these positions.
Agency notification and mobilization This element of incident management initiates the emergency response. Notification to the jurisdictional authorities comes from different sources, depending upon the nature of the threat.
Federal agencies usually notify a predetermined warning point—the local emergency manager or the police or fire department dispatch center. For “routine†emergencies (or for apparently routine emergencies that escalate to community-wide disasters, such as some hazmat incidents or terrorist events), dispatch centers are the most common warning points. Once the warning point is notified, it must notify other members of the emergency response organization and mobilize appropriate resources. The EOP should specify the channel (e.g., telephone, radio, fax) and title of all personnel to be contacted. The principal emergency response agencies (police, fire, and public works) operate 24 hours a day; relevant departments that do not operate around the clock should maintain continuous accessibility by assigning agency personnel to serve shifts as on call duty officers.
Whatever agency notification procedure is ultimately selected, it should be explicitly defined in the EOP and elaborated through each agency’s SOPs—including the mobilization of personnel to activate the jurisdiction’s EOC. This notification process should end only when all parties having a duty or capacity to respond have been informed. The fundamental aims of notification are to identify the organizations needed in the response, alert them to begin their own activation processes, and prepare them to initiate the emergency response.
Thus, it is necessary for emergency managers to establish explicit criteria for determining who is likely to initiate the notification process, which parties they should notify, which communications channels are available and should be used, and what information should be transmitted.
Mobilization of emergency facilities and equipment A major step in the mobilization of a jurisdiction’s emergency response organization is the activation of its EOCs. As facilities, EOCs are extremely variable. In more hazard prone (and wealthier) cities and at higher levels of government, EOCs have full time staff in permanent locations with extensive communications equipment, powerful computers, and sophisticated display screens. Such arrangements have the positive effect of creating stable, visible, ready locations for supporting disaster response operations. At the other extreme, many communities’ EOCs are temporarily converted from conference rooms by hanging some status boards on the wall and installing a few additional telephones.
This does not mean that only an expensively equipped permanent EOC is adequate. In fact, even a very basic EOC can be effective if it is based on careful analysis of the functions that will be performed there. Thus, it is more important to build a modest facility that matches the EOC’s design to its function than it is to build a large expensive facility that provides inadequate support to the emergency response organization.
Federal Implications At high levels of government, for example, where there could be a considerable number of important positions to fill and any number of services to continue, a COO and a COG would both be extensive. However, there would also be a considerable separation between the two, despite their obvious relations.
Consider, for example, the number of services provided by the federal government and the number of government constituents that could be affected by a single incident. Even if an incident could occur that would alter the ability of government officials to perform their duties permanently or temporarily, the services that are performed across the U.S. would not all necessarily be affected. The Postal Service, Social Security, and other government-based services are geographically spread enough that they would be physically capable of performing at least some of their basic functions to ensure the continuation of most services and would have the opportunity to lean on other facilities to make up for any losses (such as the use of another post office to help disseminate mail).
Similarly, if an incident were to occur that hampered a government service, such as an attack on the U.S. Mint, continuity of operations plans would need to be put in to place but federal government COG plans would not need to be utilized as most levels, depending, of course, on who, if anyone, was injured. In these cases, the ability of the U.S. Postal Service to operate is not hampered by the death of a president and the loss of the U.S. Mint building will not prevent a U.S. Senator from acting as a U.S. Senator.
In contrast, low levels of government, such as small municipal governments and small organizations, often have COO and COG plans that maintain closer relations. The inability of certain municipal personnel to perform may also hamper the services that can be performed due to limited geographical spacing and the limited number of persons capable of filling roles. Consider small municipalities that utilize a single person to fulfill multiple roles or use single facilities for multiple departments.
In my current town, for example, the town clerk and deputy town clerk both work in the same building. Should an incident occur that took out the facility and both of these wonderful ladies, there would be a gap in the fulfillment of this elected position as well as a gap in the services that only these ladies provide to the town (in this case, water billing, different licensures, and so forth). In this case, the continuity of the position within the government and the continuity of the government services have far closer relations, something that would, presumably, be reflected in planning.
Summary The relation of both of these forms of planning to an EOP is largely up to the planners of each. To be sure, both COO and COG plans are a part of the planning process but whether or not they are written as a part of the formal EOP or are written as their own documents is, again, not universally agreed upon. The most important aspect to be concerned with is whether or not the three (EOPs, COOPs, and COG plans) are in existence, well understood, and capable with working with one another, something discovered through evaluation, training, and exercise.